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Abstract
This thesis is a comparative analysis of the impact of local government re-
organisation on the overview and scrutiny functions across four unitary local
authorities in England. The creation of new unitary authorities in England in 2009
gave an opportunity to compare how they have maintained and developed
effective overview and scrutiny functions previously undertaken by the former
district and county councils. Investigating how this was achieved allowed reflection
upon New Labour’s aims and objectives within the overall local government
modernisation agenda and the wider discourse on local government, new localism
and democracy. This research contributes to the knowledge previously
established on overview and scrutiny by harnessing original empirical data from
the unitary authorities. At the time there were no in-depth studies of how the
transition to unitary status has affected and challenged patterns of overview and
scrutiny developed in local authorities after 2000. The research for the thesis
included a critical examination of the existing literature on local government and
the overview and scrutiny function, was undertaken partly as a participant
observer within the overview and scrutiny team of one of the case study authorities
and through semi-structured interviews of council members and officers.
The research found the case study authorities have developed overview and
scrutiny functions that: adhere to accepted good practice; reflect the culture of
their authorities; is understood and valued by council members and officers;
acknowledges the influence of party politics; is dependent upon dedicated officer
support and finance and are playing a significant role in meeting New Labour’s
aims of transparent, accountable and efficient local government. However it is
unclear as to whether they are contributing to ‘new localism’ given their
unsuccessful engagement of the general public and communities. The research
has also augmented the typologies of effective overview and scrutiny advocated in
the existing literature.
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1Chapter 1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to provide a contextual overview of the O&S function by
highlighting the significant developments in local government, which have led to its
inception. It will then identify relevant concepts and theories pertaining to local
government and O&S; specifically:
 Renewing democracy and public participation
 New Labour and new localism
 Accountability
 The ‘conditions’ for effective O&S
 The move to unitary councils.
Finally, it will detail the aims of the thesis, the research questions, and the original
contribution to the literature and outline the structure of the thesis.
1.1. The Context of Overview and Scrutiny: Concepts and Theories
Local government in the UK has always been viewed as a ‘problem’ to central
government. Various investigations by Maud (1967), Redcliffe-Maud (1969) and
local government and, while they may or may not have been implemented, the last
40 years has seen major structural and political change, reforms and
modernisation. Despite these changes, or perhaps because of them, there was a
declining public interest in local government. For example, the percentage of the
public voting at elections was the lowest in Western Europe (Jones et al, 2000,
p.486) and local government was seen as being weak on accountability and
transparency (Stoker, 1999, p.1). Therefore in 1997, after eighteen years of
“power politics” by successive Conservative administrations (Ibid), the newly
elected Labour government entered office with a commitment to modernise local
government. The consultation papers Modernising Local Government: Local
Democracy and Community Leadership (DETR, 1998a) and Modern Local
2Government: In Touch with the People (DETR, 1998b) set out the government’s
vision for 21st century councils.
Three themes are identified within the modernisation programme: community
leadership, democratic renewal and improving service performance (Stewart,
2003). These documents provided the impetus for the Local Government Act
2000, which emphasised the government’s "belief in, and commitment to,
democratic local government” (Wilson and Game, 2006 p.100). There was a
particular concern that local government was weak on accountability and
transparency. It was argued that “the way local government currently operates with
its traditional committee structure is inefficient and opaque. This committee system
was designed over a century ago for a bygone age; it is no basis for modern local
government” (DETR, 1998a, para: 5.1). Subsequently local authority decision-
making was seen as taking place in committees away from public view and hence,
often not subject to public scrutiny (Ibid). This clearly weakened the link between
local people and the elected councillors (Cllrs). The government thus proposed
that the political structures in a council should be based on a separation between
the executive and O&S functions (Stewart, 2003). The Local Government 2000 Act
required all large local authorities to choose one of three models of executive
political management; either a directly elected mayor and cabinet, a directly
elected leader and cabinet, or indirectly elected leader and cabinet. With the old
committee system gone Cllrs via strong and accountable executives would provide
high profile, streamlined decision-making counter-balanced by an O&S process
tasked to provide checks and balances to the power of the executive (Snape,
32000). Unprescriptive guidance has allowed O&S to develop uniquely in each
authority and research has identified the conditions for an effective O&S function
(ODPM, 2002; Snape, 2002; Snape, Leach, and Copus 2002; Stoker, 2004; CfPS,
2005; Leach, 2005 and 2009). More recently, the New Labour government moved
to strengthen the O&S role of Cllrs and increase the involvement of local
communities. With the publication of the White Paper Strong and Prosperous
Communities (2006) Cllrs became ‘champions’ of communities in addition to the
‘critical friend’ of the executives. Moreover, local communities would interact more
with local government, who would engage, inform, consult, involve and devolve
policy development to local communities (DCLG, 2006).
With particular relevance to the case study - and the operation of O&S - Strong
and Prosperous Communities (2006) also invited local authorities to submit
proposals for unitary structures. The government had had under review the two
tier system of local government. The English Boundary Committee reported its
recommendations to the ODPM in 2004 giving options for new unitary authorities
in England. Arguments for and against unitary councils have focused on local
democracy and accountability verses economic efficiency. The Local Government
and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007 provided the legislation for the new
unitary authorities, which came into being on the 1 April 2009.
1.1.1 Renewing Democracy and Public Participation
A number of wider conceptual debates can be drawn upon to provide a framework
for the study of O&S. Firstly there is the concept of renewing democracy and
4public participation in local government. New labour expressed the desire to
renew local democracy and public participation with “a comprehensive
revitalization of the ethos of democracy, the strength of civil society, the citizen-
orientation of public services, and the vibrancy of community life itself” (Civil
Renewal Unit, 2003, p.6) and the white paper Communities in Control: Real
People, Real Power stated the aim to “give real control over local decisions and
services over to a wider pool of active citizens” (DCLG, 2008, p.1). The aim is to
increase the number of people involved in decision making, but not at the expense
of elected representatives. As Stewart notes, “participatory democracy does not
replace representative democracy but informs it” (Stewart, 2003, p46).
Public apathy with politics as demonstrated by the low voter turnout at general and
local elections is partly the result of the methods of public engagement used,
which discourage public participation with an over emphasis on consultation rather
than deliberation (Stewart, 2003). Recent research has also shown that local
authorities have clear aims in increasing public engagement (see Table 1).
Although, the drive to improve services is cited most there is the aim to improve
decision making and increase citizen engagement.
Table 1: Aims for Supporting Effective Citizenship
What do your authority’s efforts to support effective citizenship
aim to achieve?
% of respondents
citing it
Improve services 97
Increase public confidence 95
Improve decision making 92
Raise citizen awareness 91
Increase citizen engagement 91
Meet corporate objectives 90
Increase citizen understanding 86
Reduce disaffection 72
Increase electoral turnout 70
Source: Andrews et al, 2008, p.496.
5Table 2 shows by what means local government are engaging their citizens.
Although instances would appear to be low there is a wide variety and all but one
are regarded as successful by 50% or more of the respondents. From the
perspective of this research it is noticeable that there is no specific mention of
O&S; however that is not to say the methods cited might have been used for O&S.
Table 2: Successful Citizenship-Related Activities in Local Government
What are the three most important
citizenship-related activities that your local
authority is engaged in?
% of
respondents
undertaking it
% regarded
as
successful
or very
successful
Citizen/neighbourhood panels 30 78
Youth forum, council or parliament 25 79
Area forums/committees 22 63
Schools liaison 15 80
Consultations 14 61
Engagement with Black and Minority Ethnic
(BME) groups/young people
14 70
Local Democracy Week 11 63
Community/neighbourhood planning 11 47
Older people/tenants’ forums 10 53
Electoral turnout drives 9 53
Participation in council meetings 9 56
Source: Andrews et al, 2008, p.497.
Despite the perceived success or otherwise of the methods cited is the role for
local government to demonstrate to the public:
that their contribution to local democracy is valued and appreciated, by
ensuring that opportunities for involvement in local governance offer
positive, informative and confidence-inspiring lessons and ultimately make
a difference (Andrews et al, 2008, p504).
61.1.2 New Labour and New Localism
Another aspect of New Labour’s modernisation agenda and its themes of
enhancing community leadership, democratic renewal and improving performance
(Stewart, 2003) is that it has been located within a centrally controlled framework,
which developed into a “revised doctrine of localism” (Brookes, 2000, p.610).
Localism is viewed as the ‘ideology’ of local government (Jones and Stewart,
1983) in that the role of local government is, as elected representatives of a
locality, to make policy decisions based on local needs and priorities. The concern
for ‘old localists’ has been the extent to which central government:
 Influences the democratic accountability of local government
 Controls the finances of local government
 Determines which services are delivered by local government (Wilson and
Game, 2006).
The relationship between New Labour and local government from 1997 onwards
has been described as a period of “crude command and controlled centralism”
(Corry and Stoker, 2002, p8). One of the reasons for central control is that the
challenges facing government have become increasingly complex. Central and
local government have moved on from the ‘hard wiring challenges’, e.g. building
infrastructure, schools, hospitals etc. to the ‘soft wiring challenges’, e.g. improving
the health of communities and sustainability of economies etc (Stoker, 2004,
p.119). To tackle these complexities between 1997 and 2002, New Labour and
numerous partners introduced different initiatives, such as Health Action Zones,
New Deal for Communities and Sure Start. However this was described as
7‘chaotic centralism’, which had created a ‘congested state’ (Sullivan and Skelcher,
2002) of different actors trying to resolve the complex problems.
It was recognised by central government that this form of centralism did not
provide all the solutions to complex problems, therefore localism or more
specifically new localism became part of New Labour’s approach. The local
government paper Strong Local Leadership Quality Public Services (2001) stated
that successful councils “enable individuals, families and communities to find
solutions to their problems, provide resources and opportunities to help them do
so and work with others to contribute to those solutions” (DLTR, 2001 para; 27).
The role of central government was also outlined. For example:
Our aim must always be the maximum devolution of power possible;
government not stifling local action, local people making local decisions
about local needs (Brown, 2001).
Local communities are just better at dealing with their own problems. They
have the networks, the knowledge, the sense of what is actually possible,
and the ability to make solutions stick (Blunket, 2003, p.1).
Therefore, central government had recognised that central control had limitations,
and proposed a relationship with local government where “the centre steers and
facilitates rather than commands and controls” (Corry and Stoker, 2002, p.13).
However, local authorities and communities were not given a free hand to
implement local solutions. They were required to work within a national framework
(Stoker and Wilson, 2004) where providers of services at a local level where given
‘constrained discretion’ and ‘earned autonomy’ to innovate in the delivery of public
8services as a reward for good performance (Corry and Stoker, 2002).
Subsequently, the difference between ‘old’ and ‘new’ localism is that, the former is
concerned with the balance between central and local government whereas:
New Localists accept... its (central government’s) assumed role as principle
driver of change at a local level. They emphasise the ‘freedoms and
flexibilities’ acquired by local authorities, rather than the undiluted
centralism of the system in which these ‘earned autonomy’ baubles are
awarded only to approved high-performers (Wilson and Game, pp.381-
382).
1.1.3 Accountability
Another concept to emerge from New Labour’s Modernisation Agenda and
specifically related to the O&S function is that of accountability. As described
above accountability was said to be lacking in local government (Stoker, 1999).
There are a number of different types of accountability in local government, for
example, executive accountability. The primary role of O&S is to hold the newly
created executives to account for their decisions, however executive accountability
(and any other body for that matter) is a two way process:
Accountability involves both giving an account and being held to account.
The executive is accountable to the council, at least in giving an account of
its stewardship (Stewart, 2003, p.87).
One aspect of, if not the most important aspect of local government, is financial
accountability. The setting of the council tax rate is naturally of great interest and
concern to the public. Given the dependence of local authorities on central
government grants (approximately 75% of an authority’s income) and the
peculiarities of local taxation (a 1% rise in expenditure requires a 4% rise in
council tax) then it is difficult for the electorate to know who to hold to account and
for elected representatives to hold central government to account (Ibid, 2003).
9A growing area of accountability is accountability and new-localism. As more and
more public services are provided by partner organisations there are more
decision makers to hold to account and the people in receipt of those services
should do it (Milburn, 2004). As Stoker states:
The electorate choosing their representatives remains important, but people
should have more opportunities to be involved in direct discussion with
service providers and be in a position to judge their performance. In short,
accountability involves reason-giving, questioning and a continuous
exchange between the provider and the relevant public (Stoker, 2004,
p121).
Accountability of external providers from the private sector relies upon
“comprehensibility and transparency” if the public are to know who is responsible
for service provision and “transparency is limited unless private organisations
accept the obligations of open government and public accountability” (Stewart,
2003, pp.139-140). Finally, accountability by external assessment such as the now
defunct Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA) had the “assumption of
inspectoral infallibility” that transferred accountability from elected representative
and/or the public to the inspectors (Ibid, p215) and thus their grading of an
authority became relied upon as the measure of performance.
1.1.4 Effective Overview and Scrutiny: Process, Structures and Attitudinal
Conditions
The research undertaken by Leach (2009) on the O&S function has established
three types of conditions, which will increase the likelihood of it being effective.
The three conditions are:
1. Attitudinal Conditions
e.g. parties do not use O&S for party political points-scoring.
2. Process Conditions
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e.g. call-in is used responsibly, it is not to be invoked too easily and meets
specified criteria.
3. Structures and Support Mechanisms
e.g. There is an O&S co-ordination committee to counterbalance the
executive (Leach, 2009, pp.36-37).
These conditions will be examined in more detail in chapter 3. It will be argued
that they provide an effective framework upon which to organise the analysis of
the data.
1.1.5 Understanding Local Government Reorganisation: The Move to
Unitary Councils
There was no anticipation of reorganisation given the “chaos” of the previous
reorganisation under Conservative governments in the 1970s and 1980s (Snape,
2000a, p124) and that Labour’s manifestos for the 1997, 2001 and 2005 elections
did not include any proposals for unitary authorities in England (Labour Party,
1997, 2001, and 2005). Rather, it is suggested that a combination of Labour’s
neighbourhood empowerment agenda and the desire for civil servants to have
more control of local authorities led to New Labour proposing another
reorganisation of local government (Leach, 2009a). This policy for more
‘technocratic’ unitary authorities seems to contradict their desire for democratic
renewal (Ibid). However, in 2006 the DCLG invited local councils to submit their
own proposals for unitary structures stating that the government had:
concluded that local government in two-tier areas faces additional
challenges that can make it harder to achieve that strong leadership and
clear accountability which communities need. There are risks of confusion,
duplication and inefficiency between tiers, and particular challenges of
capacity for small Districts (DCLG, 2006d, p.5).
The criteria for the new unitary authorities were “affordability, value for money,
broad cross-section of support, neighbourhood empowerment and strong and
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effective leadership” (Leach, 2009a, p.67). New Labour’s desire for unitary local
government, whilst based on established criteria, also emphasised strong
leadership and new approaches to community engagement and this was a
significant aspect of the bids by the case study authorities (see case study
chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8). As John Healey, Minister for Local Government, said:
This debate has been going on for many years and the long-term trend has
been towards unitaries. Our interest is...to see stronger strategic leadership
and cost efficiencies - always part of the case for unitaries - but also greater
community empowerment and citizen engagement in new and innovative
ways (Healey, 2009).
And as the DCLG confirmed:
Any unitary authority… established following the current invitation process
will therefore be a new authority in any commonly understood meaning of
the word. It will have in place a wholly new style including innovative
community engagement arrangements, such as community areas with
forums having delegated responsibilities for certain services (DCLG, 2007,
para: 21).
Subsequently, the Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act, 2007,
provided the legislation for the new unitary authorities and 44 county and district
councils were abolished and 9 unitary authorities created on 1 April 2009. These
were significantly larger unitary authorities than had been created previously. The
Local Government Commission for England (1994) had recommended a
population size of 177,000 whereas the “the 2006–08 DCLG-managed process
was a set of much larger unitary authorities (average size 348,000) mostly based
on existing counties” (Leach, 2009a, p.63). Also, to emphasise the economic
argument for unitary authorities it was anticipated that they would save over
£100m per year, serve 3.2m residents, and increase the proportion of residents
living in a unitary authority in the UK from 52% to 60% (Healy, 2009).
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1.2 Aims of the Thesis
The aim of this thesis is to compare and analyse the O&S functions of four unitary
local authorities in England and to assess the impact of New Labour’s Local
Government Re-organisation Agenda on O&S. The research has three other
objectives:
 To locate debates on O&S within a wider conceptual understanding of the
process of modernisation and the emphasis on ‘New Localism’
 Highlight what O&S arrangements were and are in place within the two and
one-tier system of local government
 Examine how effective O&S is being ensured within four new Unitary
Authorities.
1.3 The Original Contribution to the Literature
This thesis aims to make an original contribution to how O&S in local authorities is
understood, by focussing on the impact of the creation of the unitary authorities in
2009. Such a focus has not yet been fully developed in the literature: hence the
study provides a valuable opportunity to detail the development of the O&S
function for two - and single - tier local government in English shire counties. It will
reflect upon key aspects of New Labour’s local government modernisation
agenda; specifically democratic renewal and public participation, new localism,
and accountability. In addition it will enhance the existing research on what
constitutes effective O&S and thereby assist all local authorities in their approach
to developing and maintaining an effective O&S function.
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1.4. Structure of the Thesis
1.4.1 The Literature Review
The first two chapters will be a critical analysis of the existing literature and
evidence to contextualise the research. The first chapter will focus on the
democratic legitimacy of local government and the significant reforms to local
government over the last thirty years, which led to New Labour’s modernisation
agenda and the new political structures for local government. The second chapter
will address the O&S function which as a recent innovation will concentrate on
academic evaluations and the identification of best practice by practitioners and
subsequently detail the various elements that constitute an effective O&S function.
1.4.2 Methodology
The third chapter presents the ontological and epistemological theory that
underlines the methodological approach, namely interpretive. It discusses the
case study method and the qualitative and quantitative methods used. The
research process is outlined from the background and context of the four case
study authorities, the identification of subjects through to the research questions.
The research process is then evaluated to reflect upon the practicalities of the
research methods and acknowledges the experience gained from undertaking
separate research for one of the case study authorities and the advantages and
disadvantages that had for the research for the thesis.
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1.4.3 Key Findings from the Case Study Authorities
Chapters five to eight identify the development and position of the O&S function
prior to and after the creation of the unitary authorities and presents the findings
from the semi-structured interviews, questionnaires and documentary analysis.
The ninth chapter compares and contrasts the findings from the four case study
authorities and indentifies what each authority has done to ensure an effective
O&S function.
1.4.4 Conclusions and Postscript
The last chapter of the thesis presents the final conclusions to be drawn from the
findings. It then reflects on further opportunities for research in the light of this
research. Finally, the thesis concludes with a postscript that considers the
implications for O&S of the recent proposals for local government the
Conservative and Liberal Democrat coalition have announced, i.e. Local
Government Bill 2010-11, the ‘Big Society’ and the cuts in public expenditure.
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Chapter 2 Local Government in the United Kingdom
2.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to provide a detailed review of literature on local
government in the UK by detailing the justification of local government and its
relationship to central government, the ideological approaches to local government
in the last 30 years and the changes to local government made by New Labour as
part of its modernisation agenda. The specific sections are:
 Local Democracy and the Role of Local Government
 Local Government and The New Right
 New Labour: The Modernisation of Local Government.
2.2 Local Democracy and the Role of Local Government
In this section we examine the role and functions of local government. As outlined
in Figure 1, local government (usually through a geographically determined local
council) provides directly or indirectly social and economic services to the public,
such as education, social services, highways maintenance, street lighting etc.
Figure 1: Your Local Council
Your local Council is:
 a large, geographically defined, multifunctional organisation,
 pursuing a variety of social, political and economic objectives,
 either through direct provision,
 or through the sponsorship, indirect funding regulation, or monitoring of
 a very extensive range of services to its local community.
Source: Wilson and Game (2006, p.10)
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From the perspective of central government “local government is one way in which
the country’s governance and administration is carried out, and its public services
delivered” (DCLG, 2009, p.11). Indeed, in the process of service delivery in
England alone, local councils spend approximately £133bn a year and employ
approximately 1.8m full time equivalent employees (Ibid, 2009 p.16). But why does
local government provide services? The alternative to local government would be
some form of centrally controlled local administration as a means of delivering
services and the policies of central government. However, there are three distinct
differences between local government and local administration.
Firstly, local government is accountable to an electorate, whereas a local
administration would only be “accountable upwards to an elected minister... and
downwards to its customers through an ombudsman, citizens’ charter or other
mechanism of legally enforceable redress” (Beetham, 1996, p.35).
Secondly, local government can supply services to a specific geographical area
and they can be “adjusted to suit the tastes and the preferences of local residents”
(Watt, 2006, p.8). Local government is also more accessible as a service provider
and has “a greater incentive to develop and extend the practice of local
consultation” (Beetham, 1996, p.38).
Thirdly, while local administration is representative of national government, locally
elected councils represent an opportunity for more people to hold public office, a
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wider range of political views and, potentially, more socially and ethnically diverse
representatives (Ibid).
As can be seen, the significant difference between local government and local
administration by central government is that local government is led by locally
elected representatives. Indeed, as advocated by 19th and 20th century theorists
such as J.S. Mill, it is “an essential part of democratic government” as it gives
citizens the opportunity to participate in politics and that “local interest, knowledge
and capacity to oversee made the prospect of achieving efficient and effective
service provision much more likely” (Stoker, 1996, p.5). Subsequently this “vision”
is seen to be the “dominant influence on the normative debate about local
government and democracy in Britain” (Ibid, pp.6-7).
One of the significant aspects of local government is that it is a means of
spreading political power throughout the country (Cockburn, 1977) and with the
exception of the House of Commons local government is the “only institution... that
can claim the authority that comes from an election” (Jones and Stewart, 1985, p.5
quoted in Stoker, 1996, p.12). Therefore, there is a justification for local
government based on the premise that it is led by council members who are
democratically elected representatives of the local community. “Their role, as
representative bodies elected by their fellow citizens, is to take such decisions
themselves, in accordance with their own policy priorities: to govern their locality”
(Wilson and Game, 2006, p.26).
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However representative democracy is seen as “consisting of elections and little
more” (Stewart, 2003, p.45). Stewart notes that this is a “passive” form of
democracy in that there is only interest in - and contact between - the public and
politicians at elections. Indeed, this is “reflective” of Schumpeter’s (1950) view of
representative democracy (Ibid). Schumpeter believed that a citizen “devotes less
discipline on mastering a political problem than he spends on mastering a game of
bridge” (Schumpeter, 1950, p.200 in Stewart, 2003, p.45). However, Stewart
argues that the public are more active and directly involved in local democracy and
have a “continuing relationship between representative and represented” (Stewart,
2003 p.45). Indeed:
Cllrs who believe they can speak for people merely because they are
elected enclose the organisation against the diversity of the public and of
their views. The danger of the local authority being an enclosed
organisation is challenged by a concept of representative democracy based
on active citizenship built through deliberation (Stewart, 2003, p53).
2.3 Central-Local Government Relations
Local government is “subordinate” to central government (Wilson and Game,
2006, p.1) therefore local autonomy is primarily determined by central government
(Goldsmith, 1990, p.33). Indeed, the relationship between central and local
government changes in that central government shapes “the growth and working
of local government” (Ibid, p.25) as the demands upon government change.
During the post war period local government was a part of the distribution of the
welfare state, however during the 1960s there were more demands placed on it by
higher public expectations (Cockburn, 1977). In the 1970’s and 1980’s economic
problems led to cuts in services by central government (Cochrane, 1993) and in
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the 1990’s local government evolved into local ‘governance’ as an “extensive
network of public, voluntary and private sector bodies...are now involved in policy-
making and service delivery” (Wilson and Game, 2006, p.17). All this was set
against a background of authorities becoming increasingly reliant upon central
government grants for the majority of their funding, whilst central government
attempted to micro-manage local government (Watt, 2006, p.9). Subsequently it is
the relationship between central and local government that “determines the
parameters within which local authorities operate”, which include the:
 Organisation of local government
 Distribution of functions
 Methods of central control
 Level of state funding (Dunleavy, 1980, p.105).
There has been an attempt to define the relationship between central and local
government with the development of the Central-Local Concordat (see Figure 2).
This document is an agreement between the Government and the Local
Government Association, which clarifies the rights and responsibilities of both
parties; specifically in:
 Setting of national policies and minimum standards of services
 Consultation and collaboration
 Setting the priorities of communities
 Providing accountable, visible and responsive leadership to their
communities
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 Using taxpayers’ money and devolving power to and engaging communities
(HM Government and LGA, 2007, p.3).
Figure 2 Central-Local Concordat
Central government has the right to set national policies, including minimum
standards of services, to work with local areas to support them and, as a last
resort, to intervene to avoid significant underperformance. It proposes to
Parliament the legislation within which local government works.
Central government has the responsibility to consult and collaborate with
Councils in exercising these rights. It undertakes to progressively remove
obstacles which prevent Councils from pursuing their role, including reducing the
burden of appraisal and approval regimes, the ring fencing of funds for specific
purposes and the volume of guidance it issues.
Councils have the right to address the priorities of their communities as expressed
through local elections and to lead the delivery of public services in their area and
shape its future without unnecessary direction or control.
Councils have the responsibility to provide leadership that is accountable, visible
and responsive to their communities and to work in partnership with the local
statutory, business and third sectors, and collectively to drive continuing
improvement.
Both partners have the responsibility to use taxpayers’ money well and devolve
power, and to engage and empower communities and individual citizens – at
national level and at local level – in debate and decision making and in shaping
and delivering services.
Source: HM Government and LGA (2007, p.3).
Although the Central-Local Concordat defines the rights and responsibilities the
balance of power between central and local government still lies with the hands of
central government, however:
it matters because improving the lives of local people and local
communities matters, and because where the balance of power between
central and local government lies, there lies the responsibility and
accountability for the delivery of those improvements...local authorities
should have the freedom to shape the development of their communities
(House of Commons Communities and Local Government Committee,
2009, p.3).
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Given the above descriptions of the role of local government, the relationship to
central government and importance of local political representation, it is possible to
redefine local government (see figure 3).
Figure 3: UK Local Government Defined
Local government is:
 A form of geographical and political decentralisation
 In which directly elected Councils
 Created by and subordinate to Parliament
 Have partial autonomy
 To provide a wide variety of services
 Through various direct and indirect means
 Funded in part by local taxation.
Source: Wilson and Game (2006, p.33).
Similarly, the justification(s) for local government can be defined as, and relates to,
local political representation, promoting public participation and responding to
needs of an identifiable local community (see figure 4).
Figure 4: The Values or Justifications of Elected Local Government
Elected local government is likely to be better than a combination of central
government and local administration at:
1. Building and articulating community identity
2. Emphasising diversity
3. Fostering innovation and learning
4. Responding swiftly, appropriately, corporately
5. Promoting citizenship and participation
6. Providing political education and training and
7. Dispersing power.
Source: Wilson and Game (2006, p.38).
In summary, local government is “justified” as it is the focus for the community,
provides efficient services and can respond to diverse needs. It is a “check”
against abusive central power allowing political choice and participation in local
politics. (Greenwood and Stewart, 1986, pp.36-37). However these “justifications
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for local government in Britain are largely based on expediential arguments rather
than direct ethical theory” (Chandler, 2008, p.369). The value of local government
has been seen as its “contribution to efficient and stable liberal democratic
government at national level rather than ... an institution that has value in its own
right regardless of its relationship to the state” (Ibid, p.370).
2.4 Local Government and the New Right
The period of Conservative government between 1979 and 1997 saw significant
reform of local government. The orthodox view of reform is that it brings
“efficiency, effectiveness, and democracy to all at the same time, as it harms
absolutely no one”, however it has “inevitable implications for control of
governmental power and public policy advantage of some groups over others”
(Dearlove, 1979, p.12). The reform of the public sector during the 1980s and
1990s was driven by Mrs Thatcher’s adherence to the New Right economic theory
associated with Hayek and Friedman. The post-war consensus to provide public
services and control unemployment by following Keynesian economics was failing
in the light of high inflation and unemployment; therefore there was a desire to
have greater control of government expenditure (Evans, 2004). Prior to this, dating
back to the immediate aftermath of the second world war, “local government was
the most important single agent of social reconstruction...within the overall
framework of the Welfare State”, whereas, by 1997, local authorities had “lost their
pre-eminence in the delivery of local services” (Young and Rao, 1997, p2).
Furthermore local authorities no longer received:
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the political deference – the respect of ministers and that of ordinary people
– that sustained their position in the machinery of the state...far from being
part of the solution to the making of post-war Britain, local government
became part of the problem (Ibid).
This decline in the role and purpose of local government is not a recent
phenomenon. Indeed there have been many investigations into local government
(Maud, 1967; Redcliffe-Maud, 1969; Widdicombe, 1986;), which have found long
established problems with local democracy. For example, two weaknesses of local
government have been low turnout in local elections - less than 30% voted in
1998- and the lack of representativeness of Cllrs - in 1993 the majority were white,
retired, males, aged over 55 years (Miller, et al, pp.21-22). The Conservatives also
viewed local government as “wasteful, profligate, irresponsible, unaccountable,
luxurious and out of control (Newton and Karran, 1985, p116). Whatever the
evidence for these actual or perceived faults it has been also suggested that “the
Conservative government inherently distrusted local government” (Miller et al,
2000, p.15). Therefore, in a period of Conservative administration that has been
described as “a brutal intrusion of power politics” (Stoker, 1991, p.1) and “endless
intervention” (Ibid, p.5), there was a “radical change in the internal workings of
local authorities, in their role as service providers, and in their relationship with
central government” (Young and Rao, 1997, p265). Three examples illustrate
these changes:
 New Public Management (NPM)
 Local government to local governance
 Local government finance.
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New Public Management
New Right policy espoused a reduction in the role of government bureaucracy in
providing for society’s needs and an increase in the individual’s freedom to choose
from a free market of service providers (Young and Rao, 1997). The traditional
bureaucratic form of government decision-making was regarded as “too inward-
looking” focusing “on the needs of the producers… and not enough on the needs
of the public as consumers and citizens” (Stoker, 1991, p.3). Public sector
organisations were also seen as inefficient in the delivery of services (Miller, et al,
2000). Subsequently a private sector, market-led approach, was to be “applied to
the public sector in order to overcome ‘(welfare) state failures’ and public
administration failures’” (Wollmann, 2004, p.641).
Therefore, the introduction of what has been called New Public Management
(NPM) saw the modernisation of public services as a problem of managerialism.
Namely that service delivery could be improved by the use of:
externally moderated indicators and league tables, benchmarking and
increased use of the private sector, backed up by changes in the ways
councils took decisions which reinforced the responsibilities of a small elite
of councillors (Coulson, 2004, p472).
Subsequently NPM changed the way local authorities were managed with an
emphasis on performance indicators to monitor the provision of services and local
authority functions (Stewart, 2003; Wilson and Game, 2006). Significantly local
politicians would no longer be involved in the “day to day involvement in the
administrative operations”. They would ‘steer’ rather than ‘row’. (Wollmann, 2004,
p.642). Compulsory Competitive Tendering (CCT) illustrates the application of
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private sector management principles in the public sector; requiring local
authorities to open up the services they delivered to competition; forcing
authorities to put out to tender the provision of services by, or functions of, local
authorities (Stewart, 2003). Arguably it was the imposition of competition and the
exposure of local government to the market that was the “un-making of the post-
war settlement” (Young and Rao, 1997, p.262).
Local governance
As noted earlier (see page 9 on central-local relations) the normative view of local
government as service provider changed during the period of Conservative
governments. The functions of local government were transferred to central
government agencies, government appointed quangos, trusts, the voluntary and
the private sectors (Jones and Travers in Pratchett and Wilson, 1996, p.85;
Kendall and Knapp, 1996; Skelcher, 1998; cited in Laffin, 2009, p.26) resulting in a
system of local governance rather than local government. This resulted in the
public not understanding “who was responsible for what...It no longer seemed so
self evident that it was the ‘council’ that was responsible” (Miller, et al, 2000, p.19).
Local government finance
Given the desire for central control of local government finances (Stoker, 1991) the
period between 1979 and 1983 saw a “barrage of legislation” that reformed local
government finances (Wilson and Game, 2006, p.61). As local government is
subordinate to central government and parliament, changes such as these were
implemented from the top down and with little consultation (Stoker, 1999). Indeed
26
“each time there has been a real or imagined problem with local government,
ministers reached for the statute book” (Jones and Travers in Pratchett and
Wilson, 1996, p.85). During the 1980s local government raised 50% of its
revenue, whereas by the end of the Conservative administration in 1997, local
taxation accounted only for 25% of income. “The heavy reliance on non-local
revenue...created a substantial opportunity for central government to dictate the
level of local spending” (Miller, et al, 2000, p.14). Other examples of direct control
over finances were business rates being collected centrally and the imposition of
rate-caps on over-spending authorities (Butler, et al, 1994 cited in Laffin, 2009,
p.26).
Local Government Reorganisation and the New Right
The 1979 to 1997 period of Conservative government also witnessed another
significant round of local government reorganisation following on from their major
reorganisation of local government in the 1970s. The Local Government Act 1972
abolished numerous county, municipal, urban, rural and district councils. This
reduced the number of councils in England and Wales from 1,427 to a two tier
system of 47 county councils, 330 district councils, 6 metropolitan county councils
and 36 metropolitan district/borough councils (Wilson and Game, 2006). The
rationale for this was that:
larger more populous authorities were better equipped to carry out some
functions (e.g. education) , whilst smaller authorities with a stronger local
identity were better equipped to undertake others (e.g. leisure facilities)
(Leach, 2009a, p.64).
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However since the formation of the two-tier system of local government there has
been a debate about whether public service provision is more economic in larger
authorities and if local democracy is best achieved in smaller authorities.
Firstly, what is termed the technocratic model of local government (Copus, 2006),
assumes large authorities to be efficient and effective. However research shows
that “it does not appear possible to argue a conclusive case for a strong, one
directional link between population size and efficiency and effectiveness” (Travers,
et al, 1993, p.4) as there are “diseconomies as well as economies of scale”
(Stewart, 2006, p.182).
Secondly, the democratic model of local government assumes that smaller
authorities allow the public to participate in local democracy, because “cohesive
communities can be identified and represented and their views responded to...”
(Copus, 2006, p.6). However there is a potential “democratic deficit” as the
number of council members in England decreased by 31% by the 1990s leaving
fewer to represent local communities (Wilson and Game, 2006, p.72).
Despite the above concern, since 1979 there has been an increasing move
towards “all purpose” or “most purpose” unitary local authorities (Wilson and
Game, 2006, p.79). The argument was that “a single tier system would minimise
wasteful bureaucracy and be easier for the public to understand” (Miller et al,
2000, p.12). In England in 1986, the Conservatives established 68 unitary
authorities with the “politically motivated” (Leach, 2009a, p.65) abolition of the
28
Greater London Council (GLC) and the 6 metropolitan counties seeing them
replaced by 32 unitary London Boroughs and 36 unitary Metropolitan districts
(Wilson and Game, 2006). Furthermore, at the instigation of Michael Heseltine, the
1992 Conservative manifesto had pledged to review the structure of local
government to determine (on an area by area basis in most areas of England) if
unitary local government would be more accountable and efficient (Ibid).
Therefore, between 1995 and 1998 a further 46 urban and rural unitary authorities
were created with the aim of them being efficient and comprehensive councils,
close to their communities (Stewart, 2003) and with an emphasis on local identity
(DoE, 1991b). This sense of identity, for example, was arguably a factor when
Cleveland County Council was divided into four unitary boroughs having only been
created as a two-tier authority area in 1974. In contrast, it is argued, there was no
underpinning coherent rationale (Wilson and Game, 2006) unlike the previous
rounds of local government reorganisation in the 1970’s and 1980’s. The new
unitary councils owed “more to political machination than to any administrative
logic” (Ibid, p.67).
2.5 New Labour: The Modernisation of Local Government
New Labour came into office in 1997 after nearly two decades of Conservative rule
that had seen central government take control and reduce the power of local
government (Weir and Beetham, 1999). The new administration, “inherited a
political and administrative culture in which local autonomy was increasingly seen
as worth sacrificing in order to implement a national agenda” (Cole, 2003, p.191).
There were also significant weaknesses in local democracy, namely a limited:
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 Conception of the role of local government
 Electoral base
 Conception of representative democracy
 Concept of citizenship (Stewart, 2003 p42).
Furthermore it was suggested that:
The last quarter of the twentieth century is best described as an era when,
as never before, elected local government has been a problem, an irritant, a
sore on the body politic – in the eyes of the centre and, it has seemed,
citizens at large (Walker, 2000, p.2).
Local Government was “weakened by its poor base of popular support” (Blair,
1998, p.14), and public apathy resulted in the lowest turnouts at elections in
Western Europe (DETR 1998, Jones et al, 2000). The public were also unaware of
who and how decisions are made that effect their communities and subsequently
who to hold to account when things go wrong (Copus, 2003; Rao, 2000). Local
government was weak on accountability and transparency (Stoker, 1999, p.1) as
decisions were made elsewhere by elites and agreed by committees (ODPM,
1998; Cole, 2001; Copus, 2000 and 2001; Rao, 2000; Maer and Sandford 2004).
Given these limitations, New Labour “devoted more attention to local
government... traditionally it has been the Conservative party that has worried
away at local government” (Laffin, 2008, p.109). Their subsequent modernisation
agenda was seen as a response to a number of failures, with the White Paper
Modern Local Government: In Touch with the People (DETR, 1998) identifying six
key weaknesses:
 An inward-looking and paternalistic culture
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 An underdeveloped community leadership role
 A weak electoral system
 Popular concern about the ethical standards of local government
 An inefficient and opaque decision making system
 Problems with service quality and uneven performance of local authority
services (Snape, 2000, p.120).
In addition it was argued that local authorities lacked direction, coherence and
cohesion in delivering consistently quality local services (Blair, 1998). Councils
needed ‘new democratic legitimacy, new ways of working and new disciplines and
new powers’ (Ibid, p2-3). New Labour described successful councils as those
whose:
priorities are to lead their local communities. They organise and support
partnerships to develop a vision for their locality, and to contribute to
achieving it. They strive for continuous improvement in the delivery of local
services. They are committed to best value. They involve and respond to
local people and local interests. Their relationship with local business and
their local interests is strong and effective. There is trust between them and
their local people. It is in these Councils, in partnership with Government
and others, which are able to make real improvements to the quality of
peoples’ lives (DETR, 1998, p.12).
Three key themes emerge from this description, and are central to New Labour’s
modernisation of the political and managerial characteristics of local authorities.
They are: community leadership; improving performance; and democratic renewal
(Stewart, 2003).
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Community Leadership
The role of the local authority has changed from being one of ‘service provider’, to
that of ‘community leader’. Having had services privatised or given over to
quangos and area based initiatives, it was handed the responsibility to address the
well being of the communities they serve. This was to be achieved through
community planning which should:
 Engage and involve local communities
 Involve active participation of Cllrs
 Be prepared and implemented by broad local strategic partnerships through
which the local authority can work with other local bodies
 Be based on a proper assessment of needs and the availability of
resources (DETR, 2000, p.7).
The challenge for local authorities was to achieve the above by engaging and
involving its partners be they central government, the private sector, voluntary
organisations and/ or local communities. To achieve this the government
encouraged the formation of Local Strategic Partnerships (LSP) with the aim of
bringing the afore-mentioned parties together so that “different initiatives,
programmes and services support each other and work together” (DETR, 2001
p.15). The emphasis placed upon engaging communities by New Labour was a
significant change from previous administrations. For example partnership “has
gone some way to replacing the Conservatives individualistic approach to the
general public…with a more collectivist, citizen-focussed stress on community and
community empowerment” (Snape, 2000, p122).
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Improving Performance
As under the Conservatives, modernisation of local government was viewed as a
problem of managerialism, specifically that service delivery could be improved by
the use of:
externally moderated indicators and league tables, benchmarking and
increased use of the private sector, backed up by changes in the ways
councils took decisions which reinforced the responsibilities of a small elite
of councillors (Coulson, 2004, p.472).
The Local Government Act (1999) required local authorities to “make
arrangements to secure continuous improvement in the ways in which its functions
are exercised, having regard to a combination of economy, efficiency and
effectiveness” (Great Britain, Local Government Act 1999, s.3). New Labour’s
view was that councils should look to provide the best value services not only in
comparison to other councils, but also in terms of the private sector. New Labour
introduced Best Value (BV) to replace CCT, which relied too heavily on improving
efficiency at the expense of quality. While not removing competition from the
delivery of public services BV was seen as an improvement upon CCT as
“continuous improvement in both the quality and cost of services will therefore be
the hallmark of the modern council and the test of best value” (DETR, 1998, p.64).
BV would be achieved by establishing objectives, performance measures and
independent inspection overseen by the Audit Commission which benchmarked
the quality of service and the potential future improvement. BV provided a
benchmark for local authorities to measure themselves against. The Government
also introduced the Beacon Council scheme which aimed to “identify examples of
excellence in service provision and thereby provide models for other authorities to
33
follow” (Stewart, 2003, p.141). The rewards for achieving Beacon Council status
included additional power to increase capital investment and to take initiatives
where previously they were not allowed to do so.
The government’s White Paper 2001 Strong Local Leadership: Quality Public
Services recognised that “as well as too many controls, plans and initiatives, there
were also too many overlapping performance measurements frameworks” (DETR
2001, para. 3.12). However, rather than scrapping performance management, the
government introduced Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA), which
was “designed as a more coherent and integrated system of performance
measurement” (Wollmann, 2004, p.644). The Audit Commission judged six
service functions of the authority and used performance indicators and previously
agreed corporate assessments (i.e. initial assessments of what the local authority
aimed to provide) to score the authority as either; ‘high performers’, ‘strivers’,
‘coasters’ or ‘poor performers’. These scores indicate the performance of the
authority as well as their ability to improve (Wilson and Game, 2002, p.347).
However, this can be viewed as a weakness of the approach, as the focus is on
delivery rather than how need is met. Targets and performance measures are an
end in themselves “rather than as a means of understanding performance”
(Stewart, 2003 p.246). Indeed, the Audit Commission identified that “local
authorities risk being distracted by the process of BV at the expense of providing
quality services” (Kelly, 2003, p.474). Finally, with regard to CPA performance
ratings, their value was questioned as a means to re-engage the public. Were
34
“voters going to rush more excitedly to the polls to elect representatives to a
Council that is ‘a coaster’?” (Wilson and Game, 2002, p.368).
Democratic Renewal
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the modernisation agenda is that of
democratic renewal. Democratic renewal can be defined as greater numbers of
people engaging with their local authority, leading them to vote in greater numbers
and thus become involved in local politics (Rao 2000, p.195). New Labour argued
that the committee system of decision making in councils was a barrier to
democratic renewal. The weakness of the old committee system was
characterised by “endless papers, arcane bureaucratic processes, duplication,
delay” (Fenwick, et al, 2003, p.41). Instead of being open to public scrutiny,
committees were dominated by party politics, which “meant that in many
authorities decisions were taken in private group meetings and enforced by the
whips at committees” (Stewart, 2003 p.58). Also individual Cllrs were losing
influence in the decision making process and the public was losing confidence in
their Cllrs. “Opaque and unclear decision taking weakens the link between local
people and their democratically elected representatives” (DETR, 1999, p.8).
The proposed end of the committee system of political management, which was “a
product of the Victorian era” (Copus, 2000, p.76) had been debated for over 30
years. Maud (1967) recommended ‘management boards’ whereas Widdecombe
(1986) recommended policy and resources committees for authorities controlled
by one party. The consultation paper The Internal Management of Local
35
Authorities in England (DoE, 1991a) advocated appointed or elected executives
and the Commission for Local Democracy (1995) stated that local authorities
should have directly elected leaders/mayors (Leach, 1999). New Labour said that
councils would have to adopt structures that would be characterised by efficiency,
transparency, accountability, and high standards of conduct (DETR, 1999).
The 1998 White Paper Modern Local Government; In Touch with the People set
out proposals for new political structures, specifically that the structures should be
based on a “separation between the executive and scrutiny functions” (Stewart,
2003, p.60). All councils with populations over 85,000 were required by the Local
Government Act 2000 to adopt one of three structures (see Figure 5):
1. A directly elected mayor and cabinet
2. A Leader appointed by the council with a cabinet
3. A directly elected mayor with a council manager.
The elected mayor and cabinet is only adopted once 5% of the population has
requested a referendum and has voted for this option. The mayors are also
elected by proportional representation. New Labour envisaged that directly elected
mayors with a cabinet would break down the barrier of the committee system that
would block modernization, bring strong leadership to the management of councils
and greater engagement with the public, while elected mayors would fit in with
New Labour’s culture of strong individual leadership (Fenwick and Elcock, 2005,
p.61). The mayor would appoint a cabinet of their choosing and decide on the
distribution of power without having to take regard of the political make up of the
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council or with the council’s approval. However the mayor needs the council to
approve the budget and policy framework (Stewart, 2003, p.64).
Figure 5: The New Models of Political Management
Model Description Advantages Disadvantages
Indirectly elected
leader and cabinet
From the Cllrs
chosen by the
electorate a leader
and between 2 and 9
cabinet members are
elected by the full
council (or the leader
selects the cabinet).
The leader and
cabinet make
decisions and non-
executives scrutinise
the executive.
 Speeds up
decisions
 Improves
accountability and
checks and
balances on the
executive
 non-executives
have more time for
constituency work.
 It is not sufficiently
different from the
committee system
 It would not
increase public
interest or
involvement
 Decision would not
be as speedy as a
mayor.
Directly elected
mayor and cabinet
Chosen by
electorate the mayor
selects a cabinet of 2
to 9 members.
The mayor and
cabinet make
decisions and non-
executives scrutinise
the executive.
 A mayor will create
interest in the
council
 Decisions will be
quicker and be
more accountable.
 May not create
interest
 Decision could be
worse and less
accountable
 No decision-
making role for
most members
 Too much power
for one person.
Directly elected
mayor and council
manager
The mayor is chosen
by the electorate and
an Officer is
appointed by the
council as day to day
manager.
The mayor
determines the
broad policy
direction.
 A mayor will create
interest in the
council
 Decisions will be
even quicker and
accountable as
only two people will
be making
decisions.
 Too much power
for two people
 Decisions will not
be transparent
 Not accountable to
councillors
 Anti-democratic
 Few checks and
balances.
4th Option (for shire
districts of less than
85,000 population)
The committee
system is retained,
but at least one
scrutiny committee is
formed.
 It is more
efficient,
transparent and
accountable.
 Little change to
the committee
system.
Source: Adapted from Wilson and Game (2006, pp.102-105).
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The leader and cabinet structure resembled the previous committee system and
under this new structure the leader or the council can appoint and delegate the
powers within the cabinet. As the council chooses the leader it is “distinguished by
the dependence of the leader on the support of the Council” (Ibid, p.69).
The mayor and council manager structure differs from the elected mayor and
cabinet in that the all the executive powers are given to the council manager and
they are solely responsible for the delegation of power. They are expected to take
a political steer from the mayor, but they are responsible to the council as a whole
(DETR, 2000).
The most popular executive structure has been leader and cabinet with 316 (81%)
of authorities opting for it (Rao, 2006, p.19). Although it was suggested that this
was unsurprising given that many councils had been working with informal
cabinets for some years. Indeed “the development of formal cabinets is a less
radical step than electing a mayor” (Snape, 2000, p.164).
Under all three structures - and with the old committee system gone - Cllrs were
now non-executives on OSC, tasked to provide checks and balances to the power
of the executive on behalf of their communities (Snape, 2000), or executive
members who would by acting as the focus for forming partnerships with
governmental, voluntary and private bodies:
 Propose and implement policies
 Lead the community planning process
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 Lead the development of plans and strategies
 Consult on and devise the budget
 Lead the search for best value
 Decide resources and priorities (Cole, 2001b, p.239).
As Leach notes:
Whatever structures councils will have chosen, the key executive,
representational, and scrutiny roles of councillors will be readily
distinguishable. Local accountability will be effective. Councillors will more
effectively be able to speak up for their communities (Leach,1999, pp.81-82).
Furthermore, it is argued that “restructuring councillors’ roles is the primary means
by which the aims of the modernisation agenda will be achieved” (Rao, 2000,
p.170). However, this “would involve not just a fundamental constitutional change,
but a profound cultural change” in that it divides Cllrs who would regard
themselves as being “‘equal’” (Leach, 1999, p.79) . Furthermore it is argued “such
a reversal of cultural change will require a sustained reconstruction of political life”
(Rao 2000, p.195).
In terms of an evaluation of the new political structures it has also been questioned
whether they would encourage greater interest in councils (Cole, 2001). For
example, it is argued that if operated correctly the committee system would
provide open debate (Rao, 1999; Copus, 2003) and may well have been “the most
inclusive and flexible of all possible systems” (Rao, 2000, p.2). Also “in the areas
of public questioning, public advocacy, and the opportunity for the involvement of
public representatives in the political process” (Fenwick, et al, 2003, p.44) the
committee system may have been more effective.
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In addition, democratic renewal was not just a requirement of local government,
but an “inherent weakness in the culture of democracy” (Rao, 2000, p.3) and other
measures could be tried to improve participation. For example, turnout at elections
could be improved by a change of polling day (Ibid). Democratic renewal “was an
inevitable part of the modernisation programme” but there was a “focus on new
political structures, whose contribution to democratic renewal is at best uncertain”
(Stewart, 2003 p.246). Indeed, he adds:
the main weakness of the government’s programme... through its legislation it
is focused on the attention of local authorities on new political structures rather
than on the need for the involvement of citizens in the work of local government
(Ibid, 2003, p.54).
Finally, although writing in the context of the role of the executive, Snape possibly
summarises an overall view of the modernisation programme:
The government has failed to realise that ‘winning hearts and minds’ is
essential to produce real enduring change in local government. And
government will never win hearts and minds through prescription and
regulation (Snape, 2000, p.174).
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter has provided a detailed review of literature on local government in the
UK by detailing the justification of local government and its relationship to central
government, the ideological approaches to local government in the last 30 years
and the changes to local government made by New Labour as part of its
modernisation agenda. The next chapter outlines the development of the O&S
function, the role of O&S and details the roles of the different actors in O&S and
those factors which influence its effectiveness.
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Chapter 3 Overview and Scrutiny
3.1 Introduction
Chapter 2 has detailed the origins of the new political structures, which
concentrated decision making powers within local executives. This chapter will
outline the key issues regarding O&S; specifically the development of the O&S
function, the role of O&S and details the roles of the different actors in O&S and
those factors which influence its effectiveness.
3.2 The Origins of Overview and Scrutiny
The introduction of executives into local government was seen as a reproduction
of the executive in central government, therefore the precedent for O&S was the
departmental Parliamentary Select Committees (PSC), which hold to account the
decisions, policy and administration of the executive in Parliament. The PSC have
had varying degrees of success in this role, but have been hindered by the
influence of adversarial party politics (Leach and Copus 2004) and the strength of
the executive in Parliament. The Local Government Act 2000 aimed to “provide
sufficient checks and balances...to ensure that... transparency and accountability
were not undermined by the drive to stronger executive leadership” (Gains, 2006,
p.5). Section 21(2) of the Act required that O&S has the power to:
 Review or scrutinise decisions or action taken in respect of any functions
which are the responsibility of the executive
 Make reports or recommendations to the local authority or the executive in
respect of any functions which are the responsibility of the executive
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 Review or scrutinise decisions or action taken in respect of any functions
which are not the responsibility of the executive
 Make reports or recommendations to the local authority or the executive in
respect of any functions which are not the responsibility of the executive
and
 Make reports or recommendations to the local authority or the executive in
respect of matters which affect the local authority's area or its inhabitants
(DCLG, 2006b, para: 3.2).
As can be seen from the above, the legislation is unprescriptive and with no
“systematic pilot study” (Cole, 2001a, p,19) to assist, there was “little clarity on
powers and sanctions that might be made available to scrutiny committees”
(Ashworth, 2005, p.2). Subsequently, local authorities may have had difficulty
establishing their O&S function (Snape and Taylor, 2001, p.1). However, this lack
of prescription was also seen as an advantage as it “allows huge leeway for
creativity and innovation” (CfPS, 2010, p.6). Therefore, the creation and
implementation of O&S can be viewed as “experimental and aspirational” (Stoker,
et al, 2004, p.45). Furthermore, Snape, Leach, and Copus (2002) suggested that:
Overview and scrutiny is potentially the most exciting and powerful element of
the entire local government modernisation process. It places members at the
heart of policy-making and at the heart of the way in which Councils respond to
the demands of modernisation... (and is) the mechanism by which Councils
can achieve active community leadership, good governance and by which
councillors can become powerful and influential politicians (Snape, Leach, and
Copus, 2002, p.7).
Indeed, it is argued that O&S has been the hardest element of LGMA to implement
and work effectively (Wilson and Game, 2006) as it is “a qualitatively different
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system, and it therefore needs to be approached and used in a qualitatively
different way” (Sandford and Maer, 2004, p.10).
3.3 Defining Overview and Scrutiny Roles
O&S was originally intended to be just ‘scrutiny’, as it was to hold to account the
decisions and performance of the executive, however, this was seen as a “limited
and negative” focus (Stewart, 2003 p.75). As a result the function was
“broadened” to include policy review and “provide a more satisfying role for non-
executive members and to provide a more effective check and balance to the
power of the executive” (Snape, 2000, p.161). Government guidance on O&S
(DETR, 1998, para 3.16) described the role of O&S as:
 Considering broad policy issues
 Evaluating executive proposals
 Advising the executive before final decisions were taken
 Reviewing executive decisions and policy implementation
 Producing reports and recommendations (Cole, 2001b, p.239).
While for Sandford and Maer, the practicalities of O&S involved: holding the
executive to account; contributing to policy development and review; scrutinising
external partners; undertaking performance monitoring (including Best Value); and
participating in the setting of the annual budget (Sandford and Maer, 2004 p.23).
A number of additional processes and activities have been identified (see Figure
6) that could also be utilised by O&S. These range from internal activities, such as
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discussion within committee meetings, officer reports and presentations,
interviewing members and officers, to joint working with partner organisations and
co-option of representatives of user groups. The underlying principles of such
activities and process include transparency, accountability, responsiveness,
inclusivity, flexibility and the power to influence (Snape and Taylor, 2001, p.6).
Figure 6: Overview and Scrutiny Processes and Activities adapted from (Snape
and Taylor, 2001, p.14)
Internal processes
 discussion within committee meetings
 Officer reports and presentations
 interviewing members and officers
 desk-based review of available
internal and external documentation
 site visits within the authority
 case studies
 commissioned internal research.
External processes – engaging
partners
 co-option of representatives of partner
organisations
 joint working with partner
organisations
 interviewing partners
 visits to partners
 workshops/discussions with partners.
External processes – general:
 interviewing expert witnesses
 conference attendance
 visits to other authorities and other
organisations; and
 commissioning external research.
External processes -engaging the
public and users of services:
 co-option of representatives of user
groups
 interviewing representatives of user
groups
 workshops
 public meetings
 researching public/user views
 press releases and media launches.
Source: Adapted from Snape and Taylor (2001, p.14).
3.3.1 Members Role in Overview and Scrutiny
It has been said that New Labour’s reforms of local government have produced
the “most profound revolution in political management arrangements since the
party politicisation of the 1960s and 1970s” (Snape and Dobbs, 2003, p.47) and
has been “an attempt fundamentally to change the way councillors approach their
business” (Fenwick, et al, 2003, p.32). The separation of members into executive
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and O&S roles divides the council and while executive members have become the
focus of leadership and decision making, the non-executive members’ role has
been seen as merely to “nit-pick over decisions already taken by an elite few”
(Snape and Taylor, 2001, p.1). This goes against, arguably, the primary motivation
of members in that they “go into local government to make a difference and make
decisions” (Davis and Geddes, 2000 p.17). Modernising Local Government: Local
Democracy and Community Leadership (DETR, 1998) stated that members, as
community champions, will now represent the concerns of their constituents
through O&S (Cole, 2001a). Therefore the role of O&S is to influence the
decisions of the executive and/or policy committees (Rao, 1999, p.267).
The traditional role of a Cllr has been that of:
 Representative e.g. elected and accountable to their constituents
 Community leader e.g. working in partnership with other organisations
 Policy maker e.g. initiates, develops & reviews policy
 Monitor/progress chaser e.g. evaluating the effectiveness of policy delivery
 Party activist e.g. representing the party in debates and discussions (Snape
and Dobbs, 2003, p.51).
O&S has had an impact on the generic Cllr roles. As can be seen the impact has
been potentially negative as well as positive. For example:
 Representative - O&S is an additional forum to raise issues, but ‘parochial’
issues may be excluded
 Community leader – O&S of external bodies such as the NHS
45
 Policy maker – O&S can review existing policy but does not make new
policy
 Monitor & progress chaser – members dislike Best Value reviews
 Party activist – O&S tries to exclude party politics (Ibid).
In addition Snape and Dobbs have identified three further roles which, if combined
with those above, could be described as the meta role of “scrutineer”. They are:
 Lobbyist – influencing decision makers
 Policy analyst – using evidence more than traditional committees
 Challenger - holding the executive to account (Ibid, pp.59-60).
Table 3: Duties Undertaken as a Non-Executive Member Related to Overview and
Scrutiny
Duties Undertaken as a Non-Executive Member Related to O&S
Joined a task and finish group 65%
Pushed for an item to go on an overview and scrutiny agenda 59%
Been involved in policy development 48%
Visited outside organisations in relation to a scrutiny activity 47%
Called in a decision from the executive 29%
Achieved significant publicity for a scrutiny activity 25%
Source: Adapted from Stoker, et al (2004, p.51).
Previous research has shown that members are involved in O&S in a number of
different ways. Table 3 shows the percentage of non-executive members involved
in activities related to O&S. They range from Called in a decision from the
executive (29%) to Joined a task and finish group (65%). Moving forward to 2006
and 2009 and survey work undertaken by CfPS (see Table 4) found that members
are increasingly participating in O&S activities e.g. critically challenging decision-
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makers (88% in 2009) and monitoring outcomes of previous work (85% in 2009).
These activities illustrate an important aspect of O&S in that “a vital part of this
process is simply the willingness to make overview and scrutiny work. It is not a
passive system” (Sandford, and Maer, 2004, p.51). Indeed one of the CfPS 4
principles of good scrutiny states that O&S should be led by members (CfPS,
2006c).
Table 4: Members Roles in Overview and Scrutiny
% of AuthoritiesMembers Roles in O&S
2009 2006
Presenting recommendations 83% 84%
Monitoring outcomes of previous work 85% 75%
Critically challenging decision-makers 88% 79%
Proposing/writing recommendations 67% 67%
Presenting an annual report to council 69% 63%
Conducting research outside of meetings 54% 63%
Proposing scrutiny topics at the public's request 56% 50%
Publicising the work of scrutiny 41% N/A
Writing reports 20% 20%
Adapted from CfPS annual surveys 2006 and 2009.
There are a number of other factors that impact on members involvement in O&S.
Firstly the experience of members of the old committee system. Members used to
the old system are more likely to be negative towards O&S whereas “new
members were far more eager than existing ones to get involved in, and make use
of the scrutiny process” (Sandford, and Maer, 2004, p.51).
Secondly, Government guidance recognised that all those involved in O&S would
require training (DETR, 1998). The Audit Commission identified specific skills such
as being able to:
 Assess
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 Probe
 Understand performance indicators and financial processes
 Compare data (Audit Commission, 2002a, p.24).
Subsequently there is an expectation that members “take part in such training and
development opportunities as an integral part of their role as a councillors” (Snape,
Leach and Copus, 2002 p.72). Indeed the need for training emphasised just how
different the way of working in O&S and the old committee system were (Wilson
and Game, 2006).
Thirdly, although it was envisaged that members would spend less time in
committees, “the new political structure place similar demands on members time
as the old committee system (Davis and Geddes, 2000, p.17). Indeed it is argued
that O&S:
has proved more time-consuming than traditional committee work. To probe
into policy issues, to identify community concerns or to examine in depth
apparent service-failures cannot be carried out on the basis of a single meeting
on a four or six-week cycle – or even longer. It can require several meetings
and the active involvement of councillors. Where it has been successful, Cllrs
have not experienced the reduction in time commitments anticipated by the
Government (Jones and Stewart 2008, p.2).
Research has found that Cllrs in 2008 spent an average of 22 hours per week:
 Attending council, party and committees meetings (9.8 hours)
 On constituency work (7.5 hours)
 In external activities, e.g. meetings, seminars, training, travel related to
council (5.6 hours) (National Foundation for Educational Research, 2009).
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In summary, the generic role of a Cllr has been altered with the impact of O&S.
They can now be regarded as a ‘scrutineer’ lobbying decision-makers, analysing
policy and challenging the executive. Indeed it is argued that the role of the non-
executive Cllr has been made “infinitely more interesting” (Leach 2009 p.6) and
“they could have more influence on shaping policy or evaluating its impact than
many of them would ever have under the committee system.” (Wilson and Game
2006, p.115). However, even if members are said to have greater influence and a
more interesting role it does not mitigate the “key point” that members are no
longer part of the “formal decision-making role” (Fenwick and Elcock, 2004,
p.530).
3.3.2 The Expanding Role of Overview and Scrutiny
There have been a number of areas where the role of O&S has been expanded.
These include:
Health
The Health and Social Care Act (2001), and the subsequent guidance, established
an O&S role in health provision. Local authorities often formed Joint Health OSC
to investigate health issues and make recommendations to local NHS bodies, who
when “there is a substantial development or variation to health services...are
required to consult with the relevant OSC” (CfPS, 2010, p.18).
External partners
The importance of O&S of external partners has been highlighted as local
authorities “engage partners to revolve the wicked, cross-cutting issues” (Leach
2005, p22). Indeed it is stated that:
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external reviews place the individual member at centre stage and require a
recognition that the member has the potential to direct and influence the
activities of other powerful organisations and agencies that impact on the
quality of life of local communities (Snape, 2002 p.70).
The Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act (2007) allowed O&S
“to scrutinise other organisations which deliver services on the council’s behalf, or
...have a significant impact on the well-being of the local community” (CfPS, 2010,
p.22), such as Local Area Agreement partners. The Local Authorities (Overview
and Scrutiny) Bill had intended to extend O&S powers over a wider range of
organisations, however it was not enacted due to the general election in 2010
(DCLG, 2010, p.10).
Policing
The Police and Justice Act (2006) gave power to O&S to review Crime and
Disorder Reduction Partnerships, but not the police themselves. (CfPS, 2010)
Councillor Call for Action and Petitions
New Labour sought to strengthen O&S and increase the involvement of local
communities. The white paper Strong and Prosperous Communities envisaged
Cllrs as ‘champions of communities’ in addition to the ‘critical friend’ of the
executives (DCLG, 2006a). The Local Government and Public Involvement in
Health Act (2007) allowed members and the public to raise issues with O&S via
petitions and Councillor Call for Action (CCfA) when they had not been resolved
through normal processes (CfPS, 2009b).
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3.3.3 Overview and Scrutiny Work programmes
One of the ‘principles’ of O&S is that it is a member-led function (CfPS, 2006a). All
members can suggest topics for their committee’s work programmes, however
there are a number of variables that need to be taken into consideration, when
selecting and finalising them.
Firstly, “the job of a UK councillor in either a committee or an executive system is
both multifaceted and potentially extremely demanding” (Wilson and Game, 2006,
p.269). As both member and officer time is limited, “committees should focus on
areas where they can have the greatest effect” (Sandford and Maer, 2004,p.26).
Secondly, it is suggested that, as O&S can slow down decision-making, therefore
members should select “only a small number of issues per year... for intensive,
deliberative investigation” and be “carried out judiciously” (Ibid, p.26).
Thirdly, the work programme is not planned too far in advance and is able to adapt
to unforeseen issues. Thus, “six month work programmes are probably more
workable than annual or two yearly programmes” (Snape and Taylor, 2001, p.11).
Fourthly, as most authorities have combined OSC’s, members need to find a
balance between the ‘overview’ and ‘scrutiny’ roles (Cole, 2001b). If O&S is
“focused on ‘scrutiny’ of past decisions then it will be to the detriment of policy
development” (Stewart, 2003, p.80). However if members concentrate on the
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‘overview’ role the relationship with the executive1 “may become too cosy. The
‘critical’ part of the ‘critical friend’ metaphor is just as important as the ‘friend’ part”
(Snape, Leach, and Copus 2002, p.87).
Fifthly, while opposition members should be able to suggest topics as freely as
majority party members it is suggested that issues that are party political2 should
be avoided as “it will affect the political climate of overview and scrutiny in the
authority” (Leach, 2009b, p.15).
3.3.4 Overview and Scrutiny Recommendations
Ultimately the power to influence is made through the reports and
recommendations made by O&S. The percentage of recommendations accepted
by authorities has remained above 80% over a six year period. However it is the
percentage of those recommendations that have been implemented, which is
crucial. This has fallen from 83% to 74% over the same period (see Table 5).
Analysis of the survey data suggested there was a correlation between the
influence of party politics on O&S and authorities that have “a lower percentage of
recommendations accepted” (CfPS, 2009, p.12). Those authorities that have the
specialist model of officer support3 “are more likely to have higher acceptance and
implementation rates” (Ibid).
1 See section 3.5.4 p.74 for the relationship between O&S and the executive.
2 See section 3.5.2, p.69 for the party politics and O&S.
3 See Table 6, p.64 for Models of O&S Support.
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Table 5: Overview and Scrutiny Recommendations Accepted/Implemented 2004 -
2009
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Accepted 87% 81% 83% 81% 80% 85%
Implemented 83% 71% 74% 71% 70% 74%
Source: CfPS surveys 2004 -2009
3.3.5 The Call-In Procedure
As described above, a key role of the non-executive member is to hold the
executive to account and one of the provisions of the Local Government Act
(2000) was the creation of the call-in procedure. This allows O&S to request the
executive or officers to review their decisions, which have not been enacted, if
O&S consider it to “be contrary to the authority’s decision making principles” (CfPS
2006, p.3). Call-in requests:
 Must only be made in exceptional circumstances
 Must be compelling
 And can be limited to non-urgent decisions, decisions outside the policy
framework or budget (Ibid).
The call-in procedure for each individual authority is written into their constitution
and has three elements:
 The call-in period - the period available after publication of a decision during
which members can call-in the decision
 The call in trigger - the method used to call-in a decision
 Exemptions and limitations on the scope of call-in (Stoker et al, 2004, p.46).
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Figure 7 highlights the dominant model of call-in in England. As can be seen, the
call-in request is five working days following the publication of the decision and the
number of persons required to make the request is at least three non-executive
members. Table 6 shows examples of the exemptions and limitations to the call-in
procedure and the percentage of authorities who use them.
Figure 7: The Dominant Model of Call-in in English Local Authorities
The dominant model would allow 5 working days for a decision to be
called-in following its publication.

At least 3 authorised signatories would be required to do so, comprising
either OSC Members or non-executive councillors.

An OSC, or other specified panel, will be required to meet to discuss a
called-in decision within 5 working days of this action.

If the OSC or other panel agrees that there is a case for the decision to
be called-in, a meeting of the executive or decision maker will be held
within 10 working days of the OSC meeting.
Source: CfPS (2006, p.7).
The rules for call-in detailed above, may be regarded as necessary, but they can
also serve as barriers, and reduce the number of call-in requests (Stoker et al
2004). For example, if call-in requests from majority or opposition members are
made to majority party chairs then they could be readily rejected as to not
embarrass the ruling executive. Alternatively members’ justification for the call-in
may only be political. Therefore there is a “balance to draw between majority
parties voting down irksome call-ins and allowing minority parties to call in
enormous numbers of decisions” (Sandford and Maer 2004, p.31). Given the
potential for politically motivated call-in requests and decisions it would be
appropriate that an authorities monitoring officer (or some other senior officer)
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determines the appropriateness of the call-in request rather than O&S chairs
(Leach, 2009b).
Table 6: English Local Authorities’ Procedures for Call-in
 70% allow 5 working days in which a decision may be called in before it is
implemented
 47% allow only OSC members to call-in a decision
 37% allow the chair of an OSC to call-in a decision alone
 51% allow non-executive Cllrs who are not members of an OSC to call-in a
decision
 35% require at least 3 authorised signatories to call-in a decision
 14% require cross, or multi-party support for a decision to be called-in
 2% allow the public to call-in a decision
 21% require an OSC to meet within 5 days of a decision to call-in and 20%
require a meeting within 10 days
 14% require a called-in decision to be re-considered by the decision-maker
within 10 days of the OSC’s meeting
 On average, 1 extra day is allowed for the decision-maker to reconsider than
for the OSC to meet
 8% impose financial restrictions on the decision eligible for call-in, with £25,000
being the most common amount
 9% limit the number of decisions that may be called-in per annum, with 12
being the most prevalent amount
 4% limit the number of decision that a single member may call-in, or be party to
calling-in, per annum, with 4 being the most likely restriction.
Source: CfPS (2006, pp.3-4).
Research has shown that it is in fact the desire of members only to use call-in as a
last option, when all other means have been exhausted, that is the greatest limit to
its use (Sandford and Maer, 2004; Leach, 2005). It is also suggested that
members will not use call-in as it is seen by senior Cllrs and officers as a failure of
the O&S function itself. Subsequently to have no call-in requests during a year is
not unknown (Leach, 2009b) and the average number of call-ins in 2009 was only
2.5 (CfPS, 2009). Therefore, it is suggested that members do not understand fully,
and have failed to utilise the potential of call-in. As Leach states:
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Major changes of attitude are required here if call-in is to play its proper role...If
used responsibly, it provides a key mechanism for (holding to account) and
contributes materially to the democratic vitality of the authority (Leach 2005,
p.9).
3.4 The Structure of Overview and Scrutiny
The white paper, Local Leadership: Local Choice, stated that local councils “must
set up one or more overview and scrutiny committees” (DETR, 1999 para 3.15),
although government guidance on the Local Government Act 2000 allowed the
smaller 4th option councils to have only one scrutiny committee (DETR, 2000, para
3.20) and one policy committee. With regard to the number of OSC committees, it
was envisaged that they would have a “cross-cutting rather than narrow service-
based view of the conduct of the local authority's business” and therefore, there
would be “a relatively small number of such committees” (DETR, 2000, para 3.21).
It is recognised that “quite properly, councils themselves decide how to organise
the O&S function” (Wilson and Game, 2006, p2.67) and there are a number of
decisions for members to make. Firstly, how many OSC? The CfPS annual survey
(2009), reported that the number of OSC varied between 1 -11, and the average
number was 4 (CfPS,2009, p.3). Secondly, most authorities do not have separate
‘overview’ and ‘scrutiny’ committees, mainly for practical reasons, however it is
argued that “there is merit in seeking to separate out the two roles, so that in each
case members are clear what is expected of them” (Leach, 2009b, p.32). Thirdly,
will the OSC mirror cabinet portfolios, service directorates, or “form cross-cutting
committees which match neither portfolios or directorates” (Sandford and Maer,
2004, p.15). Finally, many authorities have chosen to create an O&S co-ordination
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committee (sometimes referred to as a management board or forum). The
composition of these co-ordination committees often include the overall chair of
O&S4, the chairs/vice chairs of the OSC and, if they do not hold such posts,
opposition members to ensure political balance. The advantage of such a
committee is that it:
provides a degree of parity with the executive... strengthens the ability of
overview and scrutiny chairs to negotiate with the executive over work
programme items...(and) provides a forum in which key players from different
parties can develop a set of understandings about legitimate processes for
(opposition-led) challenge (Leach, 2009b, p.31).
The responsibilities of the co-ordination committee are determined by each
individual authority, but in general they are to:
 Develop the work programme with the OSC and the executive
 Ensuring no overlaps and missed issues between OSC
 Co-ordinate the scrutiny of the annual budget
 Commission its own task-and-finish groups
 Review and make changes to the O&S function (Sandford and Maer, 2004;
Leach, 2009b).
Previous research has identified four structural approaches to O&S (see Figure 8).
Briefly they are:
 Multiple OSC that combine the holding to account and policy review roles
and allows many members to address cross-cutting issues
4 It is suggested that an opposition member should be the overall chair of O&S (Leach,
2009, p.31). See section 3.5.3, p.71 on the allocation of chairs/vice chairs.
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 Multiple scrutiny committees with a co-ordinating forum to manage
duplication of work and gaps between committees
 Single standing committee that is flexible to the ‘overview’ and ‘scrutiny’
roles, but potentially limits the number of members involved
 Role differentiation model that separates the ‘overview’ and ‘scrutiny’ roles
into separate committees giving clarity to participating members. (Snape,
Leach, and Copus 2002 pp. 48 and 51).
Other research has shown that nearly 69% of councils have adopted the multiple
OSC structure (see Table 7). The smaller 4th option authorities will account for
many of those that have only one OSC and less than 10% of those that responded
to the survey in 2009 have separate ‘scrutiny’ and ‘overview’ committees
(CfPS,2009, p.3). Indeed, it is suggested that by having separate roles so
“members are clear what is expected of them” (Leach, 2009b, p.32).
3.4.1 The Style of Overview and Scrutiny
The manner or style in which the OSCs operate is integral to an effective O&S
function: three models of committee have been identified (see Figure 9). Firstly,
the traditional committee or “traditional service committees ‘in disguise’” has
continued as “members and officers simply assume the same behaviour and
activities that they have always performed” rather than change their culture.
(Snape, Leach, and Copus 2002, p.10) Secondly, the Parliamentary Select
Committee style changes the physical layout of the OSC (Leach 2005) and
focuses on the questioning of members, officers and witnesses for evidence
gathering to bring about effective challenge. However it can be seen as
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Figure 8: Overview and Scrutiny Structural Approaches
Structural
approach
Description Potential
advantages
Potential
disadvantages
Multiple OSC (no
coordinating forum)
 Two to seven or
eight
 Have a mix of
cross-cutting
and functional
remit
 More Members
involved
 Concentrate on
key cross-cutting
issues
 Members
develop
specialisms
 Spreads high
workload
 Can mirror
cabinet portfolios
 Allows
experimentation
in approaches
 Gaps or overlaps
between OSC
 Understanding
crosscutting briefs
 Strain on officer
support
 Retention of
committee culture
 Inconsistency of
approach
Multiple OSC with a
co-ordinating forum
As above but with
co-ordinating forum
As above, also
 Gaps and
duplication are
managed
 Lessons are
learned across
OSC
 Single voice for
O&S and powerful
position for chair of
the forum
 Gaps or overlaps
between OSC
 Understanding
crosscutting briefs
 Strain on officer
support
 Retention of
committee culture
Single standing
OSC
One OSC and task
and finish working
groups
 Flexibility
 Avoids an overly
bureaucratic
 Easier officer
support to
 A cohesive O&S
team
 Limits the number
of members
involved in O&S
 Cuts down on
Members
specialisms
 Difficult to
undertake a high
workload
Different structures
for different roles
Separate scrutiny
and policy
development
committees
 Ensures distinct
roles are not
neglected
 Clarifies the
different roles
involved
 Members
specialise their role
 Can ‘free up’ other
scrutiny structures
from difficult tasks
 Overlaps and
duplication of
overview and
scrutiny
committees
 Some structures
can prove more
popular than
others with
Members and
officers
Source: Adapted from Snape, Leach, and Copus (2002, pp.49-50).
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intimidating to some participants. Finally, the Participative style is the furthest
removed from the old committee system. It is regarded as being more suitable for
engagement with the public and partners and builds a more informal relationship
between members and officers. However, its informality may not always be
appropriate (Snape, et al 2002).
In summary, the guidance issued by the government, recognised that the structure
of O&S is best determined by each individual authority. The adopted structure of
committees will reflect its size, the members available to participate in O&S, officer
support and the prevailing culture of the authority. Within England and
Table 7: Structure of Overview and Scrutiny Committees in England and Wales
Structure of O&S Committees in England and Wales5
Committee Structure 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005
Multiple overview and scrutiny
committees 69% 64% 65% 54% 59%
One "scrutiny" committee and multiple
"overview" committees 9% 7% 12% 8% 16%
One OSC that commissions time-
limited panels 16% 19% 17% 12% 14%
One OSC that does all the work 5% 11% 7% 8% 7%
Other 0% 0% 0% 18% 5%
Source: CfPS (2009, p.3).
Wales members and officers have indicated that multiple combined ‘overview’ and
‘scrutiny’ committees are most preferred, with some instances of single
committees being operated by smaller and 4th option authorities. There are also
concerns that the traditional committee style of operating O&S still remains “with
its regular cycle of meetings, its routine-ised agenda and a style of chairing
5 Total of percentages may not equal 100% as rounding completed by CfPS.
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Figure 9: Models of Overview and Scrutiny Committee Style
Model Traditional Committee Parliamentary
Select Committee
Participative
Description  A committee system ‘in
disguise’. The
committee: meets in
the same venue as
pre-new structures;
Members and Officers
sit in the same places;
agenda, minutes and
reports are unchanged;
Members and Officers
behave as in the
committee system;
activities are meetings-
based
 O&S committees
mirror the style of
parliamentary
select committees,
in particular: the
layout of select
committees; the
emphasis on oral
evidence with
internal and
external
witnesses; reports
which fully cover
the evidence
gathered
 Less formal, more
participative
approach to the
work of overview
and scrutiny. Can
involve
brainstorming,
workshops, site
visits, mystery
shopping, and
more informal
partnership
between Members
and Officers
Potential
advantages
 Members and Officers
are familiar and
comfortable with the
way of working
 Holds cabinet and
senior Officers to
account in public
 Brings in external
opinion and
expertise
 Evidence-based
approach
 Can be highly
effective approach
for engaging
partners and the
public
 Develops
questioning and
analytical skills of
Members
 Can develop
effective team
work between
Members and
Officers
 Particularly
appropriate for
contact with
Members of
public/user
groups/certain
partnership
organisations as it
is less intimidating
 Can be a relatively
cost-effective
approach
Potential
disadvantages
 Ultimately frustrating
for Members since the
key element for
Members decision
making is not present
 Undervalues the
potential of overview
and scrutiny
 Fails to recognise that
a different role requires
a different approach
 Intimidating
environment for
less senior
Officers
 Intimidating
environment for
Members of public
as witnesses/user
groups/certain
partner
organisations
 Highly resource
intensive in terms
of Member and
Officer time
 The lack of
formality may not
be conducive to
undertaking
certain roles
 Can be criticised
as less evidence-
based
 Unfamiliar
approach for many
Members and
Officers
Source: Snape, Leach, and Copus (2002, p.52).
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focusing more on getting the business through than on facilitating discussion”
(Stewart, 2003 p.80), and that the adoption of the other styles (more appropriate
for challenge and engaging with the public) will require a more radical change in
culture, for example more deliberation and less consultation outside of the
committee room.
3.4.2 Overview and Scrutiny Resources
In Local Leadership, Local Choice (DETR, 1999), New Labour recognised that
O&S would require some separate administrative and financial support. In
addition, guidance on the implementation of O&S stated that “to be effective,
overview and scrutiny committees must have effective and properly resourced
support from officers” (DETR, 2000, para: 3.45) and that “Local authorities should
provide overview and scrutiny committees with a discrete budget” (Ibid, para:
3.46). This, however, has been described as one of the most “controversial and
contentious aspects of the new political management arrangements” (Snape,
Leach and Copus, 2002, p.81); specifically, the challenge to the unified officer
structure. Local government officers have always served the whole council, but
now had a potentially conflicting role serving both distinctive and separate
executive and O&S functions. (Cole, 2001b; Wilson and Game, 2006). Therefore
“authorities were resisting making a hard split between those officers supporting
scrutiny and those supporting the executive” (Fox, 2004, p.388). However the
sustainability of unified officer structure had already been questioned (Fox and
Leach, 1999; Audit Commission, 2001). The traditional view that chief executives
and senior officers work for the whole council was already questioned by
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opposition members, who would argue that they worked for the majority party and
now the suggestion was the focus of officers would be on the new executives
(Stewart, 2003). Indeed it is argued that the unified officer structure and the unified
advice it offers to members “has to be jettisoned” for effective O&S as, “legitimate
professional differences ...should come to be valued, setting the scene for a much
more open and creative form of public debate” (Leach, 2005, p.27). On a practical
level, O&S requires dedicated officers because there needs to be more flexible
administration of OSC than traditional committees and research and analysis to
help OSC investigations (Stewart, 2003). However, there are other more
compelling reasons for dedicated officers. Firstly, O&S in authorities with no O&S
officers is “noticeably underdeveloped, lacking a champion within the authority to
make sense of the role” (Sandford and Maer, 2004, p.7). It was envisaged that a
senior officer, such as a director, would champion O&S other than those directly
involved with it. Secondly:
provided he or she has the requisite qualities (analytical ability, political
acumen, networking ability) one dedicated individual can transform the
performance of overview and scrutiny in a small shire district (Leach, 2005,
p.26).
Thirdly, it is argued that O&S functions with dedicated officers:
 Do more pro-active work
 Support more working groups
 Prepare members better for meetings
 Have more time to take evidence
 Have recommendations accepted because they are thoughtfully written and
presented (Sandford and Maer, 2004).
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Fourthly, discretionary budgets give O&S the resources to interview witnesses,
arrange fact finding visits and commission expert advice when they require it;
independently from the rest of the council. However O&S has had to obtain this
funding from within the authority. It is said that they have not been directly funded
by central government as O&S is seen as “self-financing” from the financial
savings it makes for the local authority (Sandford and Maer, 2004, p.33).
Finally, it is argued that dedicated officers and discretionary budgets are not
sufficient as O&S will require assistance from within the authority. Therefore it is
suggested that “scrutiny link officers” from the middle tier of management -
preferably with research or performance responsibilities - “facilitate the work of
overview and scrutiny in the authority”, and a senior manager, preferably with
responsibility for performance acts as a “scrutiny champion” to promote the work
and understanding of the O&S function within the authority (Leach, 2009b, pp.28-
29). The average number of full-time equivalent (FTE) dedicated officers in
England and Wales in 2009 was 3, with the smaller district authorities averaging
1.5, whereas the larger county councils had 4.3 and unitary authorities 3.6 (CfPS,
2009). This is in contrast to 2005 when the average number of FTE dedicated
officers was 2.6, district authorities averaged 1.2, county councils 4 and unitary
authorities 2.8 (CfPS, 2005). The approach to officer support of O&S is described
as either minimal, integrated or specialist (see Figure 10) with the differences
primarily being between the level of dedicated support.
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Figure 10: Approaches to Officer Support
Minimal Direct Officer support is provided by committee Officers, who also provide
support to other political forums, such as the executive, full Council and so on.
Integrated Direct Officer support is provided, on a part-time basis, from a variety
of sources, including committee services, Officers within departments and
corporate policy Officers. All these Officers also undertake work for the executive.
Specialist Direct Officer support is provided by a scrutiny support unit with
dedicated Officers, who only work to their overview and scrutiny committees.
Source: Snape and Taylor (2001, p.12).
The annual surveys of O&S members and officers by the CfPS shows that for the
period 2006-2009 (when the data can be compared) there is an increasing move
to the specialist model (see Table 8). Minimal support is most likely to be found in
47% of the smaller district/borough authorities, whereas 67% of county councils
and 61% of unitary authorities in 2009 are more likely to have the resources to
support the specialist model.
Table 8: Models of Overview and Scrutiny Support
Minimal
(Committee)
Model
Integrated
Model
Specialist
Model
OtherAuthority
Type
2006 2009 2006 2009 2006 2009 2006 2009
County
Council 8% 17% 17% 4% 75% 67% N/A 13%
District/Borough
Councils 47% 47% 22% 4% 31% 41% N/A 8%
London
Borough 6% 18% 22% 5% 73% 68% N/A 9%
Metropolitan
Boroughs 19% 19% 13% 0% 69% 67% N/A 14%
Unitary
Authorities 15% 26% 15% 9% 70% 61% N/A 4%
Welsh
Authorities 25% 17% 25% 0% 50% 75% N/A 8%
All
Authorities 31% 33% 19% 4% 47% 55% N/A 8%
Adapted from CfPS Annual Survey 2006 and 2009
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With regard to discretionary budgets, after rising substantially in 2005 they have
fallen back to 2004 levels in 2009 (see Table 9). Again it is the smaller
district/borough council that have the lowest: approximately £5,000 in 2009, with
county councils £10,000 and unitary councils £20,000 (CfPS, 2009). In summary,
there are still authorities that have no dedicated O&S officer support (Leach,
2009b) and the lack of dedicated Officer support to O&S in some authorities has
been described as “indefensible” (Wilson and Game, 2006, p.115). Dedicated
officer support has been established and grown, especially in the larger
authorities, but after a high in 2005 of £18,141 average dedicated budgets have
fallen to £8,687.
Table 9: Average Discretionary Budgets All
Average discretionary budgets
all authorities
2004 £8,280
2005 £18,141
2006 £11,772
2007 £11,853
2008 £9,917
2009 £8,687
Source: Authorities CfPS Annual Survey 2006 and 2009
They now have a greater chance of effective O&S as “dedicated units provide ...
analytical capacity geared specifically to the requirements of the overview and
scrutiny process” (Snape, Leach and Copus 2002, p.81). However, even well
resourced O&S cannot command the resources of the whole authority. Therefore
effective O&S requires “an increased flexibility on the part of all professional
officers” (Ibid).
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3.5 The Political ‘Culture’ of Councils
Every local authority is unique and a significant reason for this is the political
‘culture’ of councils. As Wilson and Game note:
Understate its significance, and one risks completely misunderstanding how
and where the most important council decisions are actually made. Overstate
it, and one falls into the trap off assuming that all councils are run on tightly
disciplined party lines, and that all decisions are party-based (Wilson and
Game, 2006, p.297).
The majority of councils in England have political party systems and most of the
Cllrs are elected as candidates for, and organised by, national political parties
(Young and Davies, 1990). There are fewer independents and minority party Cllrs,
although they are still represented in rural areas (Wilson and Game, 2006) and
this has been the trend in the UK especially since local government reorganisation
in the 1970’s (Gyford et al, 1989 in Wilson and Game, 2006). As such “local
representation is viewed by a Cllr through the prism of the political party group”
(Leach and Copus, 2004, p.337). In 2005/06, of the 46 unitary authorities in
England (the focus of this research), the majority had fully developed party
systems and most were dominated by two or one parties (see Table 10).
Table 10: Party Systems in Unitary Authorities in England 2005/06
Party System and Definition Total
Completely/Predominantly Non-Partisan (60% or more seats
held by Independents)
0
Weak Partisan (20-59% seats held by Independents) 5
Multi-Party/Fragmented (20% or more seats held by third
party/parties)
10
Two-Party (80% or more seats held by two parties, neither more
than 60%)
17
One-Party Dominant (60-75% of seats held by one party) 12
One-Party Monopolistic (75% or more seats held by one party) 2
Total 46
Adapted from: Wilson and Game, 2006, p.298.
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There are a number of advantages and disadvantages to party politics in local
government (see Figure 11).
Figure 11: The Pros and Cons of Party Politics in Local Government
The Merits and Benefits The Counter-claims
 More candidates and fewer
uncontested seats
 More active campaigning
 Clarification of issues via party policy
 More citizen awareness and interest
in local government
 Stimulation of change and initiative
via development of party policy
 More opportunities for public
involvement
 Enhanced accountability as party
pledges can be held to account
 Governmental coherence following a
decisive election result
 Enhanced local democracy by
electoral endorsement of party
policy.
 More party candidates fewer
Independents
 Narrower debating of issues
 Less electoral enlightenment as
debate is polarised
 Electoral boredom of electors
 Less public involvement as public do
not want to join parties
 Nationalisation of local elections as
national issues dominate
 Reduced representativeness of
councils
 Excessive party politicisation of
issues
 Reduced local democracy
 Exclusion of professional advice
Adapted from: Wilson and Game, 2006, p.316.
It is the last four counter-claims that concern the effectiveness of O&S the most.
Firstly, reduced representativeness of councils as the majority party allocates all
the positions of power to its members so their policies are implemented and no
others. Secondly, excessive party politicisation of issues limits the possibility of
working by consensus. Thirdly, party discipline inhibits individual choice and
results in reduced local democracy. Finally, decisions are made for political reason
to the exclusion of professional advice from professional officers and experts. That
is not to say that Independent Cllrs will be better at making the right decisions
because they a free from party interference. An alternative question could be
‘does the executive/non-executive split give the political parties’ rank and file the
opportunity work consensually and with less party discipline’? Or will O&S be a
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forum for councillors to show discontent with party leadership, but then tow the
party line in internal party meetings?
Subsequently the prevailing view of local government was that decisions and
policy were decided in the party group room, which is the “antithesis of the
overview and scrutiny process, predicated... on openness, transparency,
inclusivity and cross-party deliberation” (Leach and Copus, 2004, p.388).
Therefore party politics, especially single party dominance, affects accountability
(Gyford, et al, 1989; Stoker, 1991).
Party groups have continued to function as before the structural changes, but it
was recognised that they would need to adapt to the new political structures
(Stewart , 2003). Indeed it was argued that party groups are too introspective and
that “group loyalty and discipline closes down, rather than stimulates public debate
and involvement” and damages “councillors’ willingness and ability to hold the
executive to account” and “openness and transparency” (Copus, 2001, p.14 in
Stewart, 2003). Therefore O&S “requires a change in political culture and
approach for many members” (Snape, et al 2002, p.74).
3.5.1 Party Group Discipline
The reason for party group discipline is that the ruling party (or coalition) wishes to
remain in power, while the opposition attempt to remove them. Therefore
members who disagree with their party in public - and on too many occasions -
would expect to be sanctioned in some way, which is not conducive to effective
O&S (Leach, 2009b). Subsequently party discipline will be tightest were the
majority party (or coalition) faces electoral challenge from the opposition, whereas
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it will only be relaxed where the opposition is weak and unlikely to gain victory at
an election (Leach and Copus, 2004).
Regarding the political culture of local government and its relationship to O&S, the
Local Government Act (2000) provided that O&S committees “must reflect the
political balance of the authority” (DETR, 2000b, para: 3.11) and that government
guidance stated that “whipping is incompatible with overview and scrutiny” and
“should not take place” (Ibid, para: 3.44). On the latter point, given that they
introduced the new political arrangements, the Labour Party agreed not to allow
whipping (Leach, 2001a). The significance of parties not using the whip is that if
O&S committees have not unanimously agreed their recommendations, because
of party political differences, it will weaken their influence (Sandford and Maer,
2004).
This is not to say that members should entirely suppress their party political
beliefs. They will still influence their views within OSC deliberations, but not overtly
and “nor should they be expected to – differences in values and value-based
priorities and programmes are an essential ingredient of the local democratic
process” (Leach, 2009b, p.14).
3.5.2 The Influence of Party Politics on the Overview and Scrutiny Function
As can be seen from the above, influence of the party group over non-executive
members “can be both a driver for effective overview and scrutiny and a potential
block” (Stoker et al, 2004, p.50), although some would see it just as a barrier
(Wilson and Game, 2006). Leach and Copus (2004) have identified four models of
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party group approach to O&S (see Figure 12). Research has shown that party
groups are operating the Filter and Leviathan models, which “represent minimal, or
no change, in the conduct of Council politics”. Whereas the Partner and Arbitrator
models would “allow councillors to challenge, question and criticize an executive
comprising of party colleagues, while maintaining a distinct party identity and
programme” (Leach and Copus, 2004 p.352).
Figure 12: The Party Group Effect on Overview and Scrutiny: 4 Models
Model 1: The group as partner operates with an almost
complete relaxation of group discipline, becoming a deliberative
and advisory body only and does not apply a whip to any
business.
Effective O&S
most likely
Model 2: The group as arbitrator role is to make the new
arrangements work and deal with disagreement between the
executive and overview and scrutiny and to identify potential
problems between them.
Effective O&S
uncertain
Model 3: The group as filter positions itself between the
executive, overview and scrutiny and full Council and deliberately
filters the communication and interaction between them, acting as
an informal but important part of the decision- and policy-making
system.
Effective O&S
uncertain
Model 4: The group as Leviathan ensures it has complete
control of all aspects of political decision-making.
Effective O&S
least likely
Source: Adapted from Leach and Copus (2004, pp.340-34 and p.351).
The debate surrounding the party political control of O&S, whilst important to the
effectiveness of O&S, can (for both sides of the debate) also be considered in the
context that just 5% of council decisions are said to be party political. Therefore it
is argued that O&S should avoid them and instead focus on the 95% non-political
issues that it can hope to influence (Leach 2005, 2009).
In summary, the research suggests that O&S has not realised its potential
because “party politics, party group cohesion, loyalty and discipline predominate in
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local government and are unlikely to evaporate in the face of new council
constitutions” (Rao, 2006, p.21). Furthermore, non-executive members in O&S will
be required to balance “open, public deliberation... whilst maintaining a clear party
identity and cohesive party approach to the conduct of council affairs” (Snape,
Leach and Copus, 2002, p.74) whilst focusing on the non-controversial issues they
can influence. In addition majority parties need to relax the “unacceptable” and
“unnecessary” control they have over O&S as it is demotivating for non-executive
members (Leach, 2009b, p.21).
3.5.3 The Allocation of Chairs and Vice Chairs
The research has shown that “having an effective chair of an overview and
scrutiny committee was consistently seen by both officers, executive members and
non-executive members to be of great importance to the successful development
of that committees work and understanding of new roles” (Stoker, et al, 2003,
p.43).
Subsequently the role of a chair/vice chair is to:
 Lead, co-ordinate, prioritise and develop the work programme
 Engage and develop the skills of the members of the committee
 Ensure financial and officer support resources are provided
 Develop the ‘critical friend’ relationship with the executive and chief officers
(Snape and Taylor, 2001).
Government guidance suggests that in authorities were there is a majority group,
“all or some” of the O&S committees are chaired by the opposition or the church or
parent government representatives (DCLG 2006b, para 3.30). Indeed it is argued
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that by sharing chairs “responsible, but challenging scrutiny can be facilitated”
(Leach, 2009b, p.30).
The preferred allocation of chairs and vice chairs would be “all-party, either
proportionate to the relative strength on the council, or giving greater than
proportionate weight to opposition parties” (Leach and Copus, 2004, p.350) and
that the vice chairs are from a different party than the chair (Leach, 2009b).
However, despite the guidance from government and research showing that 68%
of Cllrs, 69% of non-executive Cllrs and 84% officers are not opposed to
opposition chairs (see Table 11), in 2009, 44% of authorities gave no chairs to the
opposition, 37% gave some, and 19% gave all chairs to the opposition (CfPS,
2009).
Table 11: Councillor and Officer Responses to the Statement ‘Chairs of Overview
and Scrutiny Should Not Be From The Majority Party’.
Agree Neither Agree nor
Disagree
Disagree
Councillors 47% 21% 31%
Non-Executive
Councillors
50% 19% 29%
Officers 44% 40% 15%
Source: Adapted from Stoker, et al (2004, p.53).
The allocation of chairs and vice chairs varies between political parties (see Table
12). For example:
 57% of Labour controlled authorities do not share chairs whereas the
majority of Conservatives and Liberal Democrats (Lib Dems) do
 50% of Conservatives do not share vice chairs whereas the majority of
Labour and Lib Dems do
 Only 21% or less of authorities have all opposition chairs and vice chairs.
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Research suggests that there are a number of reasons why chairs and vice chairs
are not allocated to opposition members. Namely:
 Chair and vice chairs are positions of status and attract special
responsibility allowances (Stoker, et al, 2003; Leach and Copus, 2004)
 The executive wants to control the O&S work programme and opposition
chairs will become too close to the majority party (Leach and Copus, 2004)
 All opposition chairs would make O&S an opposition-led process (Ibid).
Table 12: Percentage of Chair/Vice Chairs Shared by Political Party
Control Don't share
Chairs
Keep at least one
Chair but share others
All Chairs held by
other parties
Con 38% 42% 20%
Lab 57% 29% 14%
Lib
Dem
37% 42% 21%
Control Don't share Vice
Chairs
Keep at least one Vice
Chair but share others
All Vice Chairs held
by other parties
Con 50% 32% 18%
Lab 38% 42% 21%
Lib
Dem
41% 41% 18%
Source: Adapted from CfPS (2009, p.5).
Equally, research suggests that there are a number of reasons why chairs and
vice chairs should be allocated to opposition members. Namely,
 It will encourage all members to participate in O&S (Sandford and Maer,
2004)
 Sharing chairs facilitates cooperation, consensus and encourages
responsible opposition (Snape, Leach, and Copus 2002; Leach, 2005)
 It prevents the executive and O&S becoming too close (Leach, 2005)
 O&S chairs do not have the ‘power’ of the old committee system chairs
(Sandford and Maer, 2004)
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 Minority party chairs cannot prevent the ruling party or coalition using their
majority (Ibid).
In summary: when considering the allocation of chairs it would be natural to
assume that, given there is prestige and financial gain to becoming a chair or vice
chair, majority leaders would not want to give up this patronage nor would their
political colleagues want them to. In addition the leadership could be accused of
keeping the opposition too close, or too far, from the leadership of the authority. It
is perhaps understandable that opposition members desire a proportionate share
of what is supposed to be a non political activity.
3.5.4 The Relationship of Overview and Scrutiny with the Executive
Following on from the interaction within, and between, political groups perhaps the
most important relationship, as one of the most significant conditions for the
potential effectiveness of O&S, is the one with the executive (or policy committee)
(Ashworth, 2003a). In the majority councils the executive will be made up of
members from the majority party (or coalition), but in some authorities places on
the executive may be allocated to a minority party representative to reflect the
political balance of the council. Whatever the makeup of the executive (or policy
committee) “a good relationship is important because the mutual respect means
the cabinet member is more likely to take seriously a recommendation of the
(O&S) committee” (Sandford and Maer, 2004, p.50).
Government guidance encourages executives (or policy committees) to ask O&S
to undertake in-depth policy development and review (DETR, 2000b, para: 3.24),
especially as O&S has the time the executive (or policy committee) does not have
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(Snape, Leach, and Copus 2002). Indeed, it is stated that in this respect “the
executive and O&S are interdependent” and therefore “collaboration is required if
they are both to work effectively” (Wilson and Game, 2006, p.268).
The method of communication with the executive (or policy committee) can
determine the nature of the relationship and vice versa. O&S committees submit
written reports for consideration, however recommendations personally delivered,
for example, by the O&S chair are “much more difficult to ignore or marginalise”
(Leach, 2009b, p.26). The relationship may be soured if the executive or an
individual executive member views ‘critical friend’ challenge as a personal attack
or embarrasses them (Leach, 2009b). However it is suggested that: “conflicts...
are mainly likely to arise where overview and scrutiny is being used for faction
fighting within or between parties” (Stewart, 2003 p.82).
The approach the ruling party or coalition take to O&S will also determine the
relationship between them: Leach describes three approaches (see Figure 13).
Figure 13: Approach to Overview and Scrutiny by Ruling Party or Coalition
Marginalisation – which involves an attempt to minimise the potential damage
and embarrassment that might emanate from the oppositions use of overview and
scrutiny by seeking to exert political control over it.
Manipulation – which involves an attempt to accentuate the positive aspects of
overview and scrutiny, whilst minimising the changes to the administration.
Typically this approach uses overview and scrutiny on a consultative (and, where
seen as appropriate) a policy development mechanism.
Openness to challenge – which involves an encouragement of and
responsiveness to the work of overview and scrutiny whether it is critical or
whether it involves policy recommendation.
Source: Adapted from Leach (2009, p.35).
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The approach of marginalisation is said to be used when the executive or policy
committee of the ruling party or coalition is “threatened” by O&S and chooses to
minimise its influence by:
 Not meeting O&S chairs
 Developing other policy development mechanisms e.g. cabinet working
groups
 Giving only a minimal response to recommendations
 ‘Shelving’ O&S reports (Leach, 2009b, p.10).
Through manipulation the executive (or policy committee) controls the work of
O&S through “cabinet sympathisers”, for example, all chairs are from the majority
party (or coalition) or the overall chair is from the majority party where chairs are
shared. This approach is more preferable than marginalisation, as the work of
O&S will be considered and may be influential, however “the ‘overview’ role of the
function is emphasised... whilst the ‘scrutiny’ role... is relatively neglected” (Ibid,
p.11). Therefore in this approach, O&S effectively agrees not to embarrass the
executive or policy committee “in return for this limited degree of influence” (Ibid,
p.12).
Openness to challenge was the approach envisaged by New Labour. The
executive (or policy committee) accepts the role of O&S has to be open to
challenge and be able to change decisions and policy. In return, opposition
members need to suppress overt, politically motivated challenges and make
evidence based recommendations. This is the required conditions for an effective
form of O&S “which accepts the reality of politics (including party politics) but
which attempts to channel it in a positive direction” (Ibid).
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Stoker, et al, (2004) detail four forms of O&S function that also describe the
relationship between the executive (or policy committee) and O&S. Similarly they
are based on conditions or, in this case, indicators (see Figure 14). The research
shows that effective O&S is influenced by the form of the O&S function. Therefore
what makes O&S effective in a particular authority is determined by the “interplay
of different contextual factors”. It is argued that it is the “deep-set contextual
issues” in which O&S functions that shapes the behavioural, attitudinal and
constitutional conditions/factors and that “ultimately, context triumphs over such
centrally imposed structural solutions” (Ashworth and Snape, 2004, p.552-553).
In summary, O&S has only the power of influence by producing recommendations
that are based on evidence and subsequently difficult for the executive (or policy
committee) not to consider. Therefore O&S will want to develop a relationship,
which will foster influence. The choice for the executive (or policy committee) is
whether to marginalise, manipulate or be open to O&S. It is argued that it should
be the latter as:
For a reasonable competent and confident executive (majority party or
coalition), there is little to lose from an ‘opening up’ of the overview and
scrutiny process, and perhaps more to gain than is sometimes realised (Ibid,
p.19).
New Labour’s desire for improved management and increased public involvement
in local government was encompassed in the 1998 white paper Modern Local
Government: In Touch with the People (Fenwick and Elcock, 2004). Indeed
government guidance for the Local Government Act 2000 stated “there should be
greater dialogue between all councillors, the public and other stakeholders than
has often been the case in the past.” (DETR, 2000, para: 7.10) Therefore, public
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Figure 14: Forms of Overview and Scrutiny
O&S forms Management
tool
Apolitical
entrepreneurship
Opposition
game
Disengaged
Constitutional
indicators
 Restrictive
call-in
procedure may
be relatively
well resourced
 Majority chair.
 Call-in procedure
more open may
not be well-
resourced
 Either opposition
or majority chair.
 May or may not
be well
resourced
 Opposition
Chair
 Call-in
procedure
relatively
unrestricted.
 Restrictive call-
in procedure
poorly
resourced
 Either
opposition or
majority chair.
Behavioural
indicators
 No or limited
use of call-in
 Agenda often
set by either
political or
officer
executive
 Emphasis on
policy
development
and review
rather than
challenge
 High overview
& low scrutiny.
 More frequent call-
in of decisions
 Agenda under the
control of Cllrs that
run with issues
 Executive unsure
about how to
respond
 High scrutiny &
high overview.
 May make use
of call-in or
intensive policy
reviews to
make
opposition
points
 Co-ordinated
agenda setting
in control of
O&S
 Relations with
executive
tension-filled
 High scrutiny &
low overview.
 No or limited
call-in.
 Lack of
meetings,
effective
agenda or
output
 Little or no
activity and
what there is
tends to be ad
hoc and
unplanned
 Low scrutiny
low & overview.
Value or
Attitude
indicators
 O&S seen by
Members to be
playing a
constructive
part in the
council’s
management.
 Purpose is
seen as
supporting the
executive.
 Policy not politics
 Search for
innovative
solutions to
council issues.
 Aims to be
robustly
independent of the
executive, but not
automatically
critical
 O&S seen as an
opportunity by a
few ‘awkward
squad’ Cllrs to
take up issues.
 Commitment to
holding the
executive to
account
 Seen as team
job and
potentially as a
benefit to the
opposition
group
 O&S seen as
very second
class activity,
lack of
commitment
Strengths  Value added in
policy making.
 Scrutiny
champions
provide example.
 High challenge
to executive.
 Scope for
improvement.
Weaknesses  Little challenge
to executive.
 Skills gap
 Not
organisationally
ingrained.
 Impedes
efficiency.
 Little fulfilment
of Cllrs,
corporate or
community
goals.
Source: Adapted from Stoker, et al (2004, p.59).
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involvement in the new political management arrangements and O&S can be
viewed as part of New Labour’s democratic renewal agenda (Leach, 2005, p.16).
Public involvement in O&S is important because O&S “is in an ideal position to
facilitate public involvement in the council’s decision-making processes” (Leach,
2005, p.19). While recommendations that are based on evidence provided by
“those whose lives are affected by the issues under consideration” (Sanford and
Maer, 2004, p.31), it is suggested, “it would be that much more difficult for even an
unresponsive executive ignore” (Leach, 2005, p.17).
Research has identified four means by which the public can be involved in O&S:
 By contributing to the O&S agenda
 By attending O&S meetings as spectators
 Being a co-opted member of an OSC
 By providing evidence as witness to an O&S review or investigation (Snape,
Leach and Copus, 2002, p.90).
One of the 4 four principles of good scrutiny is for O&S to “reflect the voice and
concerns of the public and its communities" (CfPS, 2004a, p.2) and this can be
achieved by direct public involvement in the development of the O&S work
programme. Non-voting co-optees can suggest topics and most local authority
websites will have details of how the public can suggest topics either online or by
post. However, the CfPS Annual Survey (2009) found that the average number of
suggestions for O&S topics from the ‘general public’ was only four, with 45% of
authorities having received none (CfPS, 2009, p.4). Therefore it is suggested that
public involvement has been by stakeholders representing the “organised public”
(Leach 2005, p.16) as opposed to the general public.
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Although O&S meetings are open to the public and minutes and reports are
published “it can be extremely difficult to excite and engage the public” (CfPS,
2004a, p.8). This is perhaps not unexpected given that “the public's knowledge of
the new arrangements for local political management is slight, and the level of
public interest is low” (Fenwick, et al, 2003, p.30). The public are only interested
when the issue is of direct concern to them (Lowndes, et al, 2001; Fenwick, et al,
2003). Indeed if members and officers do not understand the role of O&S “it is
hardly surprising that the public is not fully convinced of its value.” (Fenwick and
Elcock, 2004, p.529).
One potential mechanism for greater public involvement with O&S is the area
forum/neighbourhood committee approach that has been established in many
local authorities. Typically, these consist of the local ward members,
representatives from partner organisations, such as the police, and members of
the public and often they have been delegated budgets to spend as they see fit on
local issues. Given their local characteristics and makeup they could be a vehicle
to develop O&S and community engagement at a local or area level. It is argued
that “an area dimension to the overview and scrutiny process will ensure that
overview and scrutiny activities are immediate to the concerns of local people and
located within the very communities they serve.” (Snape, Leach and Copus, 2002,
pp.71-72). However, research has shown that area committees/forums and O&S
“were seen as wholly separate mechanisms” (Ibid, p.87) although some authorities
had considered a dual function.
In summary, New Labour’s modernisation of the political structures and renewal of
local democracy requires “a greater degree of public ‘engagement’ in order to be
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deemed successful” (Fenwick and Elcock, 2004, p.535), however despite some
authorities making improvements on public consultation this aspect of O&S
remains underdeveloped (Crouch, 2009).
3.6 Comparisons Between Overview and Scrutiny and Parliamentary Select
Committees
Before moving on to the next section on the effectiveness of O&S it is perhaps
worth reflecting on the origins of O&S, the PSC, and how they compare. There
are a number of differences and similarities between local government O&S and
PSC. The differences are that:
 PSC are tasked only to scrutinise, whereas O&S assists the executive in
policy review and development
 PSC are supported by parliamentary officials and not the civil service.
Officers in local government are part of the same ‘unified’ corps
 PSC are more aggressive in terms of questioning than O&S
 The party group system is more ‘rigid’ in local government than central.
The similarities are:
 All party support for the function is encouraged
 Analysis and evidence are favoured and party politics discouraged
 Whipping is discouraged
 Both functions can only influence
 They give ‘backbenchers’ an opportunity to influence decisions and policy
(Leach and Copus, 2004, p.337.
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As can be seen the purpose of the two functions are the same, but the significant
difference is that the relationship with their respective executives is much more
adversarial with PSC, whereas O&S is the “critical friend”.
3.7 Effective Overview and Scrutiny
As discussed previously, the original aims of the modernisation agenda were to
see greater efficiency, transparency and accountability in local government
(Snape, Leach and Copus, 2002). The O&S function was to have a significant role
in achieving these aims. The various elements that constitute an O&S function
have been addressed previously, in this section we will attempt to answer the
question of what is good, successful or (as is the focus of this thesis) effective
O&S? During the early development of O&S a number of potential benefits of an
effective O&S function were proposed, such as:
 A more valued, knowledgeable and skilled role for non-executive members
 Supporting the executive (or policy committees) to develop strategy, policy
and improve services
 Evidence based decision making and policy development
 Being able to address the cross-cutting ‘wicked issues’
 Developing relationships with the authority’s partners
 Increasing public involvement in local governance (Snape, 2001).
However with regard to the effectiveness of O&S it has been suggested that local
authorities and Cllrs have failed to fully utilise their power and influence. In a
speech on strengthening local democracy John Denham MP (2009) expressed the
opinion that:
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Over the past few years, the power of scrutiny has been extended more widely
than most people realise. And, as yet, I'd argue that few local authorities or
bodies of councillors have fully utilised the powers on the statute book. In many
ways, scrutiny is a lion that has failed to roar6. Yet done properly, effective
scrutiny is a power tool for influencing local service delivery (Denham, 2009).
The research on the development of O&S has addressed the issue of good
practice and effectiveness and found that two elements are central, namely
“effective processes and tangible outcomes” (Snape, Leach, and Copus 2002,
p.12). With regard to outcomes the report for the ODPM (The Development of
Overview and Scrutiny in Local Government – 2002) found that:
‘successful’ overview and scrutiny has to involve tangible and substantive
outcomes. This means that overview and scrutiny committees must be able to
demonstrate that they have:
 Held the decision-makers to account;
 Supported the development of effective policies and initiatives which
have a beneficial impact on the community;
 Contributed significantly to continuous improvement in services through
best value;
 Positively impacted on the work and outcomes of external agencies
(Ibid, 2002, p.11).
Therefore, for effective O&S, it is essential that it “makes a difference” to
communities or “adds value” to services (Leach, 2005, p.5). However, questions
have been raised as to the practicality of measuring outcomes. When the London
Assembly responded to the Committee on Standards in Public Life’s inquiry into
openness and accountability in London government, they identified a number of
difficulties in measuring the effectiveness of O&S, namely:
 The process of holding the executive to account is difficult to evaluate
6 The suggestion that O&S is a ‘lion that has failed to roar’ was put to those interviewed
(see Appendix A, B,C,D, E and F).
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 The improvements that recommendations are intended to achieve may not
materialise for some time
 If O&S did not happen, you would not be able to measure what it prevents
 The influence of O&S may not always be acknowledged by those it
scrutinises. (London Assembly, 2009).
It concluded:
It is tempting to try to measure the effectiveness of scrutiny by counting the
number of recommendations that have been implemented, or applying other
numerical analyses to the process and outputs of scrutiny work. However,
such measures do not capture the complexity or the quality of accountability or
the impact of effective scrutiny (Ibid, p.9).
This view is supported by Snape, Leach and Copus (2002) who focus on only
‘power’ of O&S – that of influence, stating that:
output indicators are possible to devise but true outcome indicators, are, as
ever, difficult to devise. This is particularly the case for overview and scrutiny
committees since, as influencing and not decision-making bodies, measuring
‘influence’ is highly problematic (Snape, Leach and Copus 2002, p.101).
This ‘difficulty’ to measure the intangible influence of O&S is also raised when it is
proposed that:
The ultimate effectiveness test for scrutiny is whether decisions (or policies or
services) which result from its intervention are better than those which would
have resulted had that intervention not taken place (and been accepted)
(Leach, 2002, p.83).
Local authorities can evaluate their O&S function against recognised good
practice. For, example the CfPS has devised a self-evaluation framework (SEF)
for O&S practitioners to demonstrate the effectiveness. The SEF is based on the
CfPS 4 principles of good scrutiny and suggests performance indicators (see
Figure 15). While it is more practical and easier to devise and measure effective
processes, the extensive work by both Snape, Leach and Copus shows
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Figure 15: Performance Indicators for Effective O&S
1) Critical friend challenge:
a) percentage of items on work programmes taken from the forward plan
b) percentage of items on the cabinet agenda amended as a result of scrutiny
intervention
2) Reflect the voice and concerns of the public and its communities
a) the percentage of items on the work programme suggested by the public or
in response to issues raised through surveys, comments or complaints
b) number of visits to the authority’s scrutiny web pages
3) Take the lead and own the scrutiny process
a) the percentage of meetings attended by members at which they were
required
b) percentage of members who are enthusiastic about their role in scrutiny
4) Making an impact on service delivery
a) the percentage of scrutiny recommendations approved by the executive
b) the percentage of scrutiny recommendations implemented by the executive.
Source: Adapted from CfPS (2005a).
there are numerous indicators and/or criteria that could be followed, implemented
and measured. For example Snape (2002) identifies ‘14 steps to scrutiny success’
(see Figure 16).
Figure 16: 14 Steps to Scrutiny Success
1. Define O&S within the authority
2. Select O&S chairs/vice chairs who will provide effective leadership
3. Members are committed to making O&S work
4. Design a structure which fits the purpose, relates well to the cabinet and officer
structure and suits the culture of the authority
5. Develop a member-led, realistic, flexible work programme
6. Move away from traditional service committee processes
7. Prioritise a small number of items to investigate in-depth and effectively project
manage
8. Finish investigations on time and produce member-led reports which summarise
the evidence the recommendations
9. Ensure adequate officer support
10. Create a separate budget for O&S
11. Develop cross-party working, ensuring that no party group applies the whip to
O&S
12. Allocate some chairs and vice chairs to the opposition
13. Provide training and development for Cllrs, officers, and co-optees
14. Continuously monitor and undertake a more comprehensive evaluation at least
every two to three years.
Source: Adapted from Snape (2002, p.97).
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Other studies describe more specifically the conditions for effective O&S (see
Figures 17, 18 and 19).
Figure 17: The Conditions for an Effective Overview and Scrutiny Function (A)
Member leadership and engagement
 Cllrs drive the process and provide genuine leadership
 Members are actively engaged and enthusiastic about O&S
 Members have the skills, competencies and knowledge to undertake this work.
Responsive executive or policy committees
 Executive or policy committees are willing to listen to, and be influenced by
O&S
Genuine non-partisan working
 Cross-party working within O&S committees
 There is relaxation of party group discipline
Effective direct Officer support and management of scrutiny processes
 Officer support is required to manage work programmes, meetings, agenda,
minutes etc.
Supportive senior officer culture
 Vital in terms of the provision of effective direct officer support and general
responsiveness of officers in departments.
High level of awareness and understanding of the work of O&S
 Internal and external individuals and organisations are aware of and
understand O&S
 Raising the awareness of O&S with partners, the public and the local media.
Source: Adapted from Snape, Leach, and Copus (2002, pp.11-12).
Figure 18: The Conditions for an Effective Overview and Scrutiny Function (B)
The loosening of party discipline
 No whipping
 Non-executives challenge same party executive
 Opposition members are non-partisan
 Chairs are shared amongst all parties
 Non-political process.
Executive responsiveness to the work of scrutiny committees
 Decision makers must be prepared to be influenced
 Recommendations are non-political
 The work is of appropriate quality
 O&S does not embarrass the executive or policy committee.
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Figure 18: The Conditions for an Effective Overview and Scrutiny Function (B)
continued
Genuine analytical capacity for O&S
 There is capacity for rational analysis
 O&S is supported by dedicated Officers
 Meetings, information and papers are organised and provided
 Unified Officers can support O&S.
Appropriate management of O&S
 O&S has a management board/committee
 O&S identifies its own agenda
 Reflect public concern
 Danger of too much executive/officer influence
 Danger of too much OSMB influence on individual committees
 Agendas are manageable
 O&S breaks from the traditional service and committee system.
Source: Adapted from Leach (2002, pp.83-89).
Figure 19: The Conditions for an Effective Overview and Scrutiny Function (C).
Attitudinal Conditions
Parties do not use O&S for party political points-scoring.
There are a limited number of high profile politically-divisive initiatives which are
not appropriate for an in-depth overview and scrutiny review.
It is recognised that O&S will be influenced by political values and priorities but not
overtly.
The executive takes seriously recommendations based on evidence-based policy
analysis and justifies the reasons for their response.
Overview and scrutiny is influential because it assembles and interprets evidence
in a responsible way.
Overview and scrutiny is properly supported by dedicated and mainstream
Officers.
Process Conditions
Call-in is used responsibly, is not be invoked too easily and meets specified
criteria.
Call-in is not limited to key decisions.
An Officer adjudicates on whether a call-in meets the criteria.
Executive members attend call-in hearings to justify decisions and answer
questions.
A timetable enables O&S Officers to collect evidence for call-ins.
Call-in is facilitated by a setting other than a committee room layout e.g. select
committee style.
The Select committee style is used for certain types of review.
Spotlight/light touch reviews are used.
Minority Reports can be submitted.
O&S chairs present their findings to the executive and answer questions.
88
Figure 19: The Conditions for an Effective Overview and Scrutiny Function (C)
continued
Structures and Support Mechanisms
O&S has the ability and funds to access objective technical information and expert
witnesses.
The authority has link officers in their authority to facilitate O&S.
The authority has a scrutiny champion at a senior level.
Chairs of O&S committees/panels are shared amongst all parties with significant
representation.
There is an O&S co-ordination committee to counterbalance the executive.
There is a structural separation between the ‘scrutiny’ and ‘overview’ roles.
Source: Adapted from Leach (2009, pp.36-37).
In summarising the various frameworks, the requirement for O&S in all authorities
is to:
 Define what O&S means to them
 Develop a structure that is designed to reflect their needs
 Have separate overview and scrutiny committees
 Have committed non-executive members to own, lead and manage the
O&S function
 Determine their own work programme
 Investigate and make evidence based recommendations
 Use non-traditional committee methods
 Have dedicated officers and the financial resources to undertake
investigations
 Have a non-political process
 Encourage participation of opposition members and share chairs/vice chairs
 Responsive executive or policy committees
 Have a fair and open call-in procedure
 Support from the other officers in the authority
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 Have a champion for O&S
 Members, officers and co-optees have the training, skills and capacity to
undertake investigations and make recommendations
 Raise awareness of O&S with the public and partners
 Continually monitor and evaluate the O&S function.
As the conditions for effective O&S have been highlighted above, it is by no means
certain that if they are all present, O&S will be effective (Leach, 2009b). What is
perhaps more certain is that if O&S does not determine its own work programme,
is not supported by officers and financial resources and no training takes place
O&S will not be effective (Snape, 2002). Indeed it has been found that: “Too often
scrutiny is hampered in particular by party group dominance, a resistant and
suspicious executive, and unsupportive senior officers” (Ashworth and Snape
2004, p.552). As seen below in Figure 20 Stoker, et al, (2004) highlight a number
of ‘constraints’ related to the organisational, behavioural and attitudinal conditions
for effectiveness O&S.
Figure 20: Organisational/Constitutional, Behavioural and Attitudinal Constraints
on Effective Overview and Scrutiny Activity
Organisational
/constitutional
• Inadequate Officer support to overview and scrutiny
• Restrictions on call ins
• Restricted agenda
• Overloaded agendas.
Behavioural • Cllrs capacity
• Poor chairing
• Party activity
• Officers called not ‘decision makers’.
Attitudinal • Overview and scrutiny not valued by non execs
• Overview and scrutiny not valued by execs
• Party loyalty.
Source: Adapted from Stoker, et al (2004 p.57).
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Therefore, when determining the effectiveness of O&S in the case study
authorities, we will consider these conditions and the context in which their O&S
functions operate. In addition they will also provide an effective framework upon
which to organise the analysis of the data. It has been determined that Leach’s
(2009) attitudinal, process and structure and mechanism conditions are the most
appropriate as they are the most recently developed and encompass the findings
of the other researchers described above. NB It will be the researcher that
determines which aspect of O&S matches the particular condition.
3.8 Conclusion
This chapter has outlined the key issues regarding the O&S, specifically the
development of the O&S function, the role of O&S and details the roles of the
different actors in O&S and those factors which influence its effectiveness. The
next chapter describes the methodological approach to the thesis, the research
design, the methods used and evaluates the research process.
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Chapter 4 Methodology
4.1 Introduction
The methodology that was followed for this thesis was to provide evidence to fulfil
the following aims namely to:
 Compare and analyse the O&S functions of four unitary local authorities
 Assess the impact of New Labour’s Local Government Re-organisation
Agenda on O&S
 To locate debates on O&S within a wider conceptual understanding of the
process of modernisation and the emphasis on ‘New Localism’
 Highlight what O&S arrangements were and are in place within the two and
one-tier system of local government
 Examine how effective O&S is being ensured within four new Unitary
Authorities.
This chapter, therefore, establishes the theoretical approaches of the thesis,
specifically the ontological and epistemological theories that determine the reality
of the phenomena of O&S and what constitutes valid knowledge of O&S.
Furthermore, this determines the research design and the choice of methods. This
chapter will therefore outline the qualitative and quantitative methods used in the
research, why the case study authorities were chosen, the method of data analysis
and an evaluation of the research process.
4.2 Theoretical Approaches
Two accepted theoretical perspectives that influence how social research is
undertaken are positivism and interpretivism. These theories have opposing
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ontological and epistemological approaches. Positivists believe that “the social
world exists externally to the researcher, and that it’s properties can be measured
directly through observation” (Gray, 2009, p.18). A positivist tests theories
regarding the relationships between measurable variables and “collects data on
predetermined instruments that yield statistical data” (Creswell, 2003, p.18). An
interpretivist is concerned with the social and historical meaning of experiences
and “collects open-ended, emerging data with the primary intent of developing
themes from the data” (Ibid). This research is based on the view that the social
world is constructed and that knowledge is relative to the context in which it is
found. That the ontology is anti-foundationalist - and the epistemology
interpretivist – reflects the rejection within the thesis that O&S function “exists
independently of the meaning which actors attach to their action” (Marsh and
Furlong, 2002, p.19). My epistemological perspective is interpretive: as an
observer I am part of the social world and will therefore be affected by the “social
constructions of ‘reality’” (Ibid). Local democracy, local government and the O&S
function are social constructs. My aim is to interpret and understand the social and
discursive interaction of Cllrs and local government officers. “The purpose of the
study is to uncover and describe the participants’ perspectives on events – that is,
that the subjective view is what matters” (Marshall and Rossman, 2006, p.102).
4.3 Research Design
The researcher’s epistemological view determines the design of the research
“including the kind of evidence that is being gathered, from where, and how it’s
going to be interpreted” (Gray, 2009, p.18). This thesis involved empirical
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investigation of the phenomenon of O&S in four new unitary authorities in the
context of local government modernisation. Three main approaches were
considered by the researcher; experiment, case study and survey (see Figure 21).
Figure 21: A Schematic Comparison of Case Study with Experimental and Survey
Approaches
Experiment Case Study Survey
Investigation of a relatively
small number of cases.
Investigation of a relatively
small number of cases
(sometimes just one).
Investigation of a relatively
large number of cases.
Information gathered and
analysed about a small
number of features of each
case.
Information gathered and
analysed about a large
number of features of each
case.
Information gathered and
analysed about a small
number of features of each
case.
Study of cases created in
such a way as to control the
important variables.
Study of naturally occurring
cases; or in ‘action
research’ form, study of
cases created by the
actions of the researcher
but where the primary
concern is not controlling
the variables to measure
their effects.
Study of a sample of
naturally occurring cases;
selected in such a way as to
maximize the sample’s
representativeness in
relation to some larger
population.
Quantification of data is a
priority.
Quantification of data is not
a priority. Indeed, qualitative
data may be treated as
superior.
Quantification of data is a
priority.
The aim is either theoretical
inference – the development
and testing of theory – or
the practical evaluation of
an intervention.
The main concern may be
the understanding of the
case study itself, with no
interest in theoretical
inference or empirical
generalization. However,
there also may be attempts
at one, or both, of these.
Alternatively, the wider
relevance of the findings
may be conceptualized in
terms of the provision of
vicarious experience, as a
basis for ‘naturalistic
generalization’ or
‘transferability’.
The aims is empirical
generalization, from a
sample to a finite
population, though this is
sometimes seen as a
platform for theoretical
inference.
Source: Gomm, Hammersley and Foster, 2000, p.4.
Briefly, experiment and survey methods quantify data, test theories or empirically
generalise findings in relation to only certain aspects of each case and are
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therefore quantitative methods. As the epistemological view of this research is
qualitative, being concerned with many features and the understanding of each
case, the chosen research method was case study.
Case study is also appropriate because it “refers to research that investigates a
few cases, often just one, in considerable depth” (Gomm, Hammersley and Foster,
2000, p.3) and that it “provides the researcher with a holistic understanding of a
problem, issue, or phenomenon within its social context” (Hesse-Biber and Leavy,
2011, p.256). There are a number of possible variations within the case study
approach, for example:
 In the number of cases studied, and the role of comparison
 In how detailed the case studies are
 In the size of the case(s) dealt with
 In the extent to which researchers document the context of the case, in
terms of the wider society and/or historically
 The extent to which they restrict themselves to description and explanation,
or engage in evaluation and prescription (Gomm, Hammersley and Foster,
2000, pp.3-4).
Given these variations it is perhaps useful to define case study as a research
method (see figure 22).
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Figure 22: Definition of Case Study as a Research Method
Case study is an empirical inquiry that:
 Investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life
context, especially when
 The boundaries between phenomenon and context are clearly not evident
 Copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many
more variables of interest than data points, and as one result
 Relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a
triangulation fashion, and as another result
 Benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data
collection and analysis.
Source: Adapted from Yin (2009, p.18).
As can been seen from Yin’s definition “a major strength of case study data
collection is the opportunity to use many different sources of evidence” (Yin, 2009,
p.114). According to Burgess (1993) a case study should include in-depth
structured or semi structured interviews and analysis of documentary evidence
allowing the researcher to “get close to the data” (Burgess, 1993, p.4) Other
examples are:
 Documents
 Archival records
 Open-ended or structured interviews
 Observations
 Surveys
 Focus groups.
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4.4 Sources and Methods of Data Collection
The sources and methods of data collection in this research include:
 Semi-structured interviews with local authority council members and officers
 Participant/practitioner observations within Authority B
 Survey data regarding structure and resourcing of O&S
 Documentary evidence e.g. council constitutions, unitary bids, O&S work
programmes.
4.4.1 Qualitative Methods
As noted above the main method of gathering data was semi-structured
interviews, which are “appropriate when seeking to understand people’s motives
and interpretations” (Devine, 2002, p.201). They allow for a more in-depth
understanding of the experiences of those involved in O&S as “qualitative
researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or
to interpret, phenomena in terms of meanings we bring to them” (Denzin and
Lincoln, 2000, p.3 in della Porta and Keating, 2008, p.28). Therefore as this
approach is interpretivist we are interested in the narrative account of the subjects,
of their experiences and how their actions and beliefs shape their understanding of
O&S, within the context of the authorities within which they work (Robson, 2002).
The semi-structured interviews had a guide of prepared questions (see Appendix
A,B,C,D,E and F) that can be, changed, modified or omitted depending upon the
“interviewer’s perception of what seems most appropriate” (Robson, 2002, p.270)
and “allows for probing of views and opinions where it is desirable for respondents
to expand on their answers” (Gray, 2009, p.373).
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Another technique was participant observation, as I was experiencing the
phenomenon of O&S (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003) whilst undertaking research work
for one of the case study authorities. “Immersion in the setting permits the
researcher to hear, to see and to begin to experience reality as the participants do”
(Marshall and Rossman, 2006, p.100) offering the researcher “the opportunity to
gain additional insights through experiencing the phenomena for themselves”
(Ritchie, 2003 in Ritchie and Lewis, 2003, p.35). Indeed it is said that: “All social
researchers are participant observers” (Hammersley and Atkins, 1995, p.1).
By choosing participant observer as a technique I have also considered the
concept of ‘insider’ or ‘fractioned researcher’ (Robson, 2002). As I was not an
employee of a local authority and had no experience of O&S in local government
prior to this research, I could not be regarded as a practitioner researcher.
However, during the course of the PhD Studentship I undertook separate work for
one of the case study authorities within the area of O&S, as well as my own
research. As I gained experience of the role of a O&S officer - and as my work and
research informed and influenced each other – it could be suggested that I was
part practitioner researcher.
Subsequently, data was gathered from the observations of those involved in O&S
in authority B only. These subjects included:
 Council members of the new and former authorities
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 Local government officers of the new and former authorities
 Partners of the authorities
 Voluntary and community groups who engage in scrutiny.
It was decided that I would not make arrangements to attended O&S meetings at
case study authorities A,C and D as I would have only been able to gain a brief
‘snap shot’ of the O&S functions at these authorities and would not have been able
to make comparisons between the authorities with validity and reliability. The
researcher would rely on the interviews for this.
Documentary evidence was gathered in the form of council constitutions, unitary
bids, O&S work programmes, which gave detail of the process and practices that
have been designed and/or implemented to support the O&S function. The
advantages of using documents are that they are ‘stable’ and ‘unobtrusive’, in that
they can be used on numerous occasions as they are not a product of the case
study (Yin, 2009). Furthermore, such documents as these, are used to
“corroborate and augment evidence from other sources (Ibid, p.103).
4.4.2 Quantitative methods
The quantitative method used in the case study was a survey of the four O&S
Managers. A ‘standardized’ and ‘reliable’ questionnaire was used to “ascertain the
‘facts’” of the case study authorities’ O&S function (Silverman, 2005, p.8). It was
issued to and completed by the O&S Managers via email and used to gather
contextual data regarding the structure, staffing and resources of the O&S
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functions in the case study authorities (see Appendix G). This informed the
selection of the broad themes for investigation in the semi-structured interviews
and was used as part of the comparison and contrasting of the O&S functions in
the data analysis.
4.5 Data Analysis - Grounded Theory
Phenomenological research can produce “‘thick descriptions’ of people’s
experiences or perspectives with their natural settings” (Gray, 2009, p.28).
Therefore this research has used Grounded Theory to analyse the data as it is “an
approach that does not necessarily involve statistical analysis, quantitative data or
the quest for representative samples” and is appropriate for:
 Qualitative research
 Exploratory research
 Studies of human interaction
 Small-scale research (Denscombe, 2010, p.106).
Significantly, unlike positivist deductive methods, there is no prior theory to test.
The research is undertaken with an open mind with only a “general question or
problem in mind”. The research was conducted “without any preconceived
theory… concepts and hypotheses” (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, p.33). However,
the researcher does not have a ‘blank mind’ rather they are “informed about an
area…, but does not approach the analysis of data using preordained ways of
seeing things” (Denscombe, 2010, p.108). My prior knowledge and experience of
O&S was negligible prior to the commencement of the PhD. My “starting point
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from which to launch the investigation” (ibid, p.111) was the research I was
conducting for one of the case study authorities and the literature review. For
example, the research undertaken by Leach (2009) on the O&S function, which
established three types of conditions for effective scrutiny (see chapter 3) i.e.
attitudinal, process and structures and support mechanisms (Leach, 2009, pp.36-
37). These conditions were used as an analytical framework to guide the analysis
of the data (see chapters 5 through to 10).
Any theories that are formulated are grounded in empirical research and emerge
from continuous analysis of the data (Denscombe, 2010). This constant
comparative analysis is argued to be the appropriate because “the “best”
interpretation [is selected] by a process of gradual comparison” (Bevir and
Rhodes, 2002, p. 142). Indeed, it is argued that:
“Comparison in its broadest sense is the process of discovering similarities
and differences among phenomena. Rather than being a second-order
activity tacked onto more basic cognitive processes, comparison is central
to the very acts of knowing and perceiving” (Warwick and Osherson, 1973,
p.7).
Tesch (1990) adopts this view when she calls comparison the main intellectual
activity that underlies all analysis in grounded theory:
“The main intellectual tool is comparison. The method of comparing and
contrasting is used for practically all intellectual tasks during analysis:
forming categories, establishing the boundaries of the categories, assigning
the segments to categories, summarizing the content of each category,
finding negative evidence, etc. The goal is to discern conceptual similarities,
to refine the discriminative power of categories, and to discover patterns”
(Tesch, 1990,p.96 in (Boeije, 2002, pp392-393).
The qualitative analysis of the data “encompasses data organization, theme
development and interpretation” (Marshall and Rossman, 2006, p.152). Therefore
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codes are used to identify concepts and themes within the data that could be
categorised to enable comparisons and connections between the case study
authorities’ O&S functions (Creswell, 1998). Comparisons can be made:
 Within a single interview
 Between interviews within the same group
 Between different groups
 In pairs at the level of the couple
 Comparing couples (Boeije, 2002, p395).
Grounded theory uses open, axial and selective coding. Firstly, open coding is a
broad description of the different elements of the data. Secondly, axial coding
makes “links and associations” between these elements and identifies those which
are key. Finally, selective coding focuses on those core codes which are the basis
of concepts “that encapsulate the way that categories relate to each other in a
single notion. These concepts then form the cornerstone for the generation of
theories…” (Denscombe, 2010, p.115).
As grounded theory is non-scientific, i.e. there is no statistical analysis of the data,
the aim of this research is to understand and explain effective O&S within the case
study authorities. Although this does not provide statistical generalisation the
process of “breaking down, examining, comparing, conceptualising, and
categorising data” (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, p.61) allows for naturalistic
generalization (Stake, 1995 in Creswell, 1998, pp.153-154). It is argued that this
naturalistic generalizability is not limited to the case study authorities and “does
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not preclude some kind of generalizability beyond the specific setting studied”
(Robson, 2002, p.177). Rather case studies, allow for analytical generalisation:
“the data gathered from a particular study provide theoretical insights which
possess a sufficient degree of generality or universality to allow their
projection to other contexts of situations” (Sim, 1998, p.350).
With regard to this, research links will be established between local authorities, but
it may also allow linkages to the wider research questions pertaining to New
Labour’s local government modernisation agenda.
4.6 The Reliability of the Findings
Qualitative methods such as semi structured interviews produce ‘rich’ data which
the analysis of allows findings to “develop gradually from the grounded evidence
and emerging themes” (Bryman, 2004, p.287). However, the reliability of the
findings is determined by the validity of the data and the methods used. For
example, semi-structured interviews, based on the key issues of the research,
allows for flexible questioning in comparison to surveys, however “this may reduce
the comparability of interviews within the study, but provides a moreover valid
explication of the informant’s perception of reality” (Minichello, et al, 1995, p.65).
Furthermore, a valid description of “what you have seen and heard lies in the
inaccuracy and incompleteness of the data” (Robson, 2002, p.171). By using
more than one method of gathering data it was hoped that accurate finding would
be produced.
The validity of the findings is also related to the interpretation of the data and that
as a researcher must be able to show the “route by which you came to your
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interpretation...you are continuously and assiduously charting and justifying the
steps through which your interpretations were made” (Mason, 1996, p.150 cited in
Robson, 2002, p.171). However the “main threat” to validity is the choice of theory,
i.e. “not considering alternative explanations or understandings of the phenomena
you are studying” (Robson, 2002, p.172). In addition the validity of the data can be
effected by:
 The way in which the respondents react to the researcher, e.g. by affecting
the respondents’ behaviour
 The bias of respondents, e.g. by giving incorrect information
 The bias of the researcher and “their personal feelings and preconceptions”
(Ibid).
With regard to this research all participants were made aware of my role as a
research student and that I was participating in the work of O&S with another local
authority. I think that this gained the trust of the participants in that they knew I had
a practical understanding of O&S and of local authorities that were going through
the period of transition to unitary authorities.
A disadvantage of qualitative interviews is that they are time consuming, require
transcription of audio recording (if applicable) and interview notes (Bell, 1999) thus
potentially leading to errors in transcription. Fortunately for this research the semi-
structured interviews were audio-taped and fully transcribed, interview notes were
made and I was “aware of possible observer bias (McCall and Simmons, 1969).
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Another feature of case study research is that data triangulation or “multiple
sources of evidence essentially provide multiple measures of the same
phenomenon” (Yin, 2009, pp.116-117) and thus assist in establishing reliable and
valid data. In this case study, semi-structured interviews, participant observation, a
survey and documentary analysis were used.
4.7 Choice of Case Studies Authorities
The criteria for the selection of case study authorities were:
1) They had to be new unitary authorities, which were formerly two tier district
and county council authorities
2) They had similar socio-economic characteristics
3) They varied in political party leadership.
The first criteria was necessary as the thesis is concerned with what measures
new unitary authorities have undertaken to ensure effective O&S. The second
allows for comparisons to be made between similar kinds of authorities. The third
recognises the significance of political leadership being that political parties have
an influence on the O&S function (Leach and Copus, 2004). Sampling usually is
concerned balancing depth and width (Flick, 2006), however as the choice of new
unitary authorities was limited to just seven (this being the number that were
created in 2009) there were few to choose from.
Given the need for anonymity and confidentiality the background to the authorities
does not identify which region of England they are situated and the composition of
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political parties within each authority as this would make them easily identifiable
(this will be discussed further in section 4.8).
The four authorities are as follows:
4.7.1 Background to Authority A
The Local Context
Authority A covers an area of 356,200 sq km (ONS, 2007) and has a population of
529,500 (ONS, 2009), which is spread across the county with only eight towns in
excess of 10,000 residents. The county, while enjoying areas of affluence, suffers
from economic and social deprivation. For example of the 149 county and unitary
councils in England it is in the most deprived 25% for employment and income
deprivation, also over 40% of the county’s lower super output areas (LSOA) are in
the most deprived 10% in England for barriers to housing and services (GOSW,
2008). Tourism and fishing are the major industries and the county council is the
largest single public sector employer. Other employment is via small businesses
and self employment with much of it “being temporary, low-paid, part-time and
seasonal” (Audit Commission, 2002).
Local Government; Pre and Post Reorganisation
Since the Local Government Act (1972) the area had a two-tier system of a county
and six district councils. As a result of the Local Government Act (2000) the county
council adopted the leader and cabinet model for its executive comprising the
leader, deputy leader and nine portfolio-holders. Four of the districts also chose
the leader and executive model and the remaining two were 4th option councils.
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The White Paper Strong and Prosperous Communities (DCLG, 2006) invited
authorities to bid for unitary status fulfilling New Labour’s desire to establish
unitary authorities in the English shire counties. In 2008 the county council
successfully bid to create a single unitary body based on the boundaries of the
county council, which came into existence in April 2009.
Political Representation
Under the two-tier system one party controlled the county council and one district
council. The other districts were no overall control (NOC) with strong
representation of independent Cllrs (LGA, 2008). At the time the unitary surveys
showed that the public were neither for nor against the authority, but disapproving
of the county and district councils. Prior to the local elections in May 2009 the
incumbent party held 36 out of 79 seats on the county council. However the
elections for the unitary council saw a significant change in the political
representation. The incumbent party suffered due to mistakes they made in the
unitary process and national issues such as MPs expenses and as a result lost
control of the authority to a minority administration. Another party gained 49 of the
123 seats and formed a coalition.
4.7.2 Background to Authority B
The Local Context
Authority B covers 222,600 sq km (ONS 2007) and has a population of 504,900
(ONS 2009) of which 80 per cent live in 12 major towns. The remaining 20 per
cent live in the rural areas which geographically account for 80 per cent of the
county. It has a legacy of heavy industry such as coal mining, steel manufacturing
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and the railways, however this legacy has also resulted in economic and social
deprivation. For example, 45% of the super output areas (SOA) in the county are
in the 25% most deprived in England and 10 of the 20 worst wards in England for
health outcomes are in the east of the county. Manufacturing and the public sector
are major employers and tourism is also important as the county includes a world
heritage site and areas of outstanding natural beauty (Audit Commission 2008).
Local Government; Pre and Post Reorganisation
Since the Local Government Act (1972) the area had a two-tier system of a county
and seven district councils. As a result of the Local Government Act (2000) the
county council adopted the leader and cabinet model for its executive comprising
the leader, deputy and eight portfolio-holders. Five of the district councils also
chose the leader and executive model and the remaining two were 4th option
councils. The White Paper Strong and Prosperous Communities (DCLG, 2006)
invited authorities to bid for unitary status fulfilling New Labour’s desire to establish
unitary authorities in the English shire counties. In 2008 the county council
successfully bid to create a single unitary body based on the county council, which
came into existence in April 2009. Six of the districts had proposed a slower move
to two or three unitary councils by 2012.
Political Representation
Under the two-tier system the county council and four of the seven district councils
were controlled by one party (LGA 2008). The elections for the unitary council saw
a significant change in the political representation within the county. Whether it
was a result of national politics, opposition to the unitary council or electors having
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the opportunity to elect two Cllrs per ward, independents and opposition parties
made significant gains. The incumbent party remained in control and continued
with all seats on the cabinet; however its majority was cut to only eight seats.
Given that the cabinet is comprised entirely of the majority party members then it
means the opposition outnumber the controlling party in-terms of non-executive
members. However, the opposition do not lead or dominate the O&S function.
4.7.3 Background to Authority C
The local context
Authority C covers an area of 501,300 sq km (ONS 2007) and has a population of
310,600 (ONS 2009). The majority of the county is rural towns and villages,
however over 50% of the population live in the more urban corner of the county,
which accounts for less than 5% of the land area and 25% of the most deprived
neighbourhoods in England. The economy was based on coal mining, but now
over one third of jobs are in the public sector and increasingly in tourism; as it has
areas of outstanding natural beauty and a world heritage site (Audit Commission
2008).
Local Government; Pre and Post Reorganisation
Since the Local Government Act (1972) the area had a two-tier system of a county
and six district councils. As a result of the Local Government Act (2000) the county
council adopted the leader and cabinet model for its executive comprising the
leader, deputy leader and eight portfolio-holders. Three of the districts also chose
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the leader and executive model and the remaining three were 4th option councils.
The White Paper Strong and Prosperous Communities (DCLG, 2006) invited
authorities to bid for unitary status fulfilling New Labour’s desire to establish
unitary authorities in the English shire counties. In 2008 the county council
successfully bid to create a single unitary body based on the county council, which
came into existence in April 2009.
Political Representation
Under the two-tier system, prior to the local elections in May 2008, the county
council and two of the six district douncils were controlled by one party, three were
NOC and one another (LGA 2008). The incumbent party held 35 out of 67 seats
on the county council, however the elections for the unitary council saw a
significant change in political representation with incumbent party retaining only 17
seats and losing control of the council to a minority administration, who form all the
cabinet.
4.7.4 Background to Authority D
The local context
The county covers an area of 325,500 sq km (ONS 2007) and has a population of
452,600 (ONS 2009). The county consists of 20 local communities centred around
rural towns and villages. Employment is high and deprivation is low. The public
and private sectors are all major employers in the county, which has large areas of
outstanding natural beauty and two world heritage sites (Audit Commission 2004).
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Local Government; Pre and Post Reorganisation
Since the Local Government Act (1972) the area had a two-tier system of a county
and four district Councils. As a result of the Local Government Act (2000) the
county council adopted the leader and cabinet model for its executive comprising
the leader, deputy and eight portfolio-holders. Two of the districts also chose the
leader and executive model and the remaining two were 4th option councils. The
White Paper Strong and Prosperous Communities (DCLG, 2006) invited
authorities to bid for unitary status fulfilling New Labour’s desire to establish
unitary authorities in the English shire counties. In 2008 the county council
successfully bid to create a single unitary body based on the county council, which
came into existence in April 2009.
Political Representation
Under the two-tier system, prior to the local elections in May 2009, the county
council and 3 of the district councils controlled by one party and 1 was NOC (LGA
2008). The incumbent party held 28 out of 49 seats on the county council and at
the elections for the unitary council gained 62 of the 98 available seats and
retained control of the council. The cabinet are all from the same controlling party.
4.8 The Interview Participants
The case study used purposive sampling to select those who were of specific
interest to the research (Robson, 2002). Whilst all those interviewed were happy to
be quoted, the university’s ethics policy was followed and the participants gave
their informed consent and were assured that the information they shared would
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be anonymous and confidential (ESRC, 2005). According to Babbie anonymity can
only be achieved when “neither the researchers nor the readers of the findings can
identify a given response with a given respondent” (Babbie, 2010, p.67). Given the
small number of authorities that met the sample criteria (see section 4.5) the
anonymity of the authorities may be difficult to achieve, especially as the sole
researcher can identify the respondents comments. However, confidentiality was
assured as the identity of the participants and their responses are not made public
(Ibid). Therefore the description of the participants has been formulated as not to
identify them (see p.111). Indeed, to eschew identification in any future
publication, the descriptions of those interviewed could further be reduced to a
minimum e.g. a local politician or local government officer. This was also to
maximise the participation of the respondents and so they could respond
uninhibited by such concerns as party political loyalty.
In each case a representative of the authorities’ political leadership, i.e. an elected
Cllr who is part of the executive was interviewed (with the exception of Authority
B). Also a representative of the senior management was interviewed, e.g. a
director or chief executive. These participants were able to share their views and
experiences of the development and effectiveness from the perspective of the
executive side of the authority, i.e. those Cllrs and officers who being held to
account by O&S, but who also determine the resources allocated to O&S.
Conversely O&S leadership and O&S describes those senior Cllrs and officers
who organise, maintain and direct the O&S function. In addition district and county
council members from each authority area were interviewed for their perspective
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on O&S as it operated under the two-tier system. These participants can also be
described as ‘elites’ as they are “considered to be influential, prominent, and/or
well informed in an organization or community” (Marshall and Rossman, 2006,
p.105) and specifically to the development, organisation, resourcing and day to
day operation of the O&S function. While they are sometimes difficult to access,
they can “report on an organization’s policies, histories and plans” (Ibid) and, as is
the focus of this thesis, have influence on the effectiveness of O&S.
The district and county council members in the area of Authority B were
interviewed face to face for an evaluation of O&S in their authorities between
28/01/08 and 22/02/08. Given the depth of the evaluation of O&S and that it had
addressed the future of O&S in the unitary authority it was determined that a
repetition of interviews would not be advantageous or necessary. Indeed, they
could be seen as a pilot study for the case study. The district and county council
members in the areas of authorities A, C and D had represented their authorities
on the O&S committees established to oversee the transition to unitary authorities.
One Cllr was interviewed for each authority, where practicable, and represented
different political parties or were independent Cllrs. They were contacted directly
by telephone and the interviews were conducted over the telephone and recorded
on audiotape with the permission of the participants. These interviews were
conducted between 03/04/09 and 28/04/09. The interviews with the leadership,
chief officers, O&S leadership and O&S management were arranged with the help
of the O&S Managers and conducted face to face between 16/09/09 and 09/10/09.
The following is a list of those interviewed:
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Authority A
 6 Cllrs who participated in the joint OSC of the Implementation Executive
from 5 district councils and the county council
 Authority A Leadership
 Authority A Chief Officer
 Authority A O&S Leadership
 Authority A O&S Management
Authority B
 8 Chairs of O&S from the 7 district councils and the county council who
were interviewed for the evaluation of O&S
 Authority B Chief Officer
 Authority B O&S Leadership
 Authority B O&S Management
Authority C
 6 Cllrs who participated in the joint OSC of the Implementation Executive
from 5 district councils and the county council
 Authority C Leadership
 Authority C Chief Officer
 Authority C O&S Leadership
 Authority C O&S Management
Authority D
 5 Cllrs who participated in the joint OSC of the Implementation Executive
from 4 district councils and the county council
 Authority D Leadership
 Authority D Chief Officer
 Authority D O&S Leadership
 Authority D O&S Management.
4.9 Evaluation of the Research Process
A number of issues arise when reflecting upon the research process:
 The experience of the researcher in relation to O&S and local government was
very limited prior to commencing the studentship; however the studentship with
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one of the case study authorities gave an opportunity to gain practical
experience of O&S function and local government by working with members
and officers. The research work undertaken for the authority covered the full
remit of the O&S function from supporting committee meetings, participating in
evidence gathering and evaluating the O&S function in the authority area. This
not only allowed a grounded understanding of O&S, but added to the
confidence that the participants had in the researcher and the research
process.
 Given the depth of participation in O&S at Authority B, which hosted the
studentship, it raised the question of using observational methods with the
other case study authorities. However, as noted above, it was decided that to
attempt such observation in the other authorities would only result in a ‘snap-
shot’ of O&S activity and therefore not be comparable. However this does raise
the question of was Authority B a good mentor for understanding O&S?
 Undertaking original research for Authority B greatly assisted in developing that
practical knowledge of O&S and in most instances complemented the research
for the case study. Indeed, part of the work for Authority B was to undertake an
evaluation of O&S in the whole authority area using the CfPS SEF. This raised
the question as to whether it could be used for the case study, however this
was determined not to be appropriate on the grounds of time and resources
needed to complete such an evaluation. Also that more importantly the aim of
the thesis was to determine what measures unitary authorities had undertaken
themselves to ensure an effective O&S function and therefore the SEF was
one of the possible means by which they may have achieved this.
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 The timing of the interviews with the district and county council members could
have been undertaken earlier. These respondents were contacted within
weeks of them effectively losing their jobs as Cllrs, as for the majority of them,
their councils were being abolished. Fortunately as with all of the respondents
they were very willing to share their experiences of O&S.
 Due to inexperience on behalf of the researcher, the telephone interviews were
somewhat experimental in sense of recording the conversation using analogue
audio tapes as opposed to digital recordings. Despite this, the recordings were
of sufficient quality to capture the views of the respondents.
 Individual interviews were preferred as opposed to focus groups. Focus groups
could have allowed more members to participate especially from opposition
and parties and independents however there would have been a danger of
time limited discussions becoming partisan in nature (of course this would be
against the spirit of O&S). Also the logistics of arranging and conducting focus
groups would have been difficult for a researcher inexperienced in this method
of data collection.
 Given that the research was looking to give “a description of circumstances at
the time of the research” (Flick, p.139) an alternative approach could have
been that of ‘snapshot’ as it would also allow for a comparison of the O&S
functions of the case study authorities. However as ‘snapshots’ primarily aim to
describe the phenomenon at the time of the research they are not concerned
with the “retrospective reconstruction of the process” (Ibid) which this research
is as the data would be used to compare the development of O&S in the case
study authorities before and after the unitary authorities came into being.
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 Finally, numerous questions were included in the interview guides covering the
wide range of categories raised by the literature review and by the experience
of the studentship with Authority B. However during the course of the
interviews most were used as prompts to what were in-depth conversations
although the length of the interviews varied from 20 minutes to over an hour;
averaging about 40 minutes.
4.10 Conclusion
This chapter has established the theoretical approaches of the thesis, outlined the
qualitative and quantitative methods used in the research, why the case study
authorities were chosen, the method of data analysis and an evaluation of the
research process. The following four chapters place the case study authorities in
to context and analyse the data gathered from each authority.
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Chapter 5 Local Authority A
5.1 Introduction
This chapter firstly, through analysis of the data from the semi-structured
interviews held with the members from the former county and district councils and
of relevant documents, will outline O&S prior to reorganisation. Secondly, through
analysis of the data from the semi-structured interviews held with members and
officers from the unitary council, it will then describe O&S after reorganisation. The
analysis is presented thematically in a framework based on Leach’s (2009) three
conditions for effective O&S namely, attitudinal, process and structure and
mechanism conditions. Finally, it will highlight key findings to be compared and
contrasted with the other case study authorities in a later chapter and relative
conclusions will be drawn.
5.2 Pre Reorganisation Approach to Overview and Scrutiny
NB For this section former district and county councillors will be referred to as
member(s).
5.2.1 Attitudinal Conditions
Understanding the Role of Overview and Scrutiny
As members described this county as having a significant number of independent
Cllrs and a culture of political independence from central party control, which is
characteristic of the way all councils were prior to the increasing politicisation of
local government particularly in the 1970’s (Gyford, et al, 1989). As one member
stated they viewed their council as the collective total of all members who were
entitled to participate in the various committees, determining policy and making
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decisions by consensus. Therefore when O&S was introduced they did not see it
as a significant change to their role as members, but rather
“as a continuing iterative process.”
The member from the former county council considered O&S as part of the
process of being a good Cllr from the first day they were elected. Indeed, they
regarded the creation of the executive and non-executive functions as “self-
conscious” and “clumsy” reflecting their view that O&S was an afterthought of the
Local Government Act (2000). However despite the uncertainty concerning the
origins of O&S the collective opinion of those interviewed as to the role of O&S is
as follows:
 To provide critical friend challenge
 To improve public services
 To voice the concerns of the public
 To own the scrutiny function
 To consider upcoming decisions.
Conversely the collective opinion of the members was the role of O&S is not:
 To be an opposition to the executive
 To ’second guess’ the executive
 To constantly call-in executive decisions
 An opposition process involving lots of challenge and criticism.
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Relationship with the Executive or Policy Committees
The relationship between the executive members (or policy committees) and O&S
has evolved since the introduction of O&S. A member stated the creation of the
executive had split the executive away from OSC and had fragmented the
“essential informal discourse which is what takes the business of councils
forward”.
Furthermore they argued that through their own previous experience as an
executive member they considered that O&S would be a good arena for portfolio-
holders to have discourse with non-executive members on a range of issues away
from the council chamber and political party rooms. In practice, on the other hand,
the experience of members was that the relationship was reliant on the attitude of
individuals to O&S rather than anything systemic. For example, one district
member said during the tenure of three different leaders of the council their
attitude towards O&S began as hostile, then became more relaxed and then
became more open to O&S. Another stated that executive members only
infrequently attended O&S meetings and recommendations made by O&S have
not only been rejected by the executive, but have been rejected very harshly:
“with animosity to the point where relationships with various individuals fell
apart”.
In contrast on occasions some more “diligent” executive members used “their own
initiative” and attended O&S meetings and have accepted recommendations that
have improved the executive’s decision. This has been attributed to the portfolio-
holder being:
“an eminently reasonable and rational man who was capable... in engaging
in a discussion in which criticism of the decision was not taken personally”.
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Another district Cllr said that their well developed relationship with the executive
meant they were able to ask questions at the monthly cabinet meetings and have
adopted select committee style O&S to look at individual portfolio holder’s
performance, policy outcomes, executive decision’s and the overall budget,
therefore demonstrating an ongoing and effective challenge to the executive.
Member Involvement in Overview and Scrutiny
The member from the former county council explained that members lamented the
passing of the old committee system when they were able to vote and make
decisions. However despite a substantial proportion of the elected members no
longer having a direct engagement with decision making process they did not
participate in O&S. Indeed, they were frustrated with the new political structures
and thought O&S was “pointless”. Therefore the number of members involved in
O&S varied across the authority area leaving the “usual few” to participate in it
fully. Another member acknowledged that some have been reluctant to be
involved with O&S, but argued that an effective O&S can influence decision-
makers. They explained that:
“once they get into it and realise the power of scrutiny and how you can
make it work with the executive to make the right decision, but you’ve got to
have the resolve to keep going. I’ve always had the resolve to do scrutiny,
but do it properly.”
Officer and Financial Resources
In most authorities the officers supporting the O&S function were provided by
democratic services or its equivalent and, at the minimum level, carried out
clerking duties and/or research and advice for members. Only three of the
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authorities had officers dedicated to O&S and one of those was described as “only
being on paper” as they had other responsibilities away from O&S. The members
indicated that officer support from other services within their authority, in terms of
providing information and evidence, varied depending upon the topic under
investigation and the support of directors for the O&S function. In addition only two
of the authorities had a dedicated budget for undertaking O&S investigations.
Non-political Overview and Scrutiny
There was consensus amongst those interviewed that O&S should be non-political
and to that extent the members experiences were that politics, whilst having an
influence on members views, did not overtly affect O&S. This has been achieved
through the chairs of O&S re-enforcing this position. As one explained:
“In my committee... it’s been non-political because I refused as an
independent councillor to allow politics to get in the way... that has always
been my resolve and it remains so”.
In their experience politics was:
“left behind the other side of the door when the committees met...one or two
try it on, but I’m sorry I don’t want to listen to that. We’re here for the good
of the community so let’s forget it”.
Furthermore the member from the former county council held the view that party
politics needs to be removed from local government altogether as a culture of
“tribes” and “ruler and opposer” has developed. In their opinion councils’ decisions
should all be based on a consensus of opinion and support, which is reflective of
NOC councils and, of course, O&S.
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Effectiveness of Overview and Scrutiny
“If scrutiny made a difference they wouldn’t let you do it.”
That was the rather cynical view of O&S from one district member. In fact, that
member described their experience of O&S as:
“very disillusioning. I don’t think we did it very well at all. The purpose of it
was for everybody just to show up and congratulate the officers on how
they met these performance indicators.”
In contrast the experience of one member was that O&S within their authority has
produced:
“extremely valuable work on policy development”.
However as to whether this has been effective depended upon what criteria you
used to measure effectiveness. One member doubted that the public would regard
O&S as being value for money for the tax payer although they also thought that
the average elector was unaware of the O&S process and therefore would not
know if it was value for money or not. The members were in agreement that
effective O&S:
 Responds to questions the public raise
 Is dependent upon the calibre and capacity of the members
 Is non-political
 Is not unduly influenced by the executive members and officers
 Has dedicated officer support.
5.2.2 Process Conditions
Call-in
Arguably the most public mechanism for holding the executive to account which
‘tests’ the relationship between the parties is call-in. The ability of O&S to call-in
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the decision of the executive was used infrequently in the former districts and
county council. There were varying views as to what extent members understood
the ‘power’ of call-in. It had never been used in one authority prior to one
member’s involvement in O&S and they had only experienced two during their
time in O&S. Their experience was that members had not:
“understood what their powers were and how they could use them
effectively”.
However in another district the ‘power’ of call-in was understood, but restrictions
were placed on its use. The member explained the reason for this:
“The power of call-in was fairly restricted because we didn’t want it being a
boil under the saddle of the council”.
Indeed this desire to avoid making call-in a means to create conflict in a council is
perhaps understandable when contrasted with the experience of the member from
the former county council. They said that the calling-in of executive decisions
were viewed by the portfolio-holders as a personal affront:
“attacking his masculinity and his leadership of the tribe”.
Public Involvement in Overview and Scrutiny
The general opinion of members was that the public has little understanding of
how councils work and even less knowledge of O&S. In addition some members
and officers are either unable or reluctant to engage with O&S and/or the public.
Therefore all parties need more information on and a greater understanding of
how the public can participate in O&S. One more pessimistic member’s view on
public engagement with O&S was that:
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“I think the public don’t expect to be engaged with that and they don’t want
to be engaged with it.”
However other members found that the public were active in O&S when the issue
was of great interest and concern such as hospital provision, dog fouling or waste
collection. One member saw the creation of the community networks by the unitary
authority as an opportunity for O&S to engage with the public through them. With
the appropriate communication and co-operation O&S should be able to take note
of the issues raised by these networks. They said:
“The local community needs ... to be embedded into scrutiny so that
scrutiny can make sure that (the community’s) need is being met and their
(O&S) recommendations attempt to do that.”
In addition one member highlighted the national political situation regarding MP’s
expenses as an opportunity to raise the profile of O&S as the term ‘scrutiny’ had
never had so much publicity.
5.2.3 Structure and Mechanism Conditions
The Development and Structure of Overview and Scrutiny
As noted above following the Local Government Act (2000) in this county five of
the seven authorities adopted the leader and cabinet model of the new political
structures and the remaining two chose the 4th option. The structure of O&S has
continually evolved in the individual authorities as each authority has developed
the structure of its OSCs, membership, officer support, meeting times etc
depending upon their authority’s and members’ particular needs (see Diagram 1
for examples of OSC structures from Authority A). For example:
 Of the larger district authorities one had an over-arching O&S management
board to develop and champion the O&S function within the council
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 One had as many as five specific O&S committees related to service
departments
 Another had aligned their O&S committees with the local area agreement
themes
 The two 4th option authorities had just one permanent committee each
 All used time bound task and finish groups to conduct in-depth or light touch
reviews on specific topics
 Another had reduced the number of committees to best utilise officer
support during the final year of O&S in their district
 None of the authorities had divided their O&S function into separate
scrutiny and overview committees.
Significantly the former county council (with the exception of the joint county and
district health OSC) called the O&S committees ‘policy development and scrutiny’
clearly stating their interpretation of the term ‘overview’ and emphasising the value
the leadership placed on the role of O&S in policy development.
Allocation of Chairs and Vice Chairs
It is argued that the allocation of chairs and vice chairs of OSC is important to the
independence of O&S from the influence of the executive or policy committee. As
the member from the former county council stated the allocation of members to
OSC based on the proportions of the political parties results in, unless the
controlling group is very enlightened, with them being:
“loaded with political cronies of the portfolio-holder”.
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Diagram 1: Examples of O&S Structures from Authority A Prior to Unitary Status
The Former County Council
A Former District Council
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127
Also if the controlling group takes all the O&S chairs and vice chairs it corrupts the
“spirit” of the process.
The actual policy on the allocation of chair and vice chairs varied across the
authorities depending upon the party in control, the size of the authority or the
willingness of the opposition to take up the offer. For example:
 In a Liberal Democrat and Independent controlled authority the cabinet was
drawn from the coalition, however the chairs and vice chairs of O&S were
drawn from all parties
 In another the majority group or ruling coalition provided most of the chairs
other than the overarching O&S chair
 In another the opposition party was offered vice chair positions, but it was
agreed not to take them.
The Preparation of Overview and Scrutiny for the Unitary Authority
Of those members interviewed the majority were opposed to the creation of a
single unitary authority for their county. They thought that their county was
geographically too big for a single unitary authority. A member remarked that they
have a diverse population of 500,000 people covering a big, yet peripheral county,
therefore:
“you’re not just providing local government services you are the
government of that place and you have to function like that.”
Their view, shared by other members, was that the county should have been split
into three administrative areas, but because of the county’s strong regional identity
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it was left as one large unitary, but without been given any regional powers that,
arguably, it should also have.
Another issue with the geographical size of the unitary authority was raised as a
potential problem to unitary members in attending meetings at county hall as some
may not drive and are then reliant on unreliable public transport. However more
fundamentally the former district members expressed the fear that the towns and
villages they represented would become further detached from a centralised
administration. Their fear was that the reduced number of Cllrs in the unitary
authority would result in under representation of the people, the so-called
democratic deficit.
Indeed, under the two tier arrangements the districts would often, justifiably or not,
complain that they were overlooked or ignored by the larger county council, which
was remote from the population unlike the districts. In contrast the member from
the former county council would have advocated only 40 or 50 members rather
than the 123 the unitary does have as the role of a unitary Cllr:
“is bigger and the challenges are bigger.”
In their opinion with fewer members the area of representation (individual wards)
would have been larger and would have attracted a better calibre of people to the
highest tier of local government in that area. Whereas they feared having 123
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members will have attracted Cllrs who are more inclined to parochial issues rather
than the strategic.
As described above (see Chapter 4 Methodology ) during the final year of the two-
tier structure an IE and been established to oversee the implementation of the new
unitary authority. A joint OSC of 12 county and 12 district Cllrs was formed to
scrutinise the decisions of the IE. It brought together experienced O&S members
from across the county and a district chair was the chair of the joint OSC. This one
particular member held their O&S function in high regard and they were reluctant
to see all their achievements lost in the abolition of the districts; subsequently they
wanted to incorporate the best of O&S in a merger of the districts and the county
as opposed to a takeover by the county. With the assistance of an O&S officer
from the county council a series of workshops were arranged with the CfPS, the
Improvement and Development Agency (IDeA) and the local Regional Efficiency
and Improvement Partnership (REIP). All the cistrict and county Cllrs, both
executive and non-executives, were invited to discuss how they saw the O&S
function working in the future. The member described that as “working
tremendously well” and the event was held at three venues resulting in a report
authored by the CfPS and that formed the way forward for the members. The
planning for the O&S function for the unitary authority also included discussions
with the newly appointed chief executive, who immediately indicated that the
Assistant Chief Executive’s (ACE) department would be responsible for O&S.
Elections before going unitary would have been preferred as they would have
given political stability and direction to the period of implementation. When this
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member was asked if the preparations for O&S could alter with a change of
leadership after the unitary council elections their reply was:
“We have set the goal posts now. For anybody to change things it would
take an awful lot of work and an awful lot of thought... the terms of
reference and the scope of the committees, the names of the committees,
the procedures, rules... that’s got to be taken into consideration that’s got to
be incorporated into the constitutional arrangements...we’ve done a fair bit
of work on that. So I think it would be very difficult to change.”
Priorities for Overview and Scrutiny in the Unitary Authority
The members views as to the priorities for the unitary council fall into two strands.
Issues relating to O&S and those policy areas that need to be addressed. With
regard to O&S:
 Members advocated an overarching Overview and Scrutiny Management
Board (OSMB) to manage the O&S function to:
o Scrutinise the council’s budget
o Develop and champion the O&S in the council
o Promote democracy and engage the public in democracy
 The chair of OSMB would be elected by the full council and the chairs of the
individual OSCs would be elected by the committee members themselves
as opposed to being selected by party groups.
Great importance was placed on the executive of the unitary council having a
positive relationship with the O&S function. The chair of the joint OSC said:
“We need a leader in the new authority who understands scrutiny and that’s
not necessarily always the way it is. If you’ve got somebody who can
champion your cause who is actually a member of the executive then you’re
winning I think.”
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Although that is not to say O&S will relax their holding to account of the new
leadership. They added:
“We’ve got to push the critical friend a little bit more with the executive – I
think we need the executive to come on board and value the function and
also realise the potential benefits of liaising more with scrutiny.”
Policy priorities for the new unitary authority should be those areas that the
districts used to be responsible and of importance to the public such as:
 Planning
 Licensing
 The environment
 Public transport
 Affordable housing
 Community engagement.
5.3 Post Reorganisation Approach to Overview and Scrutiny
5.3.1 Attitudinal Conditions
Resources and Officer Support
Authority A Leadership stated that effective O&S is:
“a cost and it has to be properly resourced”.
Therefore there has been an increase in officer resources from that of the former
county council. They now have a dedicated O&S team of 2 senior policy officers
and 2 policy officers managed by the Team Leader for Scrutiny & Executive, which
is located within the ACE department (see Diagram 2). They have varying
experience of O&S and Authority A O&S Management anticipates that the O&S
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team will be at full capacity soon. They will be able to call upon additional
resources from other departments despite having no dedicated link officers,
however directors are regarded as the key link to O&S. In addition O&S has been
allocated:
 £19,000 for training
 £5,000 for conferences
 £5,000 for general scrutiny.
Authority A Chief Officer gave a cautionary note in that they already regard the
resources of the authority as being “overstretched” and financial pressures facing
the authority could have an effect on O&S resourcing in the future.
Diagram 2 Authority A Overview and Scrutiny Officer Structure
The Role of Overview and Scrutiny
Authority A O&S Leadership described the role of O&S as to:
Team Leader Scrutiny and
Executive
Overview and Scrutiny Senior
Policy Officer x2
Overview and Scrutiny Policy
Officer x2
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“drive improvement in service delivery to actually represent the concerns of
the public, the main role of course is to provide critical challenge to the
decision makers. More importantly I think… is we have to be independent
minded governors of the function, in other words be independent of the
executive, but maintain a nice friendly relationship where possible”.
Their own role is an ‘ambassador’ for O&S. They are selected by the chair and
vice chairs of the O&S committees who comprise the informal management board.
Authority A O&S Management described the role of O&S as:
“meeting the 4 principles of good scrutiny. Providing effective constructive
and critical challenges within the organisation... from a local perspective it’s
actually very much about contributing towards the authority's improvement
journey and actually helping a very new cabinet to recognise areas where it
can do things in smarter ways and better ways in different ways; more
efficient bodies to achieve these goals... it’s partly about building levels of
knowledge and expertise not just within the scrutiny committees, but
building teams inside and outside of scrutiny to be able to provide a skills
base or pool”.
Authority A Chief Officer regards the role of O&S:
“is about challenge, understanding, holding people to account within the
council and beyond. But actually there is a discussion going on as to
whether (or) how that is interpreted, whether it’s a purely looking back thing
or whether it does involve policy development. My own personal view is
that it should be both. Because I think there is a danger if it is just the sort
of looking back it can be quite negative”.
Authority A Leadership describes O&S role as to:
“ensure those policies that are put forward by the whole council are being in
fact implemented and implemented in the best way possible and as
efficiently and effectively”.
Authority A Leadership argued that the scrutiny element of O&S is too negative a
role for members and in the last four years (under the previous administration) it
was seen as being ineffective. They see a more positive role for overview to
explicitly develop policy for the executive and council as a whole to consider.
Indeed, as mentioned earlier, they would replace the term overview with policy
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development adopting the former county council’s model of policy development
and scrutiny committees. The present cabinet are in favour of implementing policy
development committees, but it would require constitutional change in addition to
consultation with O&S members and the rest of the council. As Authority A
Leadership said:
“I personally would prefer a policy development and scrutiny role for those
committees... most members want a more positive role so they want to be
involved in policy development which gives them a positive input rather than
purely a negative one of saying you are not doing that right”.
Relationship Between the Executive and Overview and Scrutiny
Authority A O&S Leadership describes the relationship as “emerging” and
“developing”. They indicated that the executive do not fully understand O&S:
“I think once they realise the value of scrutiny and what we can add in terms
of value to the decision making process, I feel that it will blossom.”
Authority A O&S Leadership does not want the relationship to be adversarial:
“we are there to be friends, but if necessary there will be a little friction
between us”.
Authority A Leadership’s view is that cabinet and O&S are not adversarial and that
they are “starting off with a clean sheet”. Indeed, the cabinet sees the
“overall committee which is made up of the chairs and vice chairs of all the
scrutiny committees which meet on a regular basis and the cabinet feeds
into that as well so we are starting off with a clean sheet and cabinet
members are attending and communicating with their own relevant areas.”
Authority A Leadership attended the first meeting of O&S and when he is available
will attend more, invited or not. The informal OSMB also review the Cabinets
agenda and are permitted to take formal questions to Cabinet. (This is a practice
that was brought from one of the districts.) Other than this there are no formal
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timetable meetings between the executive and O&S yet. From the perspective of
Authority A Chief Officer and his officers the relationships are good:
“I think my chief Officer colleagues have spent more time working with the
scrutiny panels... I would say that all the relationships are pretty good. And
it’s certainly not adversarial.”
Recommendations
At the time of the interviews O&S had not made any recommendations to Cabinet
therefore it is not possible to determine how they are made and received by
Cabinet.
Member Involvement in Overview and Scrutiny
The elections to the new authority returned many new members with little or no
experience of local government at a county wide level. Authority A Leadership
viewed this as a positive:
“Out of 123 councillors, 98 are new to the county council level. So there’s a
lot of new blood and a lot of enthusiasm and positive cooperation”.
Authority A O&S Management viewed this more negatively:
“We've got a lot of very, very new members within the authority, so people
who haven’t come in through the conventional routes or serving 10-15
years on a town or parish council, those sorts of things which is a traditional
route, and then maybe 5-10 years on a district council. We've got a lot of
members who don’t have that kind of experience base...”
Therefore:
“the collective knowledge of the organisation at member level isn’t what it
might have been”.
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Indeed for those members that have experience the former district Cllrs are
becoming accustomed to a significantly larger organisation and the former county
Cllrs are broadening their remit to include areas such as planning and housing.
Given the inexperience of the new members the authority is developing training
that covers the political and decision making processes, including O&S.
Despite the concerns raised above Authority A O&S Leadership described
member involvement in O&S as being “fairly well advanced”. They described the
chairs and vice chairs as “passionate and enthused” by O&S and said they had a
significant role in developing the O&S function:
“they need to lead the process, they need to engage the members, they
need to become ambassadors, they need to be gatekeepers”.
Political Balance and Interaction
As described above the results of the election returned the largest party without an
overall majority. Authority A Leadership of the new council regards not having one
party in overall control as being positive as it is:
“much more cooperative and inclusive... ideally the whole council will get
together in the same direction, that’s the way we get the best”.
As Authority A Chief Officer observes the authority:
“is much less political, much less party political”.
Regarding O&S it is politically balanced with a proportionate number of members
from each party represented. The O&S chairs and vice chairs are selected from
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the ruling coalition in line with previous practice with the ‘opposition’ members
being invited onto the informal OSMB. The O&S Management notes that because
the chairs and vice chairs are from the same administration they want to show
they are “independent scrutineers”. However they give a cautionary note in that
the authority has made few executive decisions therefore the opportunity for party
political tensions have been equally few.
External Overview and Scrutiny
One other area where O&S will need to improve their engagement with
organisations and individuals external to the authority is the new legislation
relating to scrutiny of organisations including and beyond Local Area Agreement
(LAA) partners. Authority A Leadership describes it as “inevitable” and “right” that
O&S looks outward as well as inward. O&S can influence the cabinet, the council
and can also inform their partners, such as the Primary Care Trust (PCT) and the
police. This corresponds with Authority A Leadership’s aim of involving as many
partners and communities in decision-making as:
“it is all part of a joined up thinking that we can’t afford not to do any more”.
The CAA is the focus for external O&S will give O&S more impetus. Authority A
O&S Management has had preliminary discussion with the members and is
looking to the CfPS for guidance on how to engage with partners. This is prudent
as Authority A Chief Officer explained the authority’s previous experience of
external O&S by the Health Scrutiny Committee of the PCT has been adversarial.
Therefore any future O&S of partners needs to be more constructive.
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The Effectiveness of Overview and Scrutiny
Authority A O&S Leadership sees an effective O&S function as one that provides
effective challenge to the decision makers and that is recognised and valued for
doing so. As they stated effective O&S:
“is recognised and valued and provides effective challenge to the decision
makers, but more important... it would be an influencing body...”.
Authority A O&S Management links effective O&S function to members ownership
and understanding of the function:
“It’s about a process which is owned by and driven by members who
recognise and understand that it’s a corporate role...”.
Authority A Leadership relates effective O&S to the attitude of non-executive
members:
“What makes it effective is an attitude among scrutiny members that they
are there to achieve the best possible outcome and they are not just there
to criticise in a negative way. They have an important input to the overall
effectiveness of the organisation and its partners.”
Authority A Chief Officer measures the effectiveness of O&S by determining if it
contributes to making a smooth transition to “a fantastic unitary council”. In
Authority A Chief Officer’s view:
“I think the measure of scrutiny is whether it helps the authority do that. So
if we have an authority that fails to make a good transition that doesn’t
achieve the financial savings, that doesn’t go beyond the council into
broader things, then scrutiny’s failing as well as the authority... scrutiny has
a contribution to make on every count. If scrutiny starts trying to do things
that detract from that by going up blind alleys or doing things that actually
aren’t critical to that mission then it could damage things.”
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Overview and Scrutiny: The Lion that has failed to roar
Authority A O&S Leadership would not regard scrutiny as a lion; noting that O&S
can only influence decision-makers:
“Scrutiny needs more teeth I would say but it still needs to remember that
they have an influencing role... it’s got to be done by hearts and minds”.
Authority A O&S Management that O&S has not achieved its potential, but has
had some success:
“I think where scrutiny does achieve its potential is very often in the areas of
performance management, of review, of contributing towards the
development of policy and informing policy but when you get to the really
hard big political issues, I think scrutiny at that highest level struggles in
exactly the same way as parliamentary select committees do.”
Authority A Leadership agreed that O&S in the former county council failed to roar,
whereas in their view O&S was very effective in the former district councils.
Authority A Chief Officer was dismissive of the minister’s opinion. He was more
concerned with making sure O&S adds value to the new unitary administration.
5.3.2 Process Conditions
Call-in
Authority A O&S Leadership is to avoid the call-in scenario by making an early
challenge to a decision of the executive before it is made by having informal
discussions with Authority A Leadership and relevant portfolio holder. This
approach is also encouraged by Authority A Leadership, however if O&S have a
good reason for disagreeing with executive then they would not be adverse to a
decision being called-in:
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“As long as they have a good reason for it. I’d like to think that informally
they would come to us and say we are not happy with that.”
The main points for the procedure for call-in at authority A is as follows:
 Call-in should only be used in exceptional circumstances
 Members have 5 working days after the publication of a decision to call it in
 The monitoring Officer (the Head of Legal and Democratic Services) calls-in
decisions at the request of the chair or any three members of the relevant
committee
 The monitoring officer rejects or accepts the call-in request
 An OSC can only call-in 2 decisions per six months
 A member can only make a call-in request every 2 months
 Urgent decisions cannot be called-in.
Public involvement in Overview and Scrutiny
The collective opinion was that O&S in the unitary needs to improve public
involvement in the O&S process and that none of the two-tier authorities had been
particularly successful at public engagement. Indeed, Authority A Chief Officer
thought that O&S is:
“not a good method of engaging with the public”.
Therefore the challenge for O&S is to improve their methods of community
engagement and one possible mechanism is the 21 proposed community
networks designed to demonstrate the unitary authorities commitment to delivering
localism. However their relationship with O&S is uncertain. As Authority A Chief
Officer explained they are a means of integrating local service provision based on
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clusters of town and parish councils and less about organising the public to make
local decisions. O&S role would be to see whether they are working and help
develop them.
For the Authority A O&S Leadership the question of community networks is not
primarily about their makeup, but more about members fulfilling their community
leadership role. In their view members would lead the process in determining what
the community wanted out of the network. With regard to the link between O&S
and the networks they see it as O&S on a different level, effectively local O&S.
They would see it as a way of taking pressure off the main OSCs. It would require
the community network managers to function like an O&S Officer. However, more
importantly it would place the members in the dual and, possibly conflicting role, of
the eand O&S for their community network area.
Authority A Leadership agrees that the community networks are a means for
members to fulfil their community leadership role and for local communities to
resolve issues at a local level. Given that members are also involved in O&S then
it would be natural for them to bring local issues to the attention of O&S and the
executive if it is of county-wide, strategic concern. Therefore the community
networks could be part of the ‘critical friend’ role of O&S. However, as the
Authority A O&S Management, the way in which the authority delivers localism is
under review and therefore the relationship between O&S and the community
networks is also to be determined. He envisages that O&S role will firstly be to
review how the networks are functioning. O&S could then use community
networks to look at the performance of the authority and other service providers at
a local level, especially in relation to the Comprehensive Area Assessment (CAA).
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5.3.3 Structure and Mechanism Conditions
The Development of Overview and Scrutiny for the Unitary Authority
As detailed above (see p.113) when they were chair of the joint O&S for the IE the
current Authority A O&S Leadership took the lead on developing the O&S function
for the unitary authority with the assistance of the CfPS, the IDeA and the REIP.
members and officers have identified working practices, methodologies, processes
to deliver a:
“robust, comprehensive scrutiny process”.
Authority A O&S Management it as a “blend” of the former county council and one
of the former districts, which was regarded as the best resourced and the best
O&S function in the county. However the structures and processes put in place are
likely to change over the coming months and years. As the Authority A O&S
Management explained:
“We have got a start which members are comfortable with... but I would
expect it to look very different in 12 months time because the unitary isn’t
the same as a county or districts”.
The O&S arrangements are embedded in the constitution with the exception of the
informal management committee. This had not been included in the constitution to
avoid party political influence on its composition and membership. There was an
issue regarding the terminology and function of the committees. Authority A
Leadership said that all members should be involved in policy development and
therefore the new executive want to revert to naming the ‘overview’ part of O&S
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‘Policy Development’ and to assist the executive in developing and deciding
policies for the new authority. However, as the O&S chair explains the executive
appears to be confused on this issue as O&S role is to influence the development
of policy before decisions are made. They cannot determine policy as they would
be unable to challenge it in the future.
Structure of Overview and Scrutiny
The structure of O&S at this authority is based on the legacy from the former
county council. There are 5 O&S committees which are aligned to the LAA themes
and also the corporate priorities of the authority (see Diagram 3). There has been
one significant change and that is the informal OSMB made up of the chairs of the
other committees, who co-ordinate the work programme to avoid duplication and
give advice and guidance to the other committees. The OSMB is informal as if it
were formal the council would have to elect its chair and members of O&S want to
avoid any potential influence from the political parties or leadership of the council.
Diagram 3: Authority A Overview and Scrutiny Committee Structure
Informal Overview and Scrutiny Management Board
Health and
Adults
Children,
Education
and
Families
Corporate
Resources
Communities Environment
and Economy
Task and finish
groups
Task and finish
groups
Task and finish
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Task and finish
groups
Task and finish
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Overview and Scrutiny Work Programme
Research has shown that the O&S function has been successful in overview and
not so in scrutiny (Ashworth, 2003a; Ashworth and Snape, 2004) therefore the
balance between two sides of O&S is significant in the work programme. Authority
A Chief Officer thought that there had been too much ‘scrutiny’ in the past and that
there should be a balance between the two. However Authority A Leadership
argued that the new authority should have continued having specific policy
development committees where non-executives could decide as opposed to just
influencing policy. However as mentioned above the chair argues that policy
development should only be influenced by O&S and the decisions on policy should
remain with the executive as in the present constitution.
O&S has held sessions with the CfPS and IDeA on the work programming
process, and as the chair explained they have just begun developing a work
programme (see Figure 23). Any member is able to suggest an item for
consideration and each OSC determines its own programme with guidance from
the informal OSMB. OSC chairs have a gate-keeping role to ensure that items are
prioritised in line with the authority’s Corporate Plan, that they will be able to
influence the decision makers and make good use of their resources.
With regard to what topics they could choose the priority for the O&S leadership is
the budget for March 2010, because without it there would be no council. Authority
A Leadership said the new authority has inherited:
145
“major organisational performance problems in all areas. We have an awful
financial situation and major areas of weakness organisationally attributable
to the whole disruption of transition and the cost”.
They described needing to develop policy for the planning process, local
development, localism, waste management, the budget, health and social care
adding:
“We are now at the stage where we are just fixing major problems before
we can start looking towards preparing to transform and actually excel”.
Authority A Chief Officer was in agreement that the authority needs to improve its
performance based on recent external inspections. They also indicated that the
authority had to address how it secured finances, made efficiencies and reduced
service levels. Therefore O&S has held meetings with the relevant Directors
regarding the biggest risks and challenges, although there have been no specific
requests from the executive so far. The O&S Management emphasised that there
is:
“non-political consensus amongst all members that where things are big
and are in need of fixing they need to be fixed”.
The O&S Management has also been working with members on issues specifically
related to O&S, i.e. recent and anticipated legislation, which also requires time in
the work programme.
Allocation of Chairs and Vice Chairs
As noted above the chairs and vice chairs are selected from the ruling coalition in
line with the practice of the previous administration. They are chosen by the
members of the individual committees and not the full council as in other
authorities.
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Figure 23: Examples of Overview and Scrutiny Work Programme for Authority A
Overview and Scrutiny Committee Topic
Environment and Economy  Unitary council’s carbon footprint
 Developing local transport plan
 Creating a green county
 Regeneration and investment of
parks, lakes and gardens
Children Education & Families  Transformation of children’s services
 Children’s trust safeguarding
Children & looked after children
 Primary strategy for change
Communities  Housing strategy
 Homeless strategy
 Sustainable Communities Act
 Gypsy and traveler sites
Corporate Resources  The budget
 Performance management
framework
 Preliminary appraisal of internal
communications, member
communication's, social media &
public engagement
 Severance policy
Health and Adults  Review outpatients appointments
 Commissioning process for adult
care and support
 Patient transport
 Progress of local hospital trust’s
foundation status
5.4 Key Findings from Authority A
5.4.1 Attitudinal Conditions
 The unitary authority now has a team of 4 dedicated officers and has been
allocated a budget of £29,000.
 Authority A Leadership sees O&S has having a greater role in developing
policy or even deciding policy
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 Leadership wants to develop a non-adversarial working relationship with
O&S
 The executive is not adverse to a decision being called-in, however they
would rather avoid a call-in and resolve any disagreements informally
 There is consensus that there are major issues that need attention and that
O&S has a role in this
 O&S relationship with the executive depended upon individuals approach
as opposed to anything systemic
 Members have always considered O&S scrutiny to be part of their role as a
Cllr
 A potential challenge for O&S is the experience of members at a county
level which varies considerably as only 26 Members of the former authority
were returned out of 123 members. Indeed, 40-50% of new members had
not served on an OSC, therefore training is an issue for the new authority
 The demands on the members' time in the new unitary authority are
considerable
 It is agreed that O&S could have more teeth, but O&S can only influence
decision-makers and therefore it needs to win “hearts and minds”.
5.4.2 Process Conditions
 The ability of O&S to call-in the decision of the executive was used
infrequently
 O&S needs to improve public participation
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 The creation of the community networks as an opportunity for O&S to
engage with the public.
5.4.3 Structure and Mechanism Conditions
 Each authority had developed the structure of O&S to reflect their culture
and meet their particular needs, including the allocation of chairs and vice
chairs of O&S
 The structure of O&S in the new authority is a blend of the old county
council and what was perceived as the best functioning district council
 The unitary authority has 5 O&S committees aligned to LAA themes and the
executive’s portfolios
 The O&S chairs & vice chairs are selected from the ruling coalition in line
with previous practice and are chosen by the members of the individual
committees and not the full council as in other authorities.
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter has summarised the key demographic and political characteristics of
the authority area. Also, by analysing the data from the semi-structured interviews
held with the members and officers from the former county and district councils,
the unitary council and from relative documents, has outlined O&S prior to and
after re-organisation. The thematic analysis has identified key findings focused on
the development, structure and resources of O&S, its role, the involvement of
members and the general public in O&S, the effectiveness of O&S and the
development of O&S for the unitary authority. These findings can now be
compared and contrasted with the other case study authorities in chapter 9.
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Chapter 6 Local Authority B
6.1 Introduction
This chapter firstly, through analysis of the data from the semi-structured
interviews held with the members from the former county and district councils and
of relevant documents, will outline O&S prior to reorganisation. Secondly, through
analysis of the data from the semi-structured interviews held with members and
officers from the unitary council, it will then describe O&S after reorganisation. The
analysis is presented thematically in a framework based on Leach’s (2009) three
conditions for effective O&S namely, attitudinal, process and structure and
mechanism conditions. Finally, it will highlight key findings to be compared and
contrasted with the other case study authorities in a later chapter and relative
conclusions will be drawn.
6.2 Pre Reorganisation Approach to Overview and Scrutiny
NB For this section former district and county cllrs will be referred to as
member(s).
6.2.1 Attitudinal Conditions
Understanding the Role of Overview and Scrutiny
The Local Government 2000 introduced new political structures and new decision-
making procedures to local authorities, but had not altered the fundamental role of
members to review the decisions within their council. As one longstanding and
very experienced member said:
“We have always had scrutiny. Scrutiny isn’t a new thing.”
150
Other members described the role as:
“to improve the services or save on the services”
“It’s there to improve and enhance what we do. If you do something the
same way for long enough it gets stale and scrutiny is there to challenge
the way things are done and to make sure that it is being carried out
correctly and efficiently and to look at better ways, in detail and examine
and explore. Under the scrutiny system we do have that chance. There's a
greater role now for members to question and query the reports that come
through from officers.”
“To review, scrutinise and advise (on) decisions”
“To support the leadership of the authority”
“We are here to further the key aims and priorities of the authority, hold the
executive to account and develop policy in a non-political arena. We’re not
here to hit anybody with big sticks. We’re not an opposition. I’m quite clear
about that remit.”
In summary, the members’ opinions on the role of O&S centred on:
 Challenge to Authority B Leadership
 Accountability for decisions
 Improvement in services
 Efficiency of services
 Support to Authority B Leadership to achieve its goals
 Not being an opposition.
Relationship with the Executive or Policy Committees
In the formative years of O&S there was the perception amongst members that
O&S role was to make negative criticism and to find fault of the executive.
Therefore the relationship between the two was initially difficult and had to be
developed. As one member reflected:
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“it was basically a matter of finding their feet. We've had to creep before we
could walk”.
They learned that:
“if you have got to be critical then be critical but do it friendly...there's a
closer working relationship between the executive members and the
scrutiny members. Before that it was a little bit strained to say the least.”
One member said that the relationship with their executive remained:
“a big big issue...because a lot of members think scrutiny is under-valued,
second hand.”
Their council leader’s regular quote when speaking in relation to O&S was ‘we’re
two-sides of the same coin’ however given the officer support and resources
allocated to the executive they did not feel this was the case.
In contrast to the problems some of the authorities had one member said that their
leadership was never a problem to O&S as they did not interfere with O&S.
“We are left alone. Of course we tell them what we are going to do. Same
as everywhere else they get to know what we have picked out to do.
Authority B Leadership has never been a problem.”
Arguably the relationship with the executive centred on the acceptance or not of
O&S recommendations and the experience across the authorities was that there
was almost 100% acceptance. A member gave a reason for this:
“I think most have been received by the executive and acted on and this is
because they are evidence led and outcome driven. If the evidence is there
and the recommendations come from that evidence base it is hard to
refute.”
However other members had problems with the executive with the implementation
of recommendations. This was resolved by the introduction of a procedure for the
executive to report back to O&S. For example, one member described that:
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“up until then the reports went to cabinet and then they were in an abyss, if
you found out what happened, you found out what happened, if you didn’t
you didn’t so there is a reporting procedure of 4 weeks in which to get back
to the chair of the relevant panel”.
Other authorities asked the executive for an action plan of how it was to implement
the recommendations, which O&S revisited every 6 months to look at progress.
Members’ found that the executive did not consult with O&S before decisions
made so they also reviewed the executive’s forward plan to see what decisions
were impending so they could make comments in advance. Another example of
how O&S formalised the relationships was one authority had allocated executive
members to their 3 OSCs to liaise with them and to create a closer working
relationship.
Member Involvement in Overview and Scrutiny
The effectiveness of O&S relies upon the participation of members and the value
they place upon it. One chair stated that members in their authority are “proactive”
and added that:
“Members themselves find the value in scrutiny as a place where they can
give their voice and make sure they are heard and make sure the executive
hears their voice.”
Another said that:
“As far as I’m concerned all non-executive members should have a scrutiny
role.”
However, the chairs estimated that only 40% of non-executive members were
involved in O&S at any one time. Reasons given for this were that some members
have never shown any interest in O&S and preferred the old committee system
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where they could make decisions rather than just being able to influence decision
makers. Alternatively they have chosen to participate in other committees such as
licensing and planning where they retain the decision-making power. Members
are allocated to OSCs based on the political balance of the full council. Decisions
on who would be made within parties based on individuals interest in a particular
subject. However, because of the rules regarding political balance some members
have been unable to participate in OSCs.
Officer and Financial Resources
Officer support was described as inadequate with most of the districts only having
one officer and in some instances they were not dedicated to O&S having other
duties in their democratic services department or equivalent. In most instances
O&S had secured additional clerking support, however one member described
their officer’s duties as being only “administrative” leaving members to provide
their own research, reports and presentations. In another authority their dedicated
officer had in fact three positions O&S Manager, democratic services Manager and
the authority’s election manger. As they worked directly with the executive this
surely raised the possibility of a conflict of interest? The experience and abilities of
the officers supporting O&S also varied between the authorities. Many were very
experienced officers, mainly from a democratic services background, and were
described as being very important in keeping O&S free from outside influence and
independent. Members tried to improve officer support, but as one member
recalled the answer was always there were more important areas to consider
staffing for:
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“so we are undoubtedly second or third or fourth.”
The member from the former county council gave their opinion on why officer
resources were so important to O&S:
“The evidence is where the capacity for officer involvement is good scrutiny
is good. I think we recognise that.”
With regard to financial resources the authorities varied in their ability to secure a
discretionary budget for O&S, however finances were made available for training
of members, evidence gathering and site visits. Unsurprisingly the O&S Manager
at the county council had been allocated a significant budget for this of £25,000,
but even one of the 4th option authorities had a budget of £2,000 to help conduct
O&S reviews. However one district member complained that:
“we have meetings were external partners come in, such as Environment
Agency staff, and we struggle to put on a cup of tea or coffee and a
biscuit…”.
Non-political Overview and Scrutiny
The view of all the members was that O&S was by and large a non-political
process in their authorities. This was achieved as a result of the ability of the
chairs to establish and maintain a non-political environment in their committees
and not to succumb to interference from outside. One member outlined their
experience of chairing O&S committees. They explained they avoided taking votes
as that made O&S political. They insisted that O&S was:
“done through discussion and consensus of opinion to make sure that we
all come up with the recommendations that we want and I won’t allow the
political element to enter into any of the scrutiny’s that I chair”.
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Effectiveness of Overview and Scrutiny
Regarding the effectiveness of O&S members agreed that it should make a
difference to the lives of the communities that they represent by improving the
council as a whole. As one member stated:
“if scrutiny is performing well and effectively it drives forward, improving the
council”.
Another also agreed with the above, but added that:
“it (O&S) could and should make a larger difference than it currently does.
Perhaps we’re partly to blame for the public awareness of Scrutiny”.
Members gave examples of O&S reviews that they described as ‘good’ this was
because of the thoroughness of the process, the recommendations made or the
extent to which the public were involved. They were:
 Smoke free public places
 Kerbside recycling
 Bonfire policy development
 Fly-tipping
 Targeting resources for young people
 Maintenance of headstones in churchyards
 City centre CCTV provision
 Council employee sickness absence
 Adolescent mental health.
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6.2.2 Process Conditions
Call-in
Of the members interviewed in this county they unanimously regarded the use of
call-in as a failure of communication with Authority B Leadership of their authority.
The majority rather regarded the use of call-in as a weakness and something to be
avoided. As one member stated:
“my idea of call-in is this, that if you call-in and continue to call-in it’s a
weakness. It means you haven’t got a dialogue with the executive.”
Therefore the majority of members appeared not to view call-in as a means by
which O&S would readily hold Authority B Leadership to account for decisions they
had made. In contrast one member did view call-in as a means to fulfil the critical
friend role. However they said the means by which to request and implement a
call-in worked against the member who wished to raise it. In their authority
members only had 72 hours to raise and to review the decision and complete a
call-in. They suggested that this was because decision-makers felt threatened by
the procedure. Subsequently they had only ever had one call-in in the 7 years they
have been involved in O&S. Whether it was because off the attitude towards call-
in by Authority B Leadership, by O&S members or the rules for a call-in there had
been few call-ins across the whole county; most members only recalling one or
two in their own authority in the time O&S had been in operation.
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Public Involvement in Overview and Scrutiny
Members generally described their experience of engaging with the public as
“hard”. Indeed one member described their attempts to involve the public in O&S
as a:
“soul destroying mission”.
The former county and district councils had made attempts to engage the public.
For example:
 Public engagement was part of scoping O&S reviews
 O&S chairs invited members of the public to be involved
 One authority allocated 20 minutes of O&S meetings to the general public
to raise questions (however they rarely attended)
 O&S co-opted interested members of the public on committees on an ad
hoc basis.
Conversely one member from a district did say that 2 or 3 people regularly
attended O&S meetings. It was suggested that the general public were not
involved, because they were either uninterested or unaware of what O&S is and
does. The overwhelming view was that the public would only become involved if
the issue under scrutiny was of interest and relevance to them. As a member
said:
“the only time the general public is interested in an issue is when it directly
effects them, so if the services has been grown efficiently and effectively,
then they don't have any qualms. So they just let you get on with the job.”
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One member stated that this lack of interest and awareness was due to the council
not promoting O&S:
“I think what we have to do is simplify it so that the public know what
scrutiny is, I think most people understand perhaps what a cabinet is or an
executive member, but ask them what scrutiny or a scrutiny member does
and they wouldn’t have a clue.”
6.2.3 Structure and Mechanism Conditions
The Development and Structure of Overview and Scrutiny
As noted above following the Local Government Act (2000) in this county six of the
eight authorities adopted Authority B Leadership and cabinet model of the new
political structures and the remaining two chose the 4th option. The structure of
O&S (See Diagram 4 for examples of O&S committee structures from Authority B)
has continually evolved in the individual authorities as each authority has
developed the structure of its OSC, membership, officer support, meeting times
etc. depending upon their authority’s and members particular needs. For example,
 All of the larger authorities had a management board made up of the
chairs and vice chairs of the O&S committees
 Most authorities had 3 or 4 committees or panels, which were collated
into themes often reflecting the service departments and or their
priorities
 Given the relative size of the 4th option councils they divided O&S into
two OSC
 Time bound task and finish groups were used to conduct in-depth or
light touch reviews on specific topics
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 None of the authorities had divided their O&S function into separate
scrutiny and overview committees.
Diagram 4: Examples of Overview and Scrutiny Structures from Authority B Prior
to Unitary Status
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Diagram 4 Examples of Overview and Scrutiny Structures from Authority B Prior to
Unitary Status continued
Former 4th Option District Council
Allocation of Chairs and Vice Chairs
In the county council and in the majority of the districts the largest controlling party
held all the chair/vice chair positions in O&S. The reason given for this by a
number of members was the desire not to allow the smaller opposition parties to
use O&S as a mechanism to oppose the executive. As one member said:
“If you’ve got the opposition as all the chairs and vice chairs of all the
scrutiny groups then immediately you’re making it political and I don’t think
it should be.”
Another more practical reason was there were insufficient opposition members
available and/or interested to take up these positions such was the dominance of
one party in the council. However there were instances where opposition
members did chair OSC, task and finish groups and, perhaps surprisingly for this
county, opposition members held cabinet positions on one authority.
The Preparation of Overview and Scrutiny for the Unitary Authority
Members in this authority were not directly asked about their opinion on the
creation of the unitary authority, however it can be noted that the district councils
Internal OSC External OSC
Task and finish groups Task and finish groups
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were opposed to a single unitary authority and would have preferred three smaller
unitary councils. Of those members that did make comment the collective view
was that they had to accept the single unitary and make the best of it they could.
As stated earlier (see Chapter 4 Methodology) the former county and district
members were interviewed as part of a county wide evaluation of O&S prior to the
creation of the unitary authority. The results of the evaluation were carried forward
by the members and officers when planning for the unitary O&S function.
Priorities for Overview and Scrutiny in the Unitary Authority
The members’ views as to the priorities for the unitary council fall into two strands;
issues relating to the structure of O&S and those policy areas that need to be
addressed. Firstly, a district member emphasised the need to address the
structure of O&S:
“If you don't get the structure of it right it ain't going to work.”
With regard to this the member from the former county council explained that that
the model of O&S at county hall should be:
“a strategic body looking at the strategy of our policies”.
They added there were plans to align the OSCs to the 4 thematic blocks of the
Local Area Agreement as they are the strategic priorities for the county as whole.
Members will address localised issues through other means such as the area
partnerships.
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Also O&S should also be taken seriously by the executive. A district member,
reflecting on their frustration of O&S within their own authority, stated they were:
“looking forward to the new authority and scrutiny working properly...”.
Secondly, members said that policy priorities for the new unitary authority should
be those areas that the districts used to be responsible for such as:
 Housing
 Leisure
 Planning
 Maintaining the standards of services that the public had in districts.
Members also highlighted priorities such as:
 How the unitary authority can address the needs of an ageing population
 Providing services and opportunities for young people, especially in rural
areas
 Supporting job creation and industry across the county.
6.3 Post Reorganisation Approach to Overview and Scrutiny
6.3.1 Attitudinal Conditions
Resources and Officer Support
The process of LGR in this authority area meant that a new unitary council had
been elected in May 2008, but the county and district councils continued until April
2009. When the district councils were abolished in April 2009 the majority of their
officers involved in O&S, be they dedicated or part-time (cross-service) were able
to continue working in O&S in the new authority. This illustrated the strength of the
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officer network, the desire of those officers to continue to work in O&S and that the
work programme required their continued support. Under LGR all interested
officers had to compete for positions including the O&S Manager, but excluding
the Health Scrutiny Liaison Manager. The former county council, in collaboration
with the NHS, had jointly funded an officer to manage health O&S for which they
were highly commended at the CfPS Good Scrutiny Awards 2009. Of the 7 officers
who were appointed in October 2009 there was a 50-50 split of former county and
district council officers all having direct experience of O&S. In addition democratic
services have a dedicated officer to facilitate the continuing committee clerk
support, the Heads of Service continue to be the link officers to O&S as does the
Head of Legal and Democratic Services in their role as monitoring officer.
Authority B O&S Management was contented with the number of staff (see
diagram 5) especially in regard to members and officers being able to manage and
respond to capacity issues and their increasing workload, e.g. their gate keeping
and appellant role for petitions, involvement with CCfA, external O&S of partners
and the “growing beast” of health scrutiny, however they said:
“we will have in the future is 7.5 officers in total. That to me is an excellent
establishment and will be able to deliver an effective Scrutiny function”.
Authority B O&S Management administers a dedicated budget of £25,000 to fund
training, conferences, seminars and O&S reviews. Finally, the new authority has
created an electronic library of O&S reports from the former county and district
councils from the last 3 years as a resource for members, officers and interested
parties.
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Diagram 5: Authority B Overview and Scrutiny Officer Structure
The Role of Overview and Scrutiny
Authority B O&S Leadership the role of O&S as:
“to hold the executive to account for the decisions they make; to be a
critical friend… we are also involved in policy development... we are not an
opposition.”
Authority B O&S Management that the O&S function is to:
“ensure that decisions made are made first time with overview and scrutiny
contributing to the decision process, contributing to positive development,
contributing to policy review, wanting to make a difference for the
communities we serve.”
Authority B Leadership regards O&S as having an uncertain introduction in 2000,
but it has emerged from a period of confusion and now:
“has got a very important role in terms of really reviewing the operation of
the council... it has got an important role to play as well in terms of looking
at the work partners, whether that’s housing bodies, health or so on...
Scrutiny, you know has got the time and expertise to be able to look at this
in depth, whereas sometimes the executive doesn’t”.
Overview & Scrutiny
Manager
Principle Scrutiny Officer Overview & Scrutiny
Officers (x4)
Health Scrutiny Liaison
Manager (0.5)
Scrutiny Support Assistant
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O&S is “more flexible then executive” as it can decide its own role and work
programme. While the executive is focused on making decisions O&S can review
the work of the council, partners and engage with communities.
Authority B Chief Officer outlines the role of O&S in the authority as:
“supporting the council and its partners to develop a prosperous, safe and
sustainable future”.
O&S can achieve this by helping the council and its partners focus on the
allocation of resources, the cost effectiveness of and quality of service provision
by engaging with local people, learning from service users, monitoring
performance and identifying internal and external best practice.
Relationship Between the executive and Overview and Scrutiny
Authority B O&S Leadership describes his experience of working with the cabinet
and chief executive as “very positive”. They meet monthly with Authority B
Leadership, the chairs and vice chairs meet their respective portfolio-holders and
directors on a monthly or bi-monthly basis and the cabinet attend O&S meetings
when requested.
For Authority B O&S Leadership it is a matter of good communication. They
stated:
“they need to know what we are doing and I think it engenders that spirit of
co-operation”.
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When questioned as to whether there would be a danger of too close a
relationship he emphasised the “fiercely independent” nature of O&S at the
authority. Authority B Leadership endorsed the chair’s view that their relationship
is positive and that they complemented each other’s roles. In the opinion of the
O&S Manager is that the relationship could be strengthened, but overall it is “fine”.
He describes the executive/non-executive meetings as “robust discussions” and
adds it is one of several mechanisms in which O&S effectively challenges and
holds the executive to account.
Recommendations
The executive does not make an instant response to recommendations made by
O&S, but rather a written reply within 6 months. This will indicate if the
recommendations have been accepted: when, how and by whom they will be
implemented and how they will be measured. Authority B Leadership indicated
that they should reflect the quality of O&S work, in that it has been well planned,
scoped and delivered. They are looking for recommendations that are grounded in
evidence, reflect best practice and are SMART (specific, measurable, attainable,
relevant and time bound).
The O&S chair stated that recommendations made by O&S should where possible
give indicative costs of implementation and be “evidence led and outcome driven”.
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Member Involvement in Overview and Scrutiny
The elections for the unitary authority returned approximately equal thirds of
former county council, former district council and new Cllrs (new to this level of
authority i.e. they may have had experience as parish Cllrs). Former county and
district members are learning how each other’s responsibilities (e.g. licensing and
planning) as well as how O&S functions within a unitary authority. Equally new
members are learning how to fulfil all the roles expected of them. Whatever their
experience there is a substantial demand on a member’s time.
As was the case with the former county the O&S chair indicated that there was a
‘hardcore’ of members involved in O&S who see the value of the function.
Authority B O&S Management observation was that an increasing number of
members have become involved in O&S, which, coupled with the time available to
members, raises questions regarding member’s and officer’s capacity to deliver
the O&S function. Members will have the opportunity to attend various training
courses on O&S conducted both internally by officers and externally, with
organisations such as CfPS and IDeA. Members also have personal development
plans to identify and manage their training needs and a O&S handbook has been
adapted from one of the former districts for the new authority.
Political Balance and Interaction
Authority B O&S Leadership thought the result of the elections had not made O&S
more political. In his experience all political parties have been involved in O&S and
members have always tried to be non-political; making recommendations by
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consensus. If there have been disagreements they have been acknowledged and
included in reports. Regarding call-in, which is potentially the most ‘political’ aspect
of O&S they have only had two votes on whether to request a call-in. Authority B
O&S Leadership does recognise that O&S could always become political
especially at election times, but he stated that it would:
“be resisted, even from my own party it will be resisted.”
Authority B O&S Management’s perception was that O&S had not become more
political than it was before the unitary authority. They thought the majority of
members interact in the right way in line with best practice. In fact he argued that
politics is “healthy” and that it is important to have challenge within the O&S
function. Within the 3 years he has been in his role he has not seen political
dogma affect O&S. Indeed he gave examples of O&S reviews relating to health
and social care that were “highly political and highly sensitive” where it was the
recommendations made by majority party members that went against the cabinet’s
view.
External Overview and Scrutiny
One other area where O&S will need to improve their engagement with
organisations and individuals external to the authority is the new legislation
relating to scrutiny of organisations including and beyond LAA partners.
Authority B O&S Management drew attention to this authority’s decision to align all
its O&S committees to the LAA thematic arrangements recognising that the
priorities for the authority are based on the wider strategic and local area plans
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developed and agreed with authority and partner organisations. They have also
hosted a 1 day seminar in October 2008 with LAA partners (i.e. the police, NHS,
fire service) with presentations by the CfPS to explain what O&S is about and how
they may come to interact in the future.
Authority B commented that it is for the leadership of O&S to determine how much
O&S of partners they do, however he reflected that the O&S function has
progressed from being focused purely on the internal workings of authorities to
being more concerned with the performance of partners. As Authority B
Leadership note this is of increasing importance as O&S role expands into
providing evidence for the Comprehensive Area Assessment (CAA).
The Effectiveness of Overview and Scrutiny
Authority B O&S Leadership stated the role of the Cllrs was once about obtaining
value for money and now it is about “value for people.” Therefore effective O&S is
that which makes a difference to the people the authority represents and serves.
Authority B O&S Management agrees that an effective O&S function is able to add
value via clear and SMART recommendations. To achieve this O&S will be led by
multi-party representatives who:
 Understand the purpose of O&S
 Have developed and own the work programme
 Have the capacity to challenge and review the decisions and policies of the
executive and partners.
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Members will be supported by “high calibre O&S officer(s)” multi skilled in a variety
of competencies including:
 Research and development
 Political acumen
 Being able to communicate and work with senior officers, partners, and
communities.
From the perspective of the executive, Authority B Leadership characterised
effective O&S as a process that can deliver outcomes that improve performance
and service delivery by being:
 Open
 Transparent
 Consistent
 Understood by members, officers, communities and partners.
Overview and Scrutiny: The Lion that has failed to roar
Authority B O&S Management agreed with the minister that O&S had failed to
roar, however they thought that had more to do with the development and position
of the O&S function and that O&S has the potential to roar more powerfully and
constructively. Conversely they also questioned whether O&S should roar. A
roaring lion would suggest that O&S is a threatening adversary to the executive.
Rather he suggested, continuing the animal metaphor, that O&S should be likened
to a dolphin:
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“intelligent, articulate, able to inform, able to be critical friends...scrutiny
should be about being able to swim with your friend, rather than a bark or
roar”.
6.3.2 Process Conditions
Call-in
Authority B O&S Leadership sees call-in as “a last resort” when other, more
informal, interventions have failed to resolve the issue. In their view they must also
avoid call-in being used as a political tool by political parties. Protocols and
principals have been developed for the OSMB to look at requests for call in,
including a filtering system to help decide which are accepted. Authority B O&S
Leadership’s experience is that the executive are pro-active in their response to
being ‘called-in’. Indeed Authority B Leadership said that O&S is “right” to examine
the way executive decisions are made and that they are “quite comfortable having
that oversight body”. They also agreed with the O&S that call-in should not be
used incorrectly adding that he would be “unhappy if it was used as a political
football”. The main points for the procedure for call-in at authority B is as follows:
 Call-in should only be used in exceptional circumstances
 Members have 5 working days after the publication of a decision to call it in
 The chair or vice chair or five members of the OSMB give notice to call in a
decision to the monitoring officer (the Head of Legal and Democratic
Services)
 The chair or vice chair of the OSMB determine the reasonableness of the
call-in request with advice from the monitoring officer
 The OSMB determine whether a call-in is accepted after meeting those
members concerned
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 The OSMB may only call-in a maximum of three decisions per three month
period
 Urgent decisions cannot be called-in.
Public Involvement in Overview and Scrutiny
The main mechanism for public involvement in O&S in Authority B is co-opting
members of the public or representatives of community groups to OSCs. In
addition to the 21 non-executive members on the OSMB there are five voting
church and parent governor representatives. Authority B O&S Leadership regards
the co-optees as the “voice of the public”. However, even though all OSC
meetings are open to the public most if not all are held at the main council offices
in ‘normal’ office hours.
Authority B Leadership stated that O&S:
“shouldn’t just be an internal exercise where they meet in committee rooms
in county hall”.
To this end the ACE department wants to enable community suggestions for O&S
topics via the authority’s website and build community engagement into the
planning of O&S reviews.
Also members and O&S officers have been meeting with the authority’s
Community Engagement Advisory Group (CEAG). As the name suggests the
CEAG is made up of various community group representatives who have an
interest in improving communication with the authority. Their meetings have
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focused on how O&S can improve its engagement with hard to reach and hard to
hear individuals or groups.
Authority B Leadership explained that the focus of the unitary authority would be
seen to be on the strategic issues facing it, however he stressed that it was
“critical” that the authority also focused on the local issues of importance to the
public. Therefore the authority has established 14 local committees comprising of
a board of ward Cllrs, partners (e.g. the police) and local people and a consultative
forum of local people. While not an attempt to replace the district councils this is
seen as the new unitary authority devolving executive power to local committees,
but no local OSCs have been established to replace the tier of O&S lost with the
district councils. Authority B Leadership suggests they are potentially the executive
and O&S:
“rolled into one, because they have actually got the power, with the budget
to do something about [an issue] immediately”.
As opposed to only being able to make recommendations to the executive or
partner organisations.
Authority B O&S Leadership agrees that the local committees have a “scrutiny”
element in that the committee will undertake a review of an issue of local concern
and be able to take action.
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Authority B O&S Management certainly sees the local committees as having the
opportunity to provide local challenge, however as to whether that equates to O&S
he states:
“if you want to call that scrutiny call it scrutiny with a small ‘s’”.
There would need to be further discussion regarding O&S relationship to the local
committees, not least because O&S will have a role in assessing their
effectiveness. He envisages a collaborative and tasked based approach rather
than a formal structure.
6.3.3 Structure and Mechanism Conditions
The Development of Overview and Scrutiny for the Unitary Authority
Prior to going unitary the eight local authorities in the county had formed member
and officer networks to share best practice, raise awareness of local and national
issues and to facilitate training and development. The development of O&S for the
unitary authority began when the officer network commissioned a project to
evaluate the O&S function in using the CfPS SEF7. The evaluation was conducted
between January and March 2008. Interviews were conducted with chairs and vice
chairs of O&S from each authority. Members and officers completed a SEF for
each authority and members, leaders (executive members) and other
stakeholders, who have been involved with O&S, completed surveys. Data was
7 Centre for Public Scrutiny (2005) Self-evaluation framework for overview and Scrutiny in local
government http://www.cfps.org.uk//improvement/20050412-cfps-sef.doc
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collated covering over fifty key lines of enquiry relating to the CfPS 4 principles of
good scrutiny. The analysis identified the strengths of O&S and development
opportunities. Recommendations were made on a range of issues for
consideration by members. The findings and recommendations were as follows
(see figures 24 and 25):
Figure 24: CfPS Self Evaluation Findings Authority B
4 Principles of Good Scrutiny Findings
Provide critical friend challenge O&S provides public accountability,
effective challenge and direct impact
on the decisions of the executive.
Reflect the voice and concerns of
the public and its communities
The public and its communities shape
O&S work programmes and
participate in reviews through
consultation and dialogue with a wide
range of community groups,
stakeholders and partners.
Take the lead and own the
Scrutiny process
The work programme is Member led.
Experienced Members foster a culture
of openness, inclusiveness,
transparency and meetings are non-
political. Call-ins are rare and seen as
a sign of weakness. The work of
Members and dedicated Officers in the
county has received regional and
national recognition.
Make an impact on service
delivery
The work programme is aligned to
corporate priorities. 100% of
recommendations, based on evidence
and focused on outcomes have been
accepted across the County. They
make a difference to the lives of public
via improved services and policy
decisions.
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Figure 25: CfPS Self Evaluation Report Recommendations Authority B
Recommendations
 Build capacity for and encourage all Members to be involved in
O&S
 Provide Members with the necessary Officer support and financial
resources to undertake effective Scrutiny
 Meet the training needs of Members and Officers for ongoing
effective Scrutiny
 Develop the structure of O&S to reflect the corporate priorities of
the new authority
 Develop a closer, more formal working partnership between the
executive and O&S
 Develop procedures to monitor and measure the effectiveness of
O&S recommendations
 Consider new and innovative ways of engaging with the public and
develop the O&S role to provide public accountability in local
government
 Develop a work-plan to take forward the above issues through the
transitional year and into the new authority and across partners
 Disseminate the findings of the evaluation to partners and
interested parties, locally, regionally and nationally.
These recommendations were then developed into an action plan for the members
and officers involved in O&S to address and review during the early months of the
unitary authority.
This action plan however was not the only means of developing the O&S function.
As Authority B O&S Management explained there were three strands. Firstly, the
OSMB had oversight of the Local Government Review (LGR) process and were
integral to shaping and forming the O&S function. Secondly, a constitutional
working group made up of officers and members looked at proposals to strengthen
and enhance the constitution of the authority including O&S. Thirdly, officer groups
met as part of the LGR workstreams, which addressed the establishment of the
new authority including O&S. One significant change to come from the
reorganisation of the authority was that the O&S function moved from Corporate
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Services into the ACE department, which is responsible for policy development,
performance assessment and community engagement.
Structure of Overview and Scrutiny
In terms of the structure of the OSCs they have retained the OSMB and the sub-
committees have been aligned to the LAA themes and priorities of the authority.
(See Diagram 6). Noticeably there are now six committees as it was determined
that four committees would be too large and that they need a separate committee
for corporate issues relating to the functioning of the authority.
Diagram 6: Authority B Overview and Scrutiny Committee Structure
Overview and Scrutiny Work Programme
Authority B O&S Leadership was very clear in his opinion that the non-executive
members independently lead the O&S function and therefore set their own work
programme (see Figure 26 for examples).
OSMB
Adults,
Wellbeing &
Health
Children &
Young
People's
Corporate
Issues
Economy &
Enterprise
Environment &
Sustainable
Communities
Safer &
Stronger
Communities
Task and
finish groups
Task and
finish groups
Task and
finish groups
Task and
finish groups
Task and
finish groups
Task and
finish groups
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Figure 26: Examples of Overview and Scrutiny Work Programme for Authority B
Overview and Scrutiny Committee Topic
Adults, Wellbeing & Health  Mental health day services
consultation
 Action to reduce health inequalities
 Transforming social care
 Living with Dementia
Children & Young People's  Anti-bullying
 Foster Care and Foster Carers
 Academies and Building Schools for
the Future
 ‘Think Family’ – Surestart, Family
Pathfinder
Corporate Issues  Discretionary Rate Relief
 Harmonisation of fees and charges
 The Budget
 Performance Reports
Economy & Enterprise  Understanding the County’s
Economy –Economic Assessment
and Review of Economic Strategy
 Housing
 Participating in review of business
support services
 Worklessness
Environment & Sustainable
Communities
 Waste strategy
 Grounds maintenance service
review
 Winter maintenance strategy
 Street lighting public finance initiative
Safer & Stronger Communities  Community Libraries
 Anti-social behaviour services, focus
on public places/spaces
 Social Inclusion
 Culture and Leisure
Whilst acknowledging that it is up to members, Authority B O&S Management
stated the work programme was “very logical”. The work of O&S, in his view, has
to make a difference and add value; therefore the work programme is developed
within the context of the sustainable community strategy, local area agreements,
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the council plan, the cabinet’s forward plan and various other plans and strategies.
They stated that:
“There is no point in Scrutiny doing something that is completely different
from the executive...”.
Many presentations and meetings were held between O&S and the stakeholders
in the above strategies and plans, for example the directors of council services or
partners such as the NHS. They highlighted what they considered to be the urgent
issues and priorities for possible review by O&S. With the assistance of officers
the members of the various OSCs are then presented with a long list of issues and
priorities and after discussion and debate develop a short list. Once a consensus
is reached in each committee it is considered by the OSMB who will look for areas
of duplication, possibilities of cross-cutting reviews and capacity issues before it is
then ratified. They are also mindful to leave capacity for the unexpected. For
example this authority had to instigate two unforeseen O&S reviews within the first
week of the new unitary authority in April 2009. Therefore developing the work
programme is about addressing strategic priorities, local issues and managing
people’s expectations, while being able to deliver within your capacity.
Authority B O&S Management did highlight an issue with individual members
influencing the long lists. In their experience they were unable to recall when
members have asked to scrutinise a specific issue. Indeed, there is not a process
where members can complete a pro-forma as to what they would like on the work
programme. Equally there is no direct consultation with the wider public as to what
they would like to see reviewed. Although Authority B Leadership has stated the
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aim of having an electronic mechanism for community suggestions via the
authority’s website. Authority B O&S Leadership thought that they have been able
to achieve a “good” balance between overview (policy development) and scrutiny
(performance). The O&S Manager stated that work programme could be divided
between four “domains”. Namely:
 Reviewing previous O&S reviews (all O&S recommendations are revisited
after 6 months)
 Further in-depth investigations
 Overview of policy (understanding, commenting on, influencing and shaping
policy)
 Monitoring performance of the authority and partners.
As well as the balance between these 4 areas the work programme:
“needs to be balanced between...our strategic priorities and creating space
for something that is very local.”
On this measure Authority B O&S Management said it was “top heavy” towards
the strategic.
As we have seen above Authority B Leadership has acknowledged it is for O&S to
determine its own work programme, but he stresses that policy development is a
very important part of O&S, in that non-executive members have the time, that the
executive does not, to become specialists in a subject.
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Allocation of Chairs and Vice Chairs
The policy of the majority group in authority B is one where leadership roles, chairs
and vice chairs are predominantly allocated to the majority group Members,
indeed all bar one vice chair of the OSCs are all from the majority party.
Opposition parties are represented on the OSMB for political balance and take the
lead on light touch reviews. There are a number of possible reasons for this policy.
Simply they are the majority party so they should hold these positions. Also there
are significant special allowances attached to these positions so why would they
offer them to the opposition? As Authority B O&S Leadership explained there is
the question of party politics:
“I’ve got to be sure .... that they [opposition party members] would not use it
as a platform to politicise their own ends.”
Indeed, they pointed out that in one of the former districts the Lib Dems had been
the majority party and they did not offer O&S chair/vice chair positions to the
opposition.
Authority B O&S Management recognised that this is a political decision. They
subscribed to the view of the CfPS that it is best practice for O&S chairs and vice
chairs to be drawn from other political parties as it delivers a healthy democracy.
6.4 Key Findings from Authority B
6.4.1 Attitudinal Conditions
 The role of O&S is to hold the executive to account, improve services,
support the leadership to achieve its goals and represent the views of the
local communities
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 O&S should not be a roaring lion threatening the executive
 O&S relationship with the executive has evolved positively
 There was almost 100% acceptance of recommendations
 The unitary authority has 7.5 dedicated officers including one jointly funded
by the NHS for health and has a budget of £25,000 p.a. for O&S activities
 Only 40% of non-executive members were involved in O&S at any one time
 In this county the controlling party has always allocated chair/vice chair
positions to their own members to prohibit other parties from using O&S as
an opposition
 O&S chairs have established a non-political environment in their
committees
 The effectiveness of O&S relies upon the participation of members and the
value they place upon it
 Effective O&S is that which: makes a difference to the people the authority
represents and serves; has SMART recommendations; members led the
O&S function and develop the work programme; supported by ‘high calibre’
O&S officers, is open, transparent and consistent.
6.4.2 Process Conditions
 Call-in was used very infrequently
 O&S needs to improve public participation
 Public involvement in O&S has been primarily through co-option, but it has
failed to engage with the wider public
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 It is envisaged that a collaborative and tasked based approach could
develop with the localised area committees.
6.4.3 Structure and Mechanism Conditions
 The O&S function in two tier authorities reflected the needs and culture of
the authorities
 The development of the O&S function for Authority B commenced with the
county wide evaluation the O&S using the CfPS SEF
 The structure for the unitary authority has been aligned to the wider
strategic role of the authority, i.e. the LAA
 Regular meetings have been established between O&S and executive in
the unitary authority
 Non-executive members set their own work programme.
6.5 Conclusion
This chapter has summarised the key demographic and political characteristics of
the authority area. Also, by analysing the data from the semi-structured interviews
held with the members and officers from the former county and district councils,
the unitary council and from relative documents, has outlined O&S prior to and
after re-organisation. The thematic analysis has identified key findings focused on
the development, structure and resources of O&S, its role, the involvement of
members and the general public in O&S, the effectiveness of O&S and the
development of O&S for the unitary authority. These findings can now be
compared and contrasted with the other case study authorities in chapter 9.
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Chapter 7 Local Authority C
7.1 Introduction
This chapter firstly, through analysis of the data from the semi-structured
interviews held with the members from the former county and district councils and
of relevant documents, will outline O&S prior to reorganisation. Secondly, through
analysis of the data from the semi-structured interviews held with members and
officers from the unitary council, it will then describe O&S after reorganisation. The
analysis is presented thematically in a framework based on Leach’s (2009) three
conditions for effective O&S namely, attitudinal, process and structure and
mechanism conditions. Finally, it will highlight key findings to be compared and
contrasted with the other case study authorities in a later chapter and relative
conclusions will be drawn.
7.2 Pre Reorganisation Approach to Overview and Scrutiny
NB For this section former district and county Cllrs will be referred to as
Member(s).
7.2.1 Attitudinal Conditions
Understanding the Role of Overview and Scrutiny
Based on the experiences of those members interviewed from the former county
and district councils the role of O&S is to:
 Provide transparency in decision-making
 Provide checks and balances to the decision making within the authority
 Refine and change the decisions of the council
 Ensure services are delivered properly and to enhance service provision
 Rigorously examine issues
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 Find value for money and cost effectiveness
 Ensure outside bodies are delivering services
 Act as a critical friend to the executive
 Act an as honest broker between the public and the executive
 Be the public’s guarantor that things are being looked at properly
 Give public confidence
 Add value
 Make a difference
 Improve services.
As a Member said:
“If there’s no add on value there’s no point to having scrutiny. It’s there to
make a difference and to improve services and if it doesn’t do that well
there’s no point having it. There’s no point just being nodding donkeys and
rubber stamping decisions. That’s pointless.”
Relationship Between the Executive and Overview and Scrutiny
As one member explained a good relationship was essential to the development of
O&S:
“You need to have a good relationship so you are not strangled at
birth...we wouldn’t have got the finance to staff scrutiny.”
One member said their good relationship with the executive was based on good
communication. They explained:
“We held regular monthly meetings with Authority C Leadership in terms of
what their programme was and what ours was.”
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Indeed communicating the work of O&S in person helped the relationship with the
executive according to a district O&S chair. They said:
“When reports went to cabinet, the officer attended, the chair of that
scrutiny commission attended, I attended, any member of the commission
could attend as well at the cabinet meeting to enforce the findings of the
commission on a particular subject or matter.”
One district member described the relationship as a “good cooperative
relationship”. It was predicated on an independent O&S function, but they would
conduct research on behalf of the executive to develop policies for council. They
explained that they would challenge the executive, but:
“we weren’t trying to trip the (executive) up.”
As another member said it was essential too that the relationship was friendly and
constructive. They said O&S should be:
“a critical friend, rather than just the critics.”
The former county member said the relationship was “fine”, however their opinion
was that executive members:
“weren’t up to speed with their brief. So you had officers answering
questions in scrutiny. Really you’d be expecting executive members to be
answering the questions.”
Member Involvement in Overview and Scrutiny
Member involvement in O&S across the county was generally “good”. However
with regard to member capacity one stated that O&S put:
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“a big workload on members. It’s not just the meetings it’s the working
groups you’ve got to attend. You’re talking about a lot of meetings.”
Another suggested that member’s occupations and ability to travel affected their
participation in O&S. They said O&S was:
“a daytime activity... I would hate to do it at night. You’re driving 30 odd
miles to (county hall) and 30 odd miles back. You want to do that in the day
anyway. You’re tired at night. It’s really to do it properly. It’s people who are
retired or haven’t got a job... anything else they would have to pay a full-
time wage.”
The authorities did make special efforts to maximise member participation. For
example one district’s O&S function was so dominated by one party because of
political balance they actively:
“tried to maximise opposition Members on each of them ...to be seen to be
fair and accessible”.
Also efforts were made to raise the profile of O&S and make it more attractive to
members. One district authority ensured that O&S members received the same
special responsibilities allowance as the portfolio holders. The member said this
was important as it was:
“parity of status for them. I think that was a message that was loud and
clearly heard across the authority that there was a parity of esteem.”
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Officer and Financial Resources
The members generally expressed the view that dedicated oficer and financial
support was needed if O&S was to make a difference. As one district member
stated:
“If you put resources into anything and take it seriously it works. If you just
pay lip service, well it doesn’t really work, does it?”
The officer and financial resources available to O&S varied across the authorities.
The former county council had good officer support either from dedicated O&S
officers or from democratic services. The 4th option district councils found securing
officer support the most difficult. One member said they only had an officer for 8
hours per week as there:
“wasn’t that sort of finance around to provide scrutiny officers.”
Another said:
“There were moves to have scrutiny officers appointed, but it was always
resisted by the controlling group on the grounds of efficiency and cost,
value for money.”
In another authority the situation was better:
“We had 0.5 officer support. There was no specific budget for scrutiny, but
we didn’t find that a problem because whatever we wanted and needed it
was provided.”
Two of the larger district councils fared better than the others. One had 2 full-time
officers and an assistant and another, from an initial starting position of no
dedicated officers, enjoyed:
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“for the last four or five years... a scrutiny performance manger, two
scrutiny officers and a PhD Student”.
Non-political Overview and Scrutiny
Members were in general agreement that O&S was operating in a non-political
manner. They recognised that members were influenced by politics, but aimed to
come to a consensus on recommendations. As one member said:
“certainly at the management board ...it was relatively confrontational, but it
was not political in the decisions. Recommendations were not political at
all.”
Another said that a consensual approach was the norm in their council as it had
always been a hung council and:
“the political groups were always comfortable with working with each
other”.
Two members indicated that a team dynamic had emerged in O&S. They said:
“For the 10 years we operated I think members were absolutely superb and
have been apolitical ... and have always been together as a team.”
“We did all actually work as a team even though we were from different
political parties. It was actually something that happened naturally. I think
we were all fighting for the same things. All for improving things in the
borough.”
Effectiveness of Overview and Scrutiny
The members varied in their opinion as to how effective O&S was. As one member
said:
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“Well that’s a difficult question... all scrutiny can do is make
recommendations for the executive to consider and if they except
recommendations made by scrutiny. Then yes, they can have a beneficial
effect.”
In contrast one member was very disappointed with O&S. They said:
“Quite frankly...we were totally toothless. We were going there and the
decisions were made before we were there anyway. We did influence a little
few things, but I think it was a paper exercise rather than people really
doing anything. I found it very disappointing actually.”
7.2.2 Process Conditions
Call-in
They were very few instances when call-in was used in the county. The prevailing
view that call-in should be used infrequently as not to damage the relationship with
executive and to only use it when the call-in would be successful. As one member
said:
“we didn’t call-in a great number of decisions, but those we did were
implemented and the funding was there to implement them. If you’re forever
calling things in you disrupt the council altogether. Nothing ever gets done.”
Public Involvement in Overview and Scrutiny
Members had a varied experience of engaging with the public. A member
expressed the view that public engagement was part of successful O&S. They
said:
“If it it’s done properly it actually gets a lot more public involvement. A lot of
the scrutiny was carried out by the officers and members themselves with
visits in the community on the specific subject that was being scrutinised,
i.e. allotments was a big thing ... because it was a popular thing... and
parking”
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O&S meetings were open to the public and as a member said:
“We didn’t just stay in the council chamber. We went out to the public and
met with them.”
Another emphasised the importance of public engagement to O&S saying that:
“The first proper scrutiny review that we did was on kerbside recycling...we
co-opted onto that group a group of the residents who had responded to the
pilot who were concerned about it.”
Indeed it was argued that public engagement was a priority for O&S. A member
explained that:
“Had we (the district council) continued we would have been looking very
much to do much more scrutiny at a community level ...scrutiny has to get
out more and be the public face of the council...they really need to be the
public challenge to the authority so the public can see that things are done
correctly and have some confidence in what’s happening. I think that’s
scrutiny’s real role.”
Members gave examples of O&S reviews that they described as ‘good’ this was
because of the thoroughness of the process, the recommendations made or the
extent to which the public were involved. They were:
 Late night shopping survey
 Leisure facilities survey
 Flooding
 Kerbside recycling
 Local health services
 Allotments
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 Car parking.
Finally, it was thought that the area boards and the community forums proposed in
the unitary bid would be an opportunity for O&S to engage with the public at a
local level, however there was little understanding of how the boards and forums
were to function let alone their relationship with O&S. The 3 area committees
cover huge geographical areas bigger than the former district councils and the
community forums are of varying sizes. As a member explained it was unknown as
to whether they would have:
“devolved power, any devolved budgets or as far as I’m aware scrutiny
functions at this moment.”
7.2.3 Structure and Mechanism Conditions
The Development and Structure of Overview and Scrutiny
In this county four of the seven authorities adopted Authority C Leadership and
cabinet model of the new political structures and the remaining three chose the 4th
option. The structure of O&S committees varied across the county and district
councils reflecting the size of the authority their authorities services departments
and other interests and responsibilities (see diagram 7). For example:
 All of the larger authorities had a management board made up of the chairs
and vice chairs of the OSC
 Most authorities had 3 or 4 committees or panels, which were collated into
themes often reflecting the service departments and or their priorities
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 Given the relative size of the 4th option councils they divided O&S into two
OSC
 All used time bound task and finish groups to conduct in-depth or light touch
reviews on specific topics
 None of the authorities had divided their O&S function into separate
scrutiny and overview committees.
Diagram 7: Examples of Overview and Scrutiny Structures from Authority C Prior
to Unitary Status
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Diagram 7: Examples of Overview and Scrutiny Structures from Authority C Prior
to Unitary Status continued
Former 4th Option District Council
Interestingly, one of the district councils had piloted the new political structures. As
the member described:
“We started with initially just two big scrutiny committees that involved
everybody that wasn’t on the executive. One looked at internal affairs and
the other looked at partnerships. That was very very cumbersome... we ran
with that for about 12 months... had a review of the process and ... came up
with a (sic) overview and management board and underneath two review
commissions”.
Significantly this authority and one other in this area chose to use the term
commissions rather than committees, perhaps in an attempt to break the link to
the old committee system.
Allocation of Chairs and Vice Chairs
The allocation of chairs varied across the county. For, example:
 The former county council allocated the chairs to the opposition parties
 In a district the ruling party chaired the 3 OSC and the main opposition
party were given the 3 vice chairs
 In another of the districts they had no opposition chairs despite the efforts of
the O&S chair.
Policy OSC Operations OSC
Task and finish groups Task and finish groups
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On the latter example the member explained:
“No they were members of the controlling group, which I argued against
and said at least one of those commissions should be members of the
opposition, but I couldn’t get that through my own group.”
The Preparation of Overview and Scrutiny for the Unitary Authority
Members had varying views on the creation of the unitary council. Some of them
opposed it while others were in favour, including district Cllrs. One specific issue
was the geographical size of the authority area and the individual wards. A district
member said:
“The reason I didn’t stand (for the unitary elections) was I felt I couldn’t do
the job properly because I would have to do (the member named villages in
their ward) and all the outlying farms and rural areas and I just couldn’t do it
properly unless you were full time.”
Another added it:
“is a huge county and its population is so spread out. We... are very
isolated. We live 60 miles from (county hall) and we feel that is a
disadvantage because we are so far away. And I hear that people that live
on the far west side... feel the same way as well, because they feel they are
too far away from the centre of what’s happening.”
Therefore there was a concern that the unitary council would lose many
experienced O&S members because they would be unwilling or unable to travel to
county hall. Also a significant number of sitting county Cllrs had been deselected
because of internal party rules (i.e. Labour’s all women shortlists) or the desire to
have new members. As a member explained:
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“a lot of people who are good councillors... are not able to stand for the
county council. And there are some good councillors who have been thrown
on the scrapheap because of the unitary as well.”
As described above (see Chapter 4 Methodology) during the final year of the two-
tier structure an IE had been established to oversee the implementation of the new
unitary authority. A joint OSC to scrutinise the decisions of the IE was also formed
from district and county O&S members. One member said that they were:
“very keen that we did take part because there was a lot of experience
there from across the authorities at both county level and district level. We
wanted responses from different kinds of communities. And it was a good
mix of the political make up of the districts and county and a good mix of the
politics, pretty much level actually.”
Perhaps most significantly they wanted to be involved because:
“the county council do scrutiny very differently from the way we do it.”
District members described their experience of O&S at the county council as
follows:
“They do it much more in terms of examining reports of the executive. Now I
think that’s a way to kill member enthusiasm dead.”
Another favoured their:
“professional way of working... when we went to the county council I
thought it was absolutely dreadful.”
Another said of the county council:
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“they don’t have a good history of doing reviews of policy and procedures
...they tend to be very inward looking. Lots of navel gazing and pouring over
the meaning of words and things”.
District members therefore saw the creation of the unitary authority as an
opportunity to change O&S at the county level. As a district member explained:
“despite the obvious misgivings about a single unitary council I thought any
change had to present a real opportunity to do things very differently. And
so we held a couple of workshops to look specifically at the new
structures... and we recommended that they concentrated on community
scrutiny. With such a big council one of the ways of keeping closer to
different communities was by doing scrutiny at that level.”
District members were particularly concerned about O&S in the unitary authority
being properly resourced as O&S would have O&S of council strategy, localities
and partnerships as well as considering petitions. They were worried that there
was going to be a repetition of the situation when the Local Government Act 2000
came in. As a member explained:
“Everybody first of all concentrates on the executive, everybody wants to be
on and it’s what the officers put the most resource into supporting. Then
when they think they’ve that sorted out they do something about scrutiny.
And it’s only if you have really strong people who are genuinely committed
to scrutiny, who don’t just do it because they they’re not on the executive.
It’s not a consolation prize.”
Priorities for Overview and Scrutiny in the Unitary Authority
The members’ views as to the priorities for the unitary council fell into two strands;
issues relating directly to O&S and those policy and service areas that needed to
be addressed. Those for O&S were:
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 Specific training for the O&S members at the new council as many had little
or no experience of O&S at a county level
 The development of the community forums and area boards
 Community based O&S
 The development of petitioning
 Improving the level of support to O&S
 Ensuring all available members participate in O&S
 Getting vibrant and interested chairs of O&S rather than just making
political appointments
 Keeping O&S independent from the agenda of the executive
 More public involvement
 O&S meeting outside of county hall.
The policy and service areas were:
 Investigations into how the authority is meeting its targets
 Different working practices
 Housing strategy
 Car parking
 Consolidation of fees
 Staffing levels
 Waste collection
 Localism
 The parish councils and town councils relationship to the unitary authority
 Community based health and social care
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 Education
 Social services.
7.3 Post Reorganisation Approach to Overview and Scrutiny
7.3.1 Attitudinal Conditions
Resources and Officer Support
Authority C O&S Management reports directly to the Head of Democratic Services
and their role is to support members, manage the dedicated O&S oficers, manage
projects and is a lead oficer on an OSC. Authority C O&S Management
summarised the support for members:
 It is part of democratic services and within the performance directorate
 There are now four officers including the manager (see diagram 8) from the
former county and districts (the former county council only had one
dedicated O&S officer)
 Officers have direct experience of O&S or democratic services
 Each O&S officer is responsible to an OSC and will be will be rotated after
12 months
 They are developing closer relationships with the policy officers
 There are no dedicated link officers, but O&S officers link with relevant
officers in service directorates depending upon the issue
 The director of corporate services is the overall monitoring officer for the
authority
 There is no discretionary budget for O&S.
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Diagram 8 Authority C Overview and Scrutiny Officer Structure
However the support for members is already under review. Authority C Chief
Officer stated that oficer support for members is:
“clearly an area that is going to come under pressure...we have got to cut
the corporate centre to protect front line services...”
The Role of Overview and Scrutiny
The role of O&S as experienced by those interviewed can be summarised as
follows:
 Examining and holding the executive to account
 Holding outside bodies to account
 Developing policy for the council
 Ensuring policies are valid
 A critical friend
 Making a positive contribution to the council’s business
 Making sure decisions are fair
 Making sure processes are followed
 Making recommendations
Overview & Scrutiny
Manager
Overview & Scrutiny
Officer
Overview & Scrutiny
Officer
Overview & Scrutiny
Officer
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 Examining and scrutinising decisions
 Highlighting errors
 A mechanism of engagement with the wider community.
Relationship Between the Executive and Overview and Scrutiny
In terms of O&S relationship with the executive Authority C O&S Leadership
highlighted that:
 A representative of the executive attends all O&S meetings
 The chair of O&S attends cabinet
 They have ad-hoc meetings with portfolio holders
 They meet with senior officers to discuss issues.
However they expressed the opinion that the relationship had declined from that
with the previous administration. It had a large majority and it would have been
understandable if they did not pay attention to O&S, however:
“the executive members then were very good at attending scrutiny meetings
and actually presenting what they had done, not just policies but what they
had actually done as executive members”.
This contrasts with the current minority. Authority C O&S Leadership explained:
“You would have expected that they would have engaged with the scrutiny
process more to try and get consensus across the council, but actually the
opposite has happened.”
They added that by not engaging fully with O&S they are missing the opportunity
to:
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“build up consensus because scrutiny is the one area where it is really
supposed to be non-political...and if you are trying to create a consensus
within a council it is an ideal way to do that. To have conversations about
outcomes of the council and to have conversations about policies in a non-
political environment, you would have thought that that would have been
attractive, but it doesn’t seem to be to the present administration.”
Therefore they feel that O&S is not being asked enough to make a sufficient
contribution to the work of the council.
Authority C O&S Management described the relationship as “good”. The new
administration is more aware of O&S having had experience either as executive or
non-executive members with the former district councils. Executive members are
invited to and attend OSC meetings and a representative of the executive attends
all the OSC meetings, which helps resolves all the issues with the executive.
Authority C Leadership agreed that the relationship was good and thought that
they work well together. However the O&S Manager questions whether the way
that O&S operates is out of genuine concern over a policy/decision or whether it is
a “delaying tactic”.
Authority C Chief Officer stated that the legislation that created an independent
O&S function from the executive was flawed and created difficulties. In their view
O&S cannot be independent as it is:
“part of the council, it’s part of the organisation.”
In their view O&S is:
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“backward looking... it makes people have inquests and apportion blame
for things that have gone wrong and that’s not conducive to the effective
working of the local authority...it divides people rather than brings them
together”.
Indeed they thought that scrutiny of the executive would be better done by an
external body. They also commented on the amount of time senior Managers are
involved in the O&S process. There is:
“too much scrutinising of the oficers and not enough scrutinising of the
executive members...there is a danger in that it becomes very like a star-
chamber sort of approach and not that productive...it’s potentially damaging
to relationships between the senior managers and members”.
Recommendations
Authority C O&S Leadership’s experience was that under the previous
administration few recommendations were made, but were taken seriously.
However in the early days of the new administration O&S is not being taken
seriously.
Authority C O&S Management said the chairs of the OSC present the reports to
the executive, recommendations are listened to and normally agreed. A monitoring
report is checked six monthly to see if the executive has implemented the
recommendations.
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The Authority C Leadership said that recommendations are accepted or rejected
depending upon the issue; it may be because of a lack of funds, or because
Authority C Leadership do not agree with it.
Member Involvement in Overview and Scrutiny
The O&S function in Authority C had only been operating for six months under the
present structures and the O&S Leadership suggested that there are not sufficient
members involved in O&S and, as there were only 67 members (less the
executive) available.
The O&S Management also questioned the capacity of members as they met at
least monthly for O&S and with their other roles and responsibilities could be
stretched at times.
However Authority C Leadership said there were enough members to do O&S:
“There is a good general mix of the membership who participate in
scrutiny”.
The Chief Officer agreed there are enough members to do O&S scrutiny and
questioned their lack of capacity stating that members:
“have created a lot of work for themselves... if anything in this council
scrutiny has been a growth area in the last year in terms of the levels of
activity”.
Indeed, they criticised members for:
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“spending a lot of time not doing the right things”
explaining that members were:
“too backward looking and too detailed” with a “tendency to get into a lot of
detail at scrutiny which I don't think is always particularly productive and
they are straying into operational issues”.
Subsequently the Chief Officer was not convinced that O&S was adding value
and would rather members stopped being scrutineers and be policy makers;
suggesting a structural split between overview and scrutiny is required.
The O&S Leadership highlighted that the elections for the unitary authority
returned many new Cllrs with experience of being a district Cllrs with:
“a narrow view of the responsibilities of a unitary councillors”.
Authority C Chief Officer explained that most of the Cllrs are former district Cllrs as
the former dounty Cllrs either did not get elected or they got de-selected.
Therefore they said that:
“we have a district council mentality in a very large unitary...you can't run
this organisation in the way they ran the district councils... the biggest
district council last year... had just over 300 employees... the unitary has
16,000.”
They also thought that as some of the new members were former executive
members from the district councils the O&S role:
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“is a bit foreign to them...that’s not a criticism that’s just a time thing, a
learning thing”.
Indeed in the in the view of the Chief Officer the Local Government Act 2000 had
introduced conflicting and contradictory roles for all members. Adding that:
“The role of the constituency member and scrutiny does work well together,
but then actually when you put the executive role on the top of that and the
party role I think it is very difficult for members to wear all those hats at the
same time.”
Political Balance and Interaction
Political interaction between the parties does arise, for example, at the time when
chairs/vice chairs are appointed in line with the political balance of the authority.
The experience of Authority C O&S Leadership is that O&S:
“does try to be fair and on a non-political basis”.
Authority C Leadership confirmed that party politics is generally kept out of O&S,
but does “creep in” on occasions.
The O&S Management said the change from a previously majority controlled
council to a minority administration means that politics play a great part in O&S.
However, this had a positive outcome in raising the profile of O&S within the
authority. Authority C Chief Officer’s view was they thought that O&S is:
“rather too political... I think that some of the things that are being done
through scrutiny at the moment are questionable in terms of their value to
the community, they are slightly more politically motivated.”
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Adding that party politics inevitably becomes more overt at election times, but
usually dissipates afterwards.
External Overview and Scrutiny
Authority C O&S Leadership and O&S Management both acknowledged that the
unitary authority needed to develop O&S of outside bodies, especially with
partners such as the NHS.
The Effectiveness of Overview and Scrutiny
The members and officers all expressed conditions or barriers to effective O&S.
Authority C O&S Leadership said that:
 O&S requires dedicated oficers able to do research.
O&S Management said that:
 O&S would be more effective if people knew what O&S is
 Officers regard O&S as a court to explain yourself to
 Officers feel that they work for the executive and not for O&S
 O&S agendas are too long
 O&S needs to get out more into the localities, i.e. out of county hall
 There should be more regular meetings between the O&S chairs and the
executive.
The Authority C Leadership said that:
 Good O&S requires a lot of time
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 There should be less reliance on the attendance of the portfolio members
 O&S and the executive should be completely separate
 Shorter agendas would be more productive
 There should be more topic and time focused working groups.
Authority C Chief Officer said that:
 Members find it “incredibly difficult” to be non-political
 O&S should be aligned to the direction of travel of the organisation, the
main themes of the community strategy and align the work programmes to
the business planning cycle e.g. budgets and key milestones throughout the
year
 O&S should look forward rather than exclusively back.
Overview and Scrutiny: The Lion that has failed to roar
Authority C Leadership agreed with the minister, but said that:
“the lion could roar a bit louder”.
The Chief Officer also agreed, but also queried whether it was a lion in the first
place. The O&S Leadership thought that the former minister had a “dim view” of
O&S, suggesting that John Denham did not understand the function of O&S.
The O&S Management thought that O&S has come a long way and has made
significant changes. The government has gradually given more powers to O&S
although did not back this up with resources. O&S does have more of a profile
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now within the authority, however this could be due to the political interaction
between parties making O&S more visible rather than any purposeful promotion.
7.3.2 Process Conditions
Call-in
The O&S Leadership’s view of call-in is that it can be used effectively; however the
threat of call-in is probably more effective than the practice. The O&S
Management re-called they only had two call-ins in the former county council. The
main points for the procedure for call-in at authority C is as follows:
 Call-in should only be used in exceptional circumstances
 Members have 5 working days after the publication of a decision to call
it in
 Any member of an OSC (whether a Cllrs or not) has the right to request
the chair of the OSC to call in a decision
 The chair of the OSC decides to whether to call in a decision
 The monitoring officer (the Executive Director of Performance) calls-in
decisions at the request of the chair
 The council may limit the subjects of call-in
 Urgent decisions cannot be called-in.
Public Involvement in Overview and Scrutiny
The O&S Leadership at this authority said that:
“we try to use scrutiny as a mechanism of engagement with the wider
community... that we think is quite important”.
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They gave two examples of successful public involvement. Firstly, the county had
recently been affected by flooding and the county and district councils had held
public O&S meetings to consider the flood action plan that the county council had
written. Secondly they had held public meetings to collate a countywide response
to the post office closure programme. They were particularly successful because
there was:
“a two way flow of information from the public back to the council and from
the council to the public.”
Authority C Chief Officer said the unitary bid was very much around:
“devolving decision making, closer to the customer”.
Subsequently three area boards, which are made up of members from that
particular area, have been created. The O&S Leadership said specific items are
taken to the area boards and looked at in detail, therefore the area boards:
“are places for local dialogue and service delivery”.
However if there are wider implications for the whole authority they are fed back to
the OSMC and reported to the executive. Alternatively, O&S may refer local issues
to the area boards. Therefore, the area boards are independent of O&S, but have
a close working relationship with them. Area OSC were considered, but it was
decided there would be a capacity issue for members. Also, as Authority C Chief
Officer explained, underneath the area boards 27 community forums will be
established:
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“creating other opportunities for Members to get involved in the democratic
process and to draw citizens into the processes”.
However O&S relationship to these community forums is to be determined, but
may also be a means to refer issues to the OSMC. According to the O&S
Leadership what is certain is that:
“O&S at the unitary level will be strategic, but local issues will still need to
be addressed...what may be missing then is that there may be not enough
scrutiny function at the more parochial levels”.
7.3.3 Structure and Mechanism Conditions
The Development of Overview and Scrutiny for the Unitary Authority
The authority had only been in operation for six months under the present
structures, therefore O&S was just developing in the authority. The O&S
Leadership’s view was that:
“the degree of planning before the unitary council started was (on the)
shallow to poor side”.
The Chief Officer said that the development of the authority and therefore O&S
was like:
“a three legged stool: structure, process and culture...structure and process
comes quite easy...culture is a longer term process.”
And likened it to:
“welding seven different organisational cultures into one ...takes some
years”.
The O&S Management explained that during the transitional period (from the May
2008 elections to April 2009) they met with the districts to consider arrangements
for O&S. They asked the districts what work they thought should be carried over to
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the new unitary authority and only three topics were put forward. The most
significant was in terms of the structure of O&S. It was suggested that O&S
mirrored the creation of 3 new area boards by establishing area OSC, however
they were not to materialise.
Structure of Overview and Scrutiny
The structure of O&S at authority C (see diagram 9) has an Overview and Scrutiny
Management Committee (OSMC), 4 OSC and sub-committees/task and finish
groups when required. The OSC are aligned to the broader strategic themes
rather than to functional areas, i.e. the sustainable community strategy and the
LAA. The OSMC is made up of the chairs and vice chairs of the 4 OSC, other
specialist Cllrs and is chaired by the opposition. It has only recently come into
being and manages O&S business by:
 Distributing work to the OSC
 Receiving petitions, recommendations from other OSC, instructions from
the executive and call-in requests
 Overseeing the CAA, LAA, performance management system and the
general functioning of the council.
Overview and Scrutiny Work Programme
The work programme at Authority C is a six month rolling programme determined
by members and co-ordinated by the OSMC. The OSMC looks at the forward plan
on a regular basis and tries to align their work to it. Members are asked for items
for consideration for the work programme and the executive have input by
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requesting topics to be considered for pre-scrutiny (policy development). O&S also
has on its agenda any major consultations and important issues relating to the
Diagram 9: Authority C Overview and Scrutiny Committee Structure
authority as a whole (see Figure 27 for examples of O&S topics).From the
perspective of the executive most if not all of the OSC have far too full an agenda
on occasions in order to do justice to their particular role:
“It’s pointless having a dozen items on the agenda and having a lengthy
meeting if you are going to spend two or three hours in a meeting…”
This view coincides with the CfPS which advocates selecting narrow topics to go
in depth (CfPS, 2004a). However they acknowledge that the executive should not
exert influence on the work programme and that the executive and O&S be
completely divorced. Authority C Chief Officer said with regard to the choice of
topics for O&S that:
“I would like them to be looking at ...how we can sustain the council and the
county through the next few years and they are not really doing that…we
are not using the member or the officer resources to best advantage...I
think and we are not using their experience, they are kind of on the ground
long term experience of living and working in (the county)”.
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The O&S Management said that O&S in the former county council has traditionally
been post decision scrutiny and they wanted to move more towards pre-scrutiny of
decisions and policy. Indeed, the O&S Leadership estimated that only 25% of the
work programme concerned policy development. The Chief Officer agreed that
there should be more policy development. In their opinion O&S started in a rather
too adversarial way focusing more on scrutiny than overview reflecting that the
model for O&S was the parliamentary select committees. They advocate that:
“scrutiny is much better when it’s forward looking than it is when it’s
backward looking. There has to be an element of retrospective work, but
actually it’s much more productive when it’s adding to the development of
policies and strategies rather than raking over why things went wrong...we
need to shift the balance slightly towards more forward looking strategic
stuff for them to add more value.”
Figure 27: Examples of Overview and Scrutiny Work Programme for Authority C
Overview and Scrutiny Committee Topic
Family and Children’s Services  Home to School Transport
 Surplus places/decline in school
numbers
 Climbie Audit Report
 SEN Provision
Communities and Place  Flood Action Plan
 Mobile Library Services
 Climate Change Action Plan
 Customer Service Performance
Economic Prosperity and Strategic
Services
 Facilities Management
 Procurement
 Regeneration
 Tourism
Care and Wellbeing  Carers Strategy
 Supporting People Action Plan
 Emergency Care Project
 Quarterly Performance Review
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Allocation of Chairs and Vice Chairs
The chairs and vice chairs of committees are decided by the full council. O&S
chairs are appointed from the opposition as in line with previous practice. In the
shadow authority Labour held all of the O&S chairs whereas in the unitary
authority they are held by the Conservatives bar one Labour chair.
7.4 Key Findings from Authority C
7.4.1 Attitudinal Conditions
 There were cultural differences between district and county council O&S
 There was a desire to reshape the O&S at the county level to reflect how it
was undertaken in the districts, but this appears not to have happened
 The dedicated officer support has quadrupled compared to the former
county council, but the corporate centre of the authority is going to come
under financial pressure including support to members
 There are conflict views on the relationship between O&S and the
executive. It appears to be less close than with the previous leadership.
 The chair of O&S attends cabinet
 Other than a representative of the executive few executive members take
up invitations to attend O&S; rather officers attend on their behalf
 Members retain all the responsibilities of the former district and county Cllrs,
but their numbers have reduced. Therefore there are questions over the
capacity of members to fulfil their many roles
 Effective O&S requires dedicated officers able to do research; O&S should
be aligned to the direction of travel of the organisation, the main themes of
216
the community strategy and align the work programmes to the business
planning cycle e.g. budgets and key milestones throughout the year; O&S
should look forward rather than exclusively back.
7.4.2 Process Conditions
 O&S needs to improve public participation
 Locality arrangements and their relationship with O&S is to be resolved.
7.4.3 Structure and Mechanism Conditions
 The chief officer advocates a structural split between ‘overview’ and
‘scrutiny’ so members can dedicate themselves to a particular role
 A representative of the executive attends all the O&S meetings and reports
anything that may be of interest to the executive
 O&S should have a stronger policy development role and there are too
many items on O&S agendas and they are going too in-depth on issues
 There should be more regular meetings between the O&S chairs and the
executive
 There should be more topic and time focused working groups.
7.5 Conclusion
This chapter has summarised the key demographic and political characteristics of
the authority area. Also, by analysing the data from the semi-structured interviews
held with the members and officers from the former county & district councils, the
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unitary council and from relative documents, has outlined O&S prior to and after
reorganisation. The thematic analysis has identified key findings focused on the
development, structure and resources of O&S, its role, the involvement of
members and the general public in O&S, the effectiveness of O&S and the
development of O&S for the unitary authority. These findings can now be
compared and contrasted with the other case study authorities in the following
chapters.
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Chapter 8 Local Authority D
8.1 Introduction
This chapter firstly, through analysis of the data from the semi-structured
interviews held with the members from the former county and district councils and
of relevant documents, will outline O&S prior to reorganisation. Secondly, through
analysis of the data from the semi-structured interviews held with members and
officers from the unitary council, it will then describe O&S after reorganisation. The
analysis is presented thematically in a framework based on Leach’s (2009) three
conditions for effective O&S namely, attitudinal, process and structure and
mechanism conditions. Finally, it will highlight key findings to be compared and
contrasted with the other case study authorities in a later chapter and relative
conclusions will be drawn.
8.2 Pre Reorganisation Approach to Overview and Scrutiny
NB For this section former district and county councillors will be referred to as
member(s).
8.2.1 Attitudinal Conditions
Understanding the Role of Overview and Scrutiny
Based on the experience of those members interviewed from the former county
and district councils the role of O&S is to:
 Provide the check and balance on the work of the council
 Hold the executive to account
 Question
 Examine
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 Make recommendations
 See fairness
 Make sure the decisions been are well thought out
 Allow members to express their view
 Overcome the democratic deficit caused by the creation of the executives.
Relationship with the Executive or Policy Committees
Of the former councils that had executives the experience of the members
differed. One described a co-operative relationship where the cabinet and O&S
worked closely together. The member said that the cabinet would:
“often come to us to look at their proposals and (we would) comment on
them in advance of them being put forward to cabinet... we play an integral
part of the development of many policies...others we look at their proposals
before they are signed off...by the cabinet”.
Another said:
“We had our moments. With scrutiny you don’t expect to be liked all the
time do you? I think we thought they were fair and they thought we were
fair.”
Another described the relationship as being one where O&S and the executive
appeared not to want to engage each other. They said that:
“It was actually quite difficult to get executive members to attend. Actually
scrutiny, as far as I could tell, seemed to be perfectly happy with that. They
were quite happy to chunter along in their own meetings without actually
directly challenging the executive. The recommendations that were
accepted tended to be the non controversial ones... rather than the any
serious challenge.”
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Member Involvement in Overview and Scrutiny
Member involvement in O&S across the county was generally good with majority
and minority parties participating. The time and frequency of O&S activity varied
according to the council and the subject. For example, some authorities
predominantly held O&S meetings during the day to maximise attendance from
oficers and those giving evidence, whereas public meetings were held in the
evenings. With regard to member capacity district members were of the opinion
that they spent more time fulfilling their role compared to the county Cllrs. One
member said:
“there’s always been a difference between county Cllrs and district Cllrs.
district Cllrs tend to do an awful lot of local, small scale paperwork, which
county Cllrs didn’t. Now that paperwork can take hours and hours and
hours... I would have thought we’re looking more at 32 hours a week”.
A member added that:
“some of the people who have been county Cllrs will find it something of a
challenge because they have not given that amount of time.”
Indeed Members were anticipating that unitary members would now be committing
more of their time to their role and not just for O&S. A member stated that:
“it’s almost going to be a full-time role and most of my colleagues would
agree with that”.
This increasing demand on members time would be exacerbated by the time spent
travelling to meetings in the different parts of a large rural county. As one member
explained:
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“somebody from the far south of the county driving to the north of the
county is going to have a journey of at least an hour and a quarter, an hour
and a half, that’s both ways. That’s 3 hours before they even get to the
meeting. I think it’s going to be a challenge.”
Officer and Financial Resources
The officer and financial resources available to O&S varied across the authorities.
The experience of members was that the county council and any joint O&S had
good support from officers and, as one member stated, was:
“well resourced with a very effective head of scrutiny officer, who is just
scrutiny…in the districts the scrutiny officers tend to be doing other jobs as
well.”
District members said they had only “part-time” officer support via democratic
services and that this effected the functioning of O&S. As one district member
said:
“The main problem was it was under resourced from an officer point of
view. So we didn’t have a dedicated scrutiny officer, who were themselves
trained in scrutiny. And it was always rather underfunded.”
However the Member from the largest district said that officer and financial support
was good:
“We weren’t restricted in any way on what resources we needed to go to
somewhere. We never had no (sic) difficulties.”
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Non-political Overview and Scrutiny
The majority of members described O&S as non-political. They acknowledged that
politics influenced them as individuals and party members, but endeavoured to
reach a consensus in their work. Members said:
“They are local politicians. They are all going to be thinking of their group
aren’t they? It’s always in the background.”
“It’s obviously political because it’s local government, but it’s non party
political in the way we carry about our work.”
“It’s totally none party political in terms of the business of carrying out our
work of scrutiny”.
“Scrutiny can start to get a little bit political… you have to rise above it, but I
wouldn’t say that it was unhealthy.”
“Sometimes politics does come into it, especially before the election or just
after.”
However, member’s experiences were not all positive. One said that O&S was
political. They described it as a:
“fairly second rate process in it was much more political than it ought to
have been”.
Another member said:
“it was intended to be non-political, but I think the members made it
political”.
Effectiveness of Overview and Scrutiny
Most members believed that O&S ultimately made a difference. One member said
that:
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“It did make a difference because it was there and it was used as a means
of correcting any policy or any function that might have been overlooked by
the council.”
Another added that:
“The result of the... task groups... will influence the lives of the people in
the end because they’ll influence the way services are delivered.”
One member had a more mixed view of the effectiveness of O&S. They thought
that O&S did not use the time available to it effectively, saying that:
“Some of it was a waste of time. Some meetings you used to go to and
some task groups you think, well, really half an hour was enough to sort it
out”.
However they were confident that when significant issues were addressed O&S
was effective. Adding:
“When the main topics came up or when there was a problem scrutiny
always took a lead in it and done (sic) a good job.”
An example of effective O&S was given as the joint district and county health
scrutiny. A member said it was good because:
“we had two extremely good officers in the early days and willingness by
people to get on and do the job. We had some severe problems with the
health service and social services who...never spoke to each other and
when they did it was a slanging match. It had to be overcome and think
scrutiny had a lot to do with bringing them together.”
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One member did not believe their council had been very effective at O&S in
comparison to other authorities. They said they have been involved with the Local
Government Association for many years so:
“I knew that scrutiny in other areas was much more effective and valuable.”
Indeed speaking of their own authority the stated they had:
“never seen a scrutiny report that I thought that was particularly effective
before I joined scrutiny. That is why I was so reluctant to join it for a long
time, because it seemed like a process that was being gone through for the
sake of going through the process rather than a really creative and
interesting, stimulating, exercise, useful for the good running of the council.”
8.2.2 Process Conditions
Call-in
The opinion of all the members was the ability to call-in a cabinet decision was
regarded as a strength, as it is the means by which the public could see
accountability in local government in operation; however it had been used
infrequently and only once other means of resolving an issue had been exhausted.
Public Involvement in Overview and Scrutiny
Public involvement in O&S was described by one member as:
“Not as good as we would hope. Sometimes you’d get a few people there
and sometimes you wouldn’t get anybody.”
One member described O&S as:
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“a pretty specialist area… it wasn’t something that local people did get
involved in”.
Another member said O&S was, rather than the general public:
“largely working with the other bodies; the police, fire authorities and NHS”.
One member highlighted that public engagement was not just an issue for O&S.
They reflected that:
“public involvement in local government isn’t very good”.
There was also an issue regarding the public understanding of O&S due to the
lack of publicity for the function. However a member reflected that the media are
not necessarily interested in the work of O&S to be able to promote it, saying:
“If you are just doing a job rather than making a public spectacle of it. If you
are doing the job professionally you don’t always make it into the papers do
you?”
The unitary authority is establishing unitary member led area boards. As a
member explained the area boards could be an opportunity for O&S to engage
with the public at a local level but are intended:
“to lead the community areas and advise the council. They are the
communication link and will be given some delegated power themselves ...
the area boards are not being set up as local scrutineers as it were.”
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8.2.3 Structure and Mechanism Conditions
The Development and Structure of Overview and Scrutiny
As noted above following the Local Government Act (2000) in this county three of
the five authorities adopted leadership and cabinet model of the new political
structures and the remaining 2 chose the 4th option. Each authority then developed
the structure of its O&S committees, membership, officer support, meeting
depending upon their authority’s and members particular needs (see diagram 10
for examples of O&S committee structures from Authority D):
 The county council had 3 OSC for health, children’s services and an O&S
management committee, they also had 3 task groups dedicated to specific
issues and various time limited task groups
 Only one of the districts had an overarching O&S management board and 4
OSC related to service departments. The two 4th option authorities had either
one OSC or two; one internally and one externally focused
 All authorities used smaller time bound task and finish groups were also used
to conduct in-depth or light touch reviews
 None of the authorities had divided their O&S function into separate scrutiny
and overview committees.
Allocation of Chairs and Vice Chairs
The common practice throughout the county was to appoint opposition members
as chairs and vice chairs of OSC as well as majority party members. Even in a
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District where 34 out of 43 Cllrs were from the majority Conservative party the
chair of O&S was always an opposition member.
Diagram 10: Examples of Overview and Scrutiny Structures from Authority D Prior
to Unitary Status
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Diagram 10: Examples of Overview and Scrutiny Structures from Authority D Prior
to Unitary Status continued
Former 4th Option District Council
The Preparation of Overview and Scrutiny for the Unitary Authority
The creation of the unitary authority was opposed by the district councils, but there
was now a commitment by members to ensure it is successful. As a member said:
“this decision for unitary was a very contentious affair. The district councils
fought it like mad. Having lost the battle we obviously had to work to make
the thing operate correctly.”
One of the reasons for opposition that was highlighted by most members was that
the unitary council serves too large an area and that there are significant
differences within it. One member explained:
“I have to admit to have serious doubts about the viability of... this particular
unitary. I’m extremely worried about how successful it’s going to be.
Geographically we’re far too big an area in my opinion. We’ve only got
435,000-440,000 population... we’re one of the biggest geographical areas
for a unitary. There’s such a diverse indigenous attitude to life between the
southernmost part of the county and the northern most part of the county.”
Overview and
Scrutiny
Committee
Task and finish
groups
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As noted earlier the members from the former districts and county council were
interviewed because they represented their authority on a joint O&S board that
undertook scrutiny of the IE. One member explained that at the first meeting of the
Joint Overview and Scrutiny Transition Board (JOSTB) the then deputy leader of
the county council said that O&S was:
“going to be a really important tool in developing the formation of the new
authority and that the IE was going to work with scrutiny”.
In addition part of their brief was to look at how O&S would work in the new council
and to make recommendations that would go in front of the IE for their approval.
Very early on it was decided by members that they would seek help with this. As a
member recalled:
“At my initiative we went to the CfPS organisation and got a consultant in to
give us advice as to how we ought to develop the new council after the
election and that has been done and adopted as the process for the new
council.”
A member said that the proposed structure was “very similar” to the county
council, but the emphasis was on the OSC being modelled on the parliamentary
select committee style. However as Authority D did not have its unitary council
elections until after it came into being new leadership or members could still have
made changes to the proposals for O&S. As one member said this:
“hindered the (transition) process. We should have had the new shadow
(authority) in place for 12 months, before the change over took place.”
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Priorities for Overview and Scrutiny in the Unitary Authority
The members’ views as to the priorities for the unitary council fell into two strands;
issues relating directly to O&S and those policy and service areas that needed to
be addressed. Those for O&S were:
 That O&S develops a good working relationship with the executive
 There are sufficient members to deliver the O&S function
 Members receive the required training to participate in O&S recognising
there are many new members inexperienced in countywide strategic O&S
 Meetings are not concentrated in hounty Hall, but consideration is given for
the time spent travelling in what is a large rural county
 That O&S develops a working relationship with the area boards.
The policy and service areas were:
 O&S are “keen to scrutinise how the new authority was going to manage
the district council functions”
 Ensuring that the move to a unitary council makes the anticipated savings
in the council budget
 There are sufficient officers to run and deliver the services to the required
standards
 Area boards are developed to allow the public to participate in and influence
the running of the council.
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8.3 Post Reorganisation Approach to Overview and Scrutiny
8.3.1 Attitudinal Conditions
Resources and Officer Support
Authority D Leadership stated that O&S had sufficient dedicated O&S officers,
however the chair of O&S described the officer support as a:
“small number of dedicated scrutiny officers...they have to be masters of all
trades”.
Authority D O&S Management noted that officer capacity restricts the work of
O&S; for example in the research required for reviews and stated that:
“there are not really enough officers for the size of the business that we
have got”
O&S works closely with the other services using the existing evidence that is
available and avoid requesting officers to write long reports as officer time is
limited. As the O&S Management explained:
“what we try and do is use what’s available... we just have to sort of dovetail
ourselves into the other parts of the business...give me more and I could do
more...before that we had to do the democratic services ourselves and beg
steal and borrow admin support”.
The unitary authority has 6 dedicated O&S officers, one democratic services
officer and admin support (See diagram 11). Currently O&S is an officer’s second
or third job and they stay for 2 or 3 years. The O&S Manager would like to retain
the services of O&S officers for longer and views the unitary authority as an
opportunity to develop a career structure for O&S.
232
Diagram 11: Authority D: Overview and Scrutiny Officer Structure
The Role of Overview and Scrutiny
As experienced by those interviewed the role of O&S is to:
 Be a critical friend
 “dig down deeper”
 Add value
 “shine a light in what I’d call some dark corners”
 Hold the executive to public account for decisions and policies
 Provide check and balance
 Raise awareness of an issue
 Provide evidence based recommendations
 Understand issues
 Find better ways of doing things
 Review decisions of the executive and individual cabinet members
 Ensure openness and transparency
 Consult the community and stakeholders
 Undertake policy review and development
Scrutiny Manager
Senior Scrutiny Officers x3
Scrutiny Officers x2
Democratic Services Officer
Administrative Assistant
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 Monitor performance
 Monitor the budget.
Relationship Between the Executive and Overview and Scrutiny
The O&S Leadership described the relationship with the executive as “generally
good”, however adding that if it were to close it would not necessarily be good
either:
“I have to be particularly careful about that line to walk…”, but “on the other
hand I don’t want it to be a political football”.
They said the executive would use O&S for policy development but that could
make O&S the decision maker and not the decision influencing body. Indeed it
could be used as a cover for executive decisions. But they emphasised that O&S
remained its own “master”. The O&S Management agrees that cabinet members
can use O&S to their own advantage:
“Some of them are pretty much switched on... they know how to use
scrutiny as well ... rather than look like the bad guys (they will) pass the
particular problem over to scrutiny ... get them to review it and ... they’ll
have to stand alongside (and) implement some of those unpalatable
decisions.”
Adding that, service directors will use O&S to:
“bid for scarce resources on their behalf.”
Although there are no regular time tabled meetings with executive the O&S
Manager said the chairs, vice chairs and the O&S officers work on their
relationship with the executive and the executive are “very positive towards
scrutiny”. The executive see the advantage of early and pro-active communication
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with O&S rather than receiving challenge after decisions are made. Authority D
Leadership’s experience has been that the:
“majority of the time a fairly open and robust relationship..”
The Authority D Chief Officer said that during the transition period leading towards
the unitary authority the relationship was very challenging. They explained that
former district members who were opposed to the unitary authority used O&S to
challenge the executive, but now the relationship had improved. They added that
the authority has got a:
“Member/officer relations protocol and we are trying to sort of foster those
good relations and to promote a culture of mutual co-operation and
respect.”
Recommendations
The experience of the Authority D Leadership was that “99%” of recommendations
were accepted by the executive because they were based on evidence. They
explained that:
“the majority of times we end up with well researched and evidence based
decisions from scrutiny...we may not always like it but at least it is based on
fact and information not pre-conceived ideas.... it is easier for the cabinet or
the port-folio holder if the decision was evidence based rather than a
political decision”.
Member Involvement in Overview and Scrutiny
Authority D Leadership said O&S is governed by the members and they have
applied their experience, qualifications and knowledge to their work. They pointed
out there was a different culture in the district councils as from the county council
and:
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“what we are trying to do is to get the best of breed...some of the members
do have different ideas as to how it should operate, but yes I think it’s been
a positive move forward, it certainly hasn’t gone back”.
The O&S Management said as the majority of the 98 members are either ex
county or district Cllrs there are few completely new members.
“In theory 98 members, less 10 executives should be enough to go round”.
Those who have been previously involved in O&S have been quick to engage with
O&S officers, but they have “struggled” to fill places on the first task groups. The
O&S Management recognised that members’ time is limited as they were having
difficulty:
“serving on area boards, regulatory committees, doing local case work,
working and living over an hour away from county hall…members are very
selective in terms of what brings them in”.
They suggested that O&S had to treat members as “customers” and determine
what is important to members. Explaining that:
“we have been working hard to involve members via local interest or subject
interest.”
They held a two day induction for member to O&S, including the select committees
having a day away with lead O&S officers to build team cohesiveness.
The O&S Leadership said that of the members who are involved in O&S most are
the majority political parties whereas the independents consider their role as to
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look after their ward only. However their experience was once members are
involved they stay involved. They explained:
“What I find is those who have got involved and it’s been a worthwhile
experience do tend to come back, but it is getting them involved.”
They added that:
“You get a number of people who get stuck into scrutiny...20% who want to
get stuck in, 50 or 60% you could twist their arm... 20% you never get
anything out of them”.
In their experience O&S is increasingly a daytime job and suggested they need to
be incentivised to attend. Authority D Leadership agreed it is difficult to get some
members fully involved in O&S and that a financial incentive could be used.
Indeed, the authorities independent members allowance panel has given £10,000
to dispense among those that have participated in O&S.
Political Balance and Interaction
The O&S Management explained the four select committees are appointed on
political proportionality, although the Authority D Leadership said that:
“political balance sometimes gets in the way of getting the most
experienced person for the job”.
The O&S Management said that members understand they are there to gather the
evidence to make consensus based recommendations. Members:
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“may express their own views initially on things based on personal
experience and ideology” and are “occasionally a little heated”, but
members tend to “leave that (politics) at the door”.
The Leadership agreed that O&S work is based on evidence and not political view
and added the:
“non-political approach to scrutiny in (the authority) is a credit to some of
the opposition Members”.
The experience of the O&S Leadership at this authority is that members involved
in O&S were not overtly party political, however their view is that there are factions
within with the large majority party on the council and on occasions they:
“use scrutiny as a vehicle to express their internal grievances with
executive”.
External Overview and Scrutiny
The O&S Management recognised that scrutiny of LAA targets and wider partners
is going to be a “big job.” The O&S Chair said:
“it’s going to be interesting to see how they (external partners) feel about
being scrutinised by an outside organisation. If we got some real power
then I think it’s going to be good”.
The Chief Officer explained that the authority has a task group looking specifically
at how scrutiny of the LAA partnerships will take place and that they are waiting for
the regulations and guidance from the government. However they said that the
authority needed to be:
238
“realistic about what we can achieve in those areas... without any additional
resources to match that responsibility... it’s going to be very challenging”.
Authority D Leadership highlighted that O&S of external partners already happens
with the monitoring of the health service and an external provider of care homes.
They cautioned:
“that there is no point in extending the areas of scrutiny unless you actually
give scrutiny some powers to influence those decisions... if there isn’t any
teeth to do it.”
Indeed the O&S Management questioned whether locally elected Cllrs should be
involved in health scrutiny as the health service is a bigger business than local
government and there is the issue of member and officer capacity to consider.
The Effectiveness of Overview and Scrutiny
The Authority Leadership described effective O&S as:
 Independent
 Supported by dedicated officers
 An open process where members of the public can attend meetings and
have input
 Recommendations and policies are properly debated
 Cabinet explains why recommendations not accepted
 Having proper protocols in place so that anyone that is involved in O&S
knows how the process works and how they should be treated
 A process which is about finding out facts not “roughing” people up.
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The Chair of O&S said that an effective O&S function would have greater member
involvement and they would participate without the promise of an allowance
payment.
The O&S Management said an effective O&S should be able to review
recommendations in 6 months or 12 months time and see that the outcomes have
made a difference and/or added value. Adding:
“it is important that we do make a difference and we do judge ourselves by
way of outcome”.
Overview and Scrutiny: The Lion that has failed to roar
The Authority D Leadership’s view was that O&S in this authority was a:
“young lion… packing a punch and is now extending its reach in the areas
that it scrutinises”.
The Authority Chief Officer did not agree with the minister. It had taken time and
training for O&S to work effectively and while recommendations are based on
evidence all that O&S can do is make recommendations to cabinet or to council.
They stated:
“scrutiny shouldn’t be operated in a way where there is aggressive
challenge or an antagonistic way... what we don't want here is sort of a
hostile environment for scrutiny... an adversarial sort of system.”
The O&S Leadership’s response was to say O&S could only make
recommendations. It:
240
“could make a lot of noise, but has it got any teeth?”
They also thought that O&S was not properly thought through by the government
stating:
“I just wonder whether this scrutiny thing was tagged on afterwards...what
shall we get these guys to do that are left?”
The O&S Management’s opinion is that O&S should be judged on outcomes only.
Their view was that O&S is still relatively new and still developing; having been left
to develop and function individually and independently as the government had only
provided limited support and guidance.
8.3.2 Process Conditions
Call-in
The Chair of O&S experience was that Authority D did not have a history of call-in.
Authority D Chief Officer explained:
“we used to actually have limitations in the constitution on the amount of
use of call-in and we do make it clear that in the constitution still that it’s to
be used in exceptional circumstances.”
Authority D Leadership accepted call-in as a legitimate challenge to the executive
but regarded its use as:
“a failure of the cabinet member to have advanced discussions with
members of scrutiny”.
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They thought that some of the call-ins had been politically driven in the past;
however the Leadership of O&S said that call-ins are not usually requested on
party political lines.
The authority has a pro-forma for requesting call-in, which signposts other ways of
resolving the issue. Call-in is not actively discouraged, but they would prefer the
issue to be resolved by other means, namely through direct discussion with the
cabinet and portfolio-holders.
The main points for the procedure for call-in at Authority D is as follows:
 Call-in should only be used in exceptional circumstances
 Members have 5 working days after the publication of a decision to call
it in
 The monitoring officer (the Director of Resources) calls-in decisions at
the request of the chair or any three members of the relevant committee
 Urgent decisions cannot be called-in.
8.3.3 Structure and Mechanism Conditions
The Development of Overview and Scrutiny for the Unitary Authority
During the transitional period from the two tier to unitary authority an IE was
formed to manage the process. The IE had representatives from the five
authorities and O&S mirrored this by having its own transition scrutiny board to
oversee the IE. This joint county and district OSC comprised of members from the
242
five councils and was called the JOSTB, which scrutinised the performance of the
IE against the transition plan.
The JOSTB also commissioned a local government consultant from the CfPS, with
guidance from the O&S Management, to develop the O&S arrangements to be in
place from day one for the unitary authority. As the O&S Management explained
members from the districts and county council were consulted as to:
“what was good about (O&S in) their previous authority, what wasn’t quite
so good and what they would like to see sort of translated into the new
arrangements”.
The consultant undertook a review of O&S in the county and offered advice based
on the CfPS 4 principles of good scrutiny. A report was compiled giving the
consensus view of the members and an officer group held discussions to address
the ‘nuts and bolts’ of O&S. The arrangements for O&S were then considered by
the JOSTB, agreed by the IE, put into the council constitution and were adopted
by the new unitary council.
At the time of the data collection the arrangements for O&S have only been in
operation for a short period of time. As the O&S Leadership O&S reflected:
“I don’t think we have really bedded in yet. It’s early days. We need to look
at it in about a year’s time.”
Authority D Leadership highlighted the fact that the elections for the unitary
happened after the authority had come into effect. Therefore April to June 2009:
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“was still very much a transitional stage... it wasn't really until we had had
the elections and the first meeting of full council to allocate, appoint
members to the various committees and also the induction that we really
felt we were able to move forward...business really started properly from
September (2009)”.
Also as the elections also resulted in increasing the largest party’s majority and
returned the existing second party as the main opposition the cabinet members
remained the same, therefore there was a sense of “business as usual” despite
Authority D Leadership trying to avoid that impression.
Structure of Overview and Scrutiny
Authority D Chief Officer considered that the unitary authority had “built on good
practice from all five councils”. The new structure of O&S at Authority D has an
Overview and Scrutiny Management and Resources Select Committee
(OSMRSC) and 3 other select committees (See diagram 12). The OSMRSC
manages reviews and develops the O&S function and is responsible for reviewing
the structures of the unitary authority.
The use of the term select committee is to reflect the method of O&S undertaken
in parliament, which this authority considers to be best practice for O&S. As the
O&S Management in a report to the JOSTB:
“It is not simply about a name or what is in the terms of reference, but how
they operate in practice and this will be the subject of induction and training
for both members and officers early in the life of the new council. The lower
levels within the decision-making structure such as task groups and rapid
scrutiny exercises are less formal with greater ability to apply a system
designed to achieve the most effective outcome to the single topic under
review.”
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Standing task groups have been created for the annual review of major contracts
as it is considered to be a growing area in the unitary authority.
The Authority D Chief Officer said:
“there is some debate at the moment about whether we've got the right
structure... whether the OSMRSC should be an overarching committee with
the other select committees underneath or as we've got at the moment, that
its one of four select committees.”
Diagram 12: Authority D Overview and Scrutiny Committee Structure
Overview and Scrutiny Work Programme
The O&S Management said members are working from a:
“legacy report from transition into the new unitary authority which reflected
the priorities of the districts. They ended up being the important things for
scrutiny on day one of the new unitary, e.g. waste collection, leisure and
housing”.
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Each of the select committees also had a development day to identify the
priorities, but O&S had not yet taken views from partners regarding the area
boards. They described the work programme (see Figure 28) as:
“pretty extensive, so they’re having to use quite a few task groups and rapid
scrutiny exercises just to get business done.”
The O&S Leadership said they have:
“concentrated on scrutiny of internal workings of authority... the frontline
services the county council didn’t run and the harmonisation of staffing and
conditions.”
The O&S Chair added that the O&S Manager was adept at identifying topics, but
Members were not forthcoming with issues as were service departments. The
Chief Officer said there was a:
“massive range of tasks for them to do and areas to cover”.
Each service director within the resources team had a meeting with the members
of the OSMRSC and presented the issues within the services for O&S to consider
for their work programme. Authority D Leadership emphasised that O&S members
set their own agenda. They are:
“totally independent to look at what they wish… working from the forward
plan or raised from the community or by the area boards or by the
members…there is no direction coming from the cabinet…scrutiny does
have the luxury of having more time to look at policy or look at decisions
and review them...the cabinet has to collate information, make a decision
and move on.”
The O&S Management said that the political and officer leadership of the authority
are:
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“very keen to have a good balance to the work programme in terms of
policy development work”.
This was confirmed by the Chief Officer who said that O&S:
“I think that what we want, the directors and indeed cabinet members, to
embrace scrutiny really and to use scrutiny for policy development”.
The Authority Leadership also said that O&S:
“is about developing policy and not just about what has happened…it has
produced very good policy which is in place and working very well to this
day”.
Figure 28: Examples of Overview and Scrutiny Work Programme for Authority D
Overview and Scrutiny Select
Committee
Topic
Overview & Scrutiny Management and
Resources
 Service Transformation (HR)
 Harmonisation of Staff Terms and
Conditions of Employment
 Delivering Customer Focus
 Agency Staff (and consultancy)
Contract
Children’s Services  Speech and Language Service
Provision
 Teenage Pregnancy
 Primary School Strategy
 Child & Adolescent Mental Health
Strategy
Health and Social Care  Care Pathway for Older People
 Autism
 Ambulance Service District
Response Times
 End of Life Care Strategy
Environment  Gypsy & Traveller Service Review
 Car Parking – harmonisation of
charging
 Climate Change/Carbon Trading
 Leisure Services – options for
transformation including contract
implications
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Allocation of Chairs and Vice Chairs
As the O&S Management explained the custom and practice is to have an
opposition member as chair of OSMB. The select committees elect their own chair
from the majority group and a vice chair from the opposition:
“so that it is not controlled by the administration per se”.
Public involvement in Overview and Scrutiny
The O&S Leadership summarised the level of public involvement in O&S as
“weak”. Their experience was that O&S had at times not sufficiently engaged with
the public and had found it difficult to engage the public. They suggested that the
public did not know or understand the O&S function and are only likely to engage
with O&S if the issue was of concern to them. The O&S Management said this
was of immediate concern to Members. A task group under the OSMRSC has
been established to look into how O&S can:
“pull local knowledge into the scrutiny arena and demonstrate that we are
undertaking scrutiny within the area(s).
The Chief Officer saw the creation of area boards for the unitary authority as the
main method of community engagement and one which could be utilised by O&S.
The O&S Management said the relationship between the area boards and O&S
has not been established and a task group has been set up to specifically look at
how they can work together. Their understanding was that the area boards would
undertake local challenge and service review, however they:
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“are not meant to undertake scrutiny per se, but what they will do is... some
sort of service based reviews themselves and any issue that are corporate
or cross boundaries will possibly be referred to O&S.”
The Chief Officer added that when an area board is not able to resolve an issue
such as a CCfA then it may also be referred to O&S to address. Certainly a
collaborative relationship is anticipated on consultations and as they noted:
“if they (the area boards) are working effectively then I would think there's
less for scrutiny to do”.
However the O&S Leadership cautioned that the area boards are going to be
overloaded as a means of consultation and that:
“you’ll just get the usual suspects. You don’t get the public.”
8.4 Key Findings from Authority D
8.4.1 Attitudinal Conditions
 Members and officers feel that O&S has not had the support from central
government and that O&S was an afterthought of the Local Government Act
2000
 The authority has 6 dedicated and independently funded O&S Officers
 The executive would like O&S to focus more on policy review and
development
 O&S has a good working relationship with the executive, however there are
concerns that the executive has used O&S to resolve challenging problems
 O&S should not be adversarial, but rather a critical friend
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 The relationship with the executive is described as being positive, but there
is a desire for it not to be too close
 There is pro-active communication with the executive to avoid challenges
after decisions are made
 O&S is effective when it has member and cabinet support, has dedicated
officer support and is focused on outcomes which make a difference and/or
add value.
8.4.2 Process Conditions
 The use of call-in is restricted by the constitution
 O&S needs to improve public participation
 The area boards relationship with O&S is to be determined, however they
could be used as a means of public consultation by O&S and may also refer
issues to O&S that cannot be resolved at the area level or that have
implications for the whole authority.
8.4.3 Structure and Mechanism Conditions
 District and county council members were consulted on the O&S
arrangements for the unitary authority, supported by guidance from a CfPS
local government consultant
 The chair of O&S is an opposition member and the select committees elect
their own chair/vice chairs from all political parties and independents
 O&S of external partners is going to be challenging based on the member
and officer capacity
 The work programme has been determined by members and focuses on
the services inherited from the former district councils.
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8.5 Conclusion
This chapter has analysed the data from the semi-structured interviews held with
the members and officers from the former county and district councils, the unitary
council and from relative documents, has outlined O&S prior to and after re-
organisation. The thematic analysis has identified key findings focused on the
development, structure and resources of O&S, its role, the involvement of
members and the general public in O&S, the effectiveness of O&S and the
development of O&S for the unitary authority. These findings can now be
compared and contrasted with the other case study authorities in the following
chapter.
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Chapter 9 Key Findings
9.1 Introduction
This chapter will bring together the evidence gathered and presented in chapters
5, 6, 7 and 8 and thus compare and contrast the individual experiences of the four
case study authorities. It will also highlight any cross-authority implications with
regard to the research questions listed at the beginning of the thesis. The research
questions were:
 To locate debates on O&S within a wider conceptual understanding of the
process of modernisation and the emphasis on ‘New Localism’
 Highlight what O&S arrangements were and are in place within the two and
one-tier system of local government
 Examine how effective O&S is being ensured within four new Unitary
Authorities.
9.2 Overview and Scrutiny in the Unitary Authorities
9.2.1 Attitudinal Conditions
Resources and Officer Support
Research has shown that for O&S to succeed it requires officer support and
financial resources. Indeed, O&S has struggled to develop as a result of poor
resources. (Snape and Taylor, 2001; Cole, 2001; Audit Commission, 2002b;
Ashworth and Hunt, 2003)
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The annual surveys by the CfPS have shown that officer support is provided by a
number of different departments within local authorities and that budgets vary
between the size and type of authority (see Tables 7 and 8 pp.59- 64). Historically
the officer resources for O&S in the 4 case study areas varied between the
authorities. In most authorities the officers supporting the O&S function were
provided by democratic services or its equivalent and, at the minimum level,
carried out clerking duties and/or research and advice for members. In Authority B
area O&S officer support was described as inadequate in one district leaving
members to provide their own research, reports and presentations. In Authority C
area one of the larger districts could boast an O&S Manager, 2 O&S officers and a
PhD Student. In Authority D area a member from the largest district said that
officer and financial support was good and they faced few restrictions. As for the
new unitary authorities, it was recognised that dedicated O&S officers and
financial resources were necessary for an effective O&S function. Table 13 details
what officer and financial resources were in place at the time of the research. The
O&S Leadership from Authority B gave their opinion on why officer resources are
so important to O&S:
“We’ve had people saying to us before ‘we’ve only got half a scrutiny
officer’. ‘What’s your scrutiny like?’ ‘Crap!’ You’ve got to back it up with
resources, that’s what I’m saying. That’s a must. It’s a false economy if you
don’t.”
Authority A has a dedicated O&S team of 2 senior policy officers and 2 policy
officers with varying experience of O&S. They are managed by the Team Leader
for Scrutiny and the executive, which is located within the ACE
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Table 13: Dedicated Overview and Scrutiny Officer and Financial Support in Case
Study Authorities
Authority A B C D
O&S Officers 5 7.5 4 6
Managed by Team Leader for
Scrutiny and the
Executive
O&S
Manager
O&S
Manager
O&S
Manager
Directorate Assistant Chief
Executive’s
Department
Assistant
Chief
Executive’s
Department
Performance Resources
Link Officer None Heads of
Service
None None
Discretionary
Budget
£29,000 £25,000 None £30,000
department. They will be able to call upon additional resources from other
departments despite having no dedicated link officers. However, directors are
regarded as the key link to O&S.
In Authority B, of the 7 officers who were appointed in October 2009 there was a
50-50 split of former county and district council officers all having direct experience
of O&S. In response to the growth of health related O&S the former county
council, in collaboration with the NHS, had jointly funded an officer to manage
health O&S for which they were highly commended for at the CfPS Good Scrutiny
Awards 2009. They are all managed by the O&S Manager, who reports directly to
the ACE department and Heads of Service act as link officers to O&S.
In Authority C the O&S Manager reports directly to the Head of Democratic
Services and is part of democratic services and within the performance
directorate. There are four officers, including the manager, all from the former
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county and district councils (the former county council only had one dedicated
O&S officer) who have direct experience of O&S or Democratic Services. There
are no dedicated link officers, but O&S officers link with relevant officers in service
directorates depending upon the issue under investigation or review.
Authority D has 6 dedicated O&S officers, one democratic services officer and
admin support. The O&S Manager reports directly to the Head of Democratic and
Member Services and is part of the resource directorate. The O&S Manager noted
that officer capacity restricts the work of O&S (for example in the research
required for reviews) and remarked they only have sufficient officers for the current
work programme.
In relation to financial resources, Authority C did not have a discretionary budget
for O&S whereas authorities A, B and D were allocated budgets between £25,000-
£30,000 to pay for member and officer training, attending conferences, venue
fees, expenses for venues, witness, experts etc. These amounts compared very
favourably to the average of £8,687 in 2009 (CfPS, 2009 p.9).
However, in Authorities A, C and D their chief executives were already concerned
about the financial pressures facing their authorities, which could have an effect on
staffing and financial resources in the future. The Chief Officer of Authority D
stated that reduced officer support for members:
“might mean that you have to have less committees and less meetings.”
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The Role of Overview and Scrutiny
The Local Government Act 2000 introduced new political structures, new decision-
making procedures to local authorities and the new O&S role. What was clear was
the introduction of O&S had not altered the fundamental role of members to review
the decisions within their council. While the basic role was clear, over the last
decade, the role of O&S has become more defined, especially with the guidance
from the CfPS on the 4 principles of good scrutiny (CfPS, 2006c) namely:
 Provide critical friend challenge
 Make an impact on service delivery
 Reflect the voice and concerns of the public and its communities
 Take the lead and own the O&S process.
Thus, the O&S Management from Authority A describes the role as:
“Meeting the 4 principles of good scrutiny. Providing effective, constructive
and critical challenges within the organisation.”
In addition the O&S Leadership from Authority A said the role of O&S is to:
“drive improvement in service delivery”,
The Leadership of Authority B regards O&S as having greater flexibility than the
executive as it can decide its own role and work programme. While the executive
is focused on making decisions, O&S can review the work of the council, partners
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Figure 29: The Role of Overview and Scrutiny as Experienced by Members and
Officers in the Case Study Authorities
The O&S Function  Challenges, questions, examines
 Understands
 Raises awareness
 Adds value
 Makes a difference
 Expresses the views of members
 Ensures openness and transparency.
The Council  Makes a positive contribution to the council’s
business.
Executive  Holds the executive to account
 Provides critical friend challenge
 Supports the leadership to achieve its goals.
Partners  Holds partners to account
 Ensures partners are delivering services.
Decisions  Examines and reviews decisions
 Provides transparency in decision-making
 Makes sure decisions are fair
 Makes sure processes are followed
 Provides checks and balances to the
decision making within the authority.
Policy  Undertakes policy review and development
 Ensures policies are valid.
Recommendations  Makes evidence based recommendations
 Reviews implementation.
Services  Improves public services
 Finds efficiencies
 Finds value for money and cost
effectiveness.
Monitor  Monitors performance
 Monitors the budget.
Public  Voices the concerns of the public
 Engages with the wider community
 Consults the community and stakeholders
 Acts as an honest broker between the
public and the executive
 Gives the public confidence.
The role of O&S is
not
 An opposition to the executive
 A preserve of the opposition parties
 To constantly call-in executive decisions.
and engage with communities. However, the members’ and officers’ of all 4
authorities expressed their experiences and views as to the role of O&S in wider
terms than the 4 principles of good scrutiny (see Figure 29).
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Relationship Between the Executive and Overview and Scrutiny
The experience of all the authorities was that the relationship between O&S and
the ruling party or coalition had an uncertain beginning when the new political
structures were adopted following the Local Government Act 2000. All of the
districts and county councils, with the exception of the smaller district authorities
who adopted the 4th option status, opted for leader and cabinet model of up to 10
executive members. Thus the remaining Cllrs became non-executive members
with the task of holding the executive to account and reviewing policy. This
separation of members’ roles immediately created a ‘them and us’ division
between the executive and O&S and subsequently they have had to establish and
develop a new working relationship between them. The leadership of the 4 case
study authorities all had a clear view on their executive’s relationship with O&S.
The Leadership of Authority A and the other cabinet members regard their
relationship with O&S as starting from “a clean sheet” and intended to meet with
the informal OSMB on a regular basis as O&S is:
“a resource that can inform the cabinet in its decision making.”
The Leadership of Authority B said that O&S:
“shouldn’t really conflict with the executive and I don’t think it does in this
authority....I think we complement each other quite well.”
Indeed, the Chair of O&S at Authority B describes their experience of working with
the cabinet and chief executive as “very positive”.
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The Authority C Leadership also said that relationship with O&S was good and
thought that they work well together. However, the O&S Leadership from Authority
C said that the new administration had not engaged with O&S, explaining:
“We find that the executive members don’t feel duty bound to attend
scrutiny meetings and to present their policy. (They) leave senior officers to
do it to a large extent.”
Authority D Leadership of felt that for the:
“Members have challenged and exposed the major faults or decisions
which were not as sound as were thought... they are not afraid to be a
critical friend, but also to support decisions when they are right”.
The O&S Leadership for Authority D described the relationship with the executive
as “generally good”, however adding that:
“if it is too cosy then there is something seriously wrong”.
They said the executive would use scrutiny for policy development but that could
make O&S:
“a bit of a fig leaf for executive decisions… sometimes I wonder if they are
expecting us to solve their problems for them”.
The O&S Management for Authority D agreed that cabinet members can use O&S
to their own advantage. For example, could use O&S to make unpopular
recommendations and therefore deflect some of the blame for decisions to O&S:
Arguably the relationship with the executive centres on the acceptance, or not, of
O&S recommendations and the experience across the authorities was that there
was almost 100% acceptance as recommendations based on evidence are not
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easily rejected. However, other members had problems with the executive on the
implementation of recommendations. This was resolved by the introduction of a
procedure for the executive to report back to O&S. All of the authorities now have
an action plan for the implementation of recommendations, which the OSMB
revisits periodically (usually every 6 months) to track the progress. Indeed all of
the authorities have, or are developing, formal and informal protocols to improve
communication between the executive and O&S.
In Authority A, the leadership attended the first meeting of O&S and when he is
available will attend more, invited or not. The informal OSMB also review the
cabinets’ agenda and are permitted to take formal questions to cabinet. In
Authority B the O&S Chair meets monthly with chief executive, the chairs and vice
chairs meet their respective portfolio-holders and directors on a monthly or bi-
monthly basis and the cabinet attend O&S meetings when requested. In Authority
C the representative of the executive attends all of the OSC meetings and reports
back to the cabinet. In Authority D there are no regular time tabled meetings with
executive, but the O&S Management said the chairs, vice chairs and the O&S
officers work on their relationship with the executive and the executive are “very
positive towards scrutiny”.
Member Involvement in Overview and Scrutiny
Having the right number of committed and able members participating in O&S is
essential to it being able to operate successfully. The elections for the unitary
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authorities resulted in significant changes to incumbent members with many being
deselected, failing to be elected and many new, less experienced, members being
returned. The Leadership of Authority A viewed this positively as there were many
new enthusiastic members, so despite the need for a certain degree of training for
the new members they would be coming fresh to O&S and not have the ‘baggage’
of the old committee system or how the districts operated O&S.
The O&S Management in Authority D commented that as the majority of the 98
members are either ex county or district Cllrs there were few completely new
members unaccustomed to O&S. With 88 members available (98 members less
10 executive members) they were confident they would have sufficient members
involved. Those who have been previously involved in O&S have been quick to
engage with O&S officers, but they have struggled to fill places on the first task
groups. Indeed, the O&S Leadership for Authority D said that they need to:
“raise the profile and consciousness of O&S with members who don’t get
sufficiently involved.”
In Authority B, the elections for the unitary authority returned approximately equal
thirds of former county council, former district council and new Cllrs. Of 116
available the O&S Chair indicated that was a “hardcore” of members involved in
O&S as there had been in the former county and district councils. Therefore
Authority B would also have to actively encourage members to become involved in
O&S.
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Unlike authorities A, B and D, Authority C did not increase the number of members
with the creation of the unitary authority. Authority C O&S Leadership suggested
that there were insufficient members involved in O&S as there were only 57
members available to participate. Indeed the O&S Management also questioned
the capacity of members as they met at least monthly for O&S and with their other
roles and responsibilities could be stretched at times.
Members identified three barriers to participation in O&S. Firstly, a former county
council member Authority A the explained that members lamented the passing of
the old committee system thought O&S was “pointless”. All the authorities have
had to work hard to convince members that O&S is worthwhile and once members
have become involved they have been persuaded of its potential to influence
decision makers.
Secondly, the overall reduction in Cllrs in the authority areas coupled with the
abolition of the district councils has increased the workload of the unitary Cllrs. For
example they may only wish to serve on a regulatory committee, such as planning.
With regard to capacity, one district member from Authority C stated that O&S was
“virtually like a full time job.”
Thirdly, another potential barrier to member involvement is the timing of meetings
and the time spent travelling to them in what are geographically large and rural
counties; not only at county hall but in other localities.
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The lack of guidance from the government also reflected their under-estimation of
the commitment required to work within O&S (Davis and Geddes, 2000; Stewart,
2003,). O&S is a very time-consuming activity, therefore the capacity for members
to partake in the process is always of concern and research has shown that many
members are unwilling to participate in the O&S process (Leach, 2001a; Fenwick
et al, 2003). It is important to highlight that O&S is not solely a function of
opposition members (Maer and Sandford, 2004; Snape, Leach and Copus, 2002).
In the view of the Chief Officer of Authority C, the Local Government Act 2000 had
introduced conflicting and contradictory roles for all members.
Political Balance and Interaction
The CfPS 4 principles of good scrutiny’ advocates that O&S should be, or should
try to be, non-political. The research by Leach (2010) recognises that members
beliefs and decisions are formed by their political ideology, but for O&S to function
effectively party politics should be avoided and that recommendations should be
achieved by consensus and without resorting to partisan votes. The majority view
amongst those interviewed was that O&S was non-political in their experience and
this has been achieved by having political balance on the OSC and through the
chairs of O&S re-enforcing this position. Three former district members from
Authority B perhaps summarize the position from all the case study authorities.
One member said :
“We’ve got political balance on our scrutiny panels. Now as far as I’m
concerned the function of scrutiny isn’t a political function at all.”
Another stated it was a matter of insisting that party allegiances are left to one side
and being:
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“willing to stand up and be counted and say your flag’s outside the chamber
and I want you to stack yours against mine and it worked brilliantly with the
new members.”
As one other Member succinctly put it:
“There is no politics. I don’t allow politics in scrutiny. We do not have a
whip, we pick our own programme and nobody interferes with us”.
The Effectiveness of Overview and Scrutiny
This chapter has examined various elements that are all important in the delivery
of O&S. The question of what makes for an effective O&S function has been
explored by a number of writers (Snape, 2002; Snape, Leach and Copus, 2002;
and Leach, 2002, 2009). The members and officers varied in their opinion on what
constitutes effective O&S, however there appears to be a number of steps or
conditions to effective O&S. Firstly, the O&S Management at Authority A links
effective O&S function to members ownership and understanding of the function:
“It is about members doing the things which they feel are the most
important because they are accountable for the organisation, they are
accountable for its effectiveness...”.
Also, the Leadership of Authority A relates effective O&S to the attitude of non-
executive members to their role in ensuring the effectiveness of the organisation
and its partners. Secondly, the leadership at Authority D places emphasis on the
relationship with the executive. Effective O&S is based on:
“a good constructive collaborative working relationship between the
executive and the scrutiny committees”.
In addition Authority A O&S Leadership sees an effective O&S function as one that
provides not only effective challenge, but is recognised and valued as a body that
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positively influences policy development. Thirdly, it is the strength of
recommendations - and whether they are adopted and implemented - that makes
O&S effective. Fourthly, as the O&S Management of Authority D commented, an
effective O&S should be able to review recommendations in 6 months or 12
months time and see that the outcomes have made a difference and/or added
value. A member from Authority B agrees that effective O&S should make a
difference to the lives of the communities that they represent by improving the
council as a whole. They stated that:
“If scrutiny is doing the job that the government set them up to do then they
are looking at things that affect people’s lives.”
Therefore effective O&S is that which makes a difference to the people the
authority represents and serves. As the O&S Chair at Authority B stated the role of
the Cllrs was once about obtaining value for money and now it is about “value for
people.” Finally, the outcome of the implementation might not be immediately
apparent as it may take some time for the recommendations to take effect. As a
member from Authority D said, it was difficult to determine if O&S was effective
because the effects would not be immediately noticeable:
“It’s really difficult to say they didn’t do a good job...it’s not an immediate
thing, you don’t click your fingers and tomorrow it’s happened. It’s more of a
long term process.”
Figure 30 summarises the characteristics that members and officers from the case
study authorities associate with effective O&S function.
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Figure 30: The Characteristics of an Effective Overview and Scrutiny Function as
Experienced by Members and Officers of the Case Study Authorities
The Role of Overview and Scrutiny
 Influences, challenges and reviews the decisions of the executive and
partners
 Reviews and develops policy
 Is open and transparent
 Is independent from executive
 Makes recommendations that are based on evidence and focused on
the delivery of outcomes.
Member Involvement
 Members lead the O&S function
 Understand the role of O&S
 Are non-political
 All political parties/independents are given the opportunity and have the
capacity to undertake O&S.
The Work Programme is
 Developed by members
 Aligned to the priorities of the authority and partners
 Balanced between overview (policy development) and scrutiny (review
of decisions)
 Achievable given the capacity of members and officers.
The Executive
 Does not unduly influence O&S
 Is open to challenge
 Formally hears and responds to recommendations
 Holds regular meetings with the O&S leadership and attends committee
meetings.
Officers
 Members will be supported by dedicated O&S officers
 Officers will not unduly influence members
 All officers in the authority understand the role of O&S.
Public Involvement
 O&S responds to the concerns of the public
 The public understand the role of O&S
 O&S is open to the public
 O&S has proper protocols in place for evidence gathering and the
treatment of witnesses.
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Overview and Scrutiny: The Lion that has failed to roar
With regard to the effectiveness of O&S it has been suggested that local
authorities and Cllrs have failed to fully utilise their power and influence and that
O&S was a “lion that has failed to roar” (Denham, 2009) and was put to those
interviewed. The majority view from all of the authorities was that O&S should not
be regarded as a lion although it could be strengthened by further legislation and
better resources more, but as the Authority A O&S Leadership emphasised O&S
power is only to influence. Indeed as the as the O&S Management from Authority
B suggested O&S should not be in anyway a roaring threatening lion, but more a
swimming with a friendly dolphin.
9.2.2 Process Conditions
Call-in
The ability to call-in a decision of the executive is arguably the only ‘power’ of
O&S. It is the most public mechanism for holding the executive to account and is a
measure of the relationship between O&S and the executive. It is also is the
opportunity for overt party political intervention in O&S.
The history of call-in in the four authority areas, however, was that it was used
very infrequently despite its potential; indeed of all of the district and county
council members interviewed they could only recall 2 or 3 actual call-ins per
authority. There were a number of reasons for this. Firstly, members thought that
the threat of call-in was more effective than the practice and that decision makers
were mindful of it. Secondly, members advocated early discussions between the
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executive and O&S before decisions were made to allow members the opportunity
to raise concerns rather than resorting to call-in. Therefore call-in was seen as a
failure of communication between the executive and O&S. Thirdly, most authorities
had placed restrictions on its use, as there was a desire to avoid conflict between
the executive and O&S and only use call-in as “a last resort” when other, more
informal, interventions have failed to resolve the issue. This approach to call-in
continues in the unitary authorities and the constitutions of all four unitary
authorities set out the rules regarding the use of call-in. While similar there are
some significant differences (see Figure 31).
All of the authorities constitutions state that call-in should only be used in
exceptional circumstances (e.g. when the executive failed to consider relevant
evidence when making a decision), members have 5 working days after the
publication of a decision to call it in and that urgent decisions are exempt from call-
in (i.e. that delaying the decision would harm the council’s or public’s interests).
The rules regarding who can make a call-in request is important to the
independence of O&S from the executive and to the extent party politics can
influence the motives for call-ins. In Authority C any member of an OSC whether a
Cllr or not (i.e. a co-opted layperson) can make the request, therefore an individual
is free to raise an objection to decision. In Authorities A and D the chair or any
three members of the relevant OSC can request a call-in. In this instance the chair
is using their authority or a number of members have to be concerned about a
decision of the executive arguably giving it greater legitimacy. Whereas in
Authority B it is the chair or vice chair or five members of the OSMB who are able
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to make a request, therefore an individual of an OSC in this authority would have
to convince the OSMB of the legitimacy of the call-in request. As the overwhelming
majority of the OSMB in this authority are from the majority party in reality an
individual would have to persuade the leadership of O&S itself. Significantly it will
be difficult for an opposition member either to make a genuine request or one
motivated by political mischief. It would be equally difficult for a majority party
member to object to their leaders’ decisions.
In all four authorities the call-in request is made via the monitoring officer, but only
in Authority A do they make the decision to proceed with the call-in request and
thus making it a decision of an impartial officer. In Authority D the decision to call-
in is made by a chair or vice chair of O&S only. The chair of the relevant OSC in
Authority C is the person who makes this decision keeping it within their remit and
independent of O&S Leadership. In Authority B this decision lies with the OSMB
and therefore the comments made above apply again. The ultimate ‘power’ of call-
in lies with the leadership of O&S and this brings into question the independence
of the OSMB, the chair/vice chair from the executive given they are all of the same
political party. To avoid the over use or perhaps improper use of call-in some of
the authorities have imposed restrictions above and beyond call-in only being
allowed in exceptional circumstances and not for urgent decisions. Authority A
limits the number of call in requests by individual members and OSC to 1
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Figure 31: Case Study Authorities’ Constitutional Procedural Rules for Call-In
Procedural
Rule
Authority A Authority B Authority C Authority D
Only in
exceptional
circumstances
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time limit 5 working
days after the
publication of
a decision
5 working
days after the
publication of
a decision
5 working
days after the
publication of
a decision
5 working
days after the
publication of
a decision
Who can call-
in
The chair or
any three
members of
the relevant
OSC
The chair or
vice chair or
five members
of the OSMB
Any member
of an OSC
(whether a
Cllrs or not)
The chair or
any three
members of
the relevant
OSC
To whom do
they request
call-in to
The
monitoring
officer (Head
of Legal &
Democratic
Services)
The
monitoring
officer (Head
of Legal &
Democratic
Services)
The
monitoring
officer
(Executive
Director of
Performance)
The
monitoring
officer
(Director of
Resources)
Who decides
to accept call-
in
The
monitoring
officer
The OSMB The chair of
the relevant
OSC
The chair or
any three
members of
the relevant
OSC
Other
limitations on
call-in
An OSC can
only call-in 2
decisions per
six months
A member
can only
make a call-in
request every
2 months
The OSMB
may only call-
in a maximum
of three
decisions per
three month
period
The council
may limit the
subjects of
call-in
None
Urgent
decisions
exempt
Yes Yes Yes Yes
request per 2 months and 2 per six months respectively. Whether this is to not
burden the monitoring officer who makes the decisions on call-in requests or to
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ensure members are certain of exceptionality of the executive decision. It could be
argued that it is another means to restrict the potential for party political motivated
call-ins. Similarly Authority B is limited to 3 call-in decisions per 3 months again is
a potential barrier to opposition members and dissenting majority members or a
reasonable control as to not have too many challenges to the executive. The full
council may decide that more subjects could be exempt from call-in in Authority C
and in Authority D there are none suggesting that the executive and authority as a
whole are more open to the challenge presented by call-in.
Public Involvement in Overview and Scrutiny
A central aim of the reform of political structures in local government was to make
decision making more transparent and the decision makers more accountable to
the public they represent and serve (ODPM, 1998). While OSC meetings are
open to the public and there are various representatives from schools, faith groups
and other interested parties co-opted onto OSC, all four case study authorities
have stated that none of the two-tier authorities had been particularly successful at
public engagement and that they need to improve public involvement in the O&S
process. Indeed, the Chief Officer of Authority A thought O&S is of public
engagement. Members had a varied experience of engaging with the public. A
member from Authority C expressed the view that public engagement was part of
successful O&S, but they emphasised that it had to be done “properly”. However
as a member from Authority D stated O&S was not something that the general
public were involved in. In their experience O&S targeted specific groups. They
explained that:
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“When we are doing our evidence seeking, digging as it were, there are
occasions when we need to involve and we invite people from community
areas and to give evidence on the issues we are looking at.”
Further to that view, members and officers from the case study authorities thought
the general public has little understanding of how councils work and even less
knowledge of O&S. A member from Authority B thought that this lack of interest
and awareness was due to the council not promoting O&S saying:
“the public perception of scrutiny I think is very hazy.”
Although a member from Authority A, highlighting the national political situation
regarding MPs expenses, saw it as an opportunity to raise the profile of O&S as
the term ‘scrutiny’ had never had so much publicity. When the public have become
involved in the issue under scrutiny it was because it was of interest and relevance
to them. Indeed, a member from Authority B suggested that the public’s priorities
were elsewhere suggesting that:
“the general public out there wouldn't notice if scrutiny's making any
difference to them or not. I mean all they are worried about is do the bins
get emptied regular, are the streets swept, is the dog dirt cleaned up”.
Concerning the choice of O&S topics, unlike some authorities, none of the 4 case
study authorities have a means for the public to suggest and/or select topics for
the O&S work programme. For example, the public could suggest topics via the
authority’s website or through the authority’s newspapers, libraries or offices.
Alternatively the public could vote for one topic from a short list, either suggested
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by members or the public, that have been determined to be achievable given the
member capacity. To this end Authority B Leadership wants to enable community
suggestions for O&S topics via the authority’s website and build community
engagement into the planning of O&S reviews.
A significant aspect of the 4 former county council’s bids for unitary status was the
desire to enhance the public’s involvement in the provision and running of services
provided or commissioned by the authorities and their partners. Therefore, with the
aim of enhancing the authorities ‘localism’ credentials each of the four case study
authorities have or are in the process of creating community networks in specific
localities in their areas and subsequently are seen as an opportunity for O&S to
engage with the public through them.
In Authority A, which is proposing 21 community networks, their relationship with
O&S is unclear. For the O&S Leadership at Authority A the networks are a means
for members to fulfil their community leadership role by helping to determine what
the community wanted out of the network. With regard to the link between O&S
and the networks they see it as O&S on a different level, effectively local O&S.
They would see it as a way of taking pressure off the main OSC. However, it
would place the members in the dual and, possibly conflicting role, of the
executive and O&S for their community network area. The Leadership of Authority
A said that members involved in O&S and the networks would be able to bring
local issues to the attention of O&S and the executive if it is of countywide,
strategic concern. However both the Chief Officer and the O&S Management of
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Authority A thought that the O&S role would be to help develop the networks and
to see if they are functioning.
The Leadership of Authority B suggested that their 14 local partnerships, once
they have identified the issues of local concern, will potentially have both the
executive and O&S functions as opposed to only being able to make
recommendations to the executive or partner organisations.
The Authority B O&S Leadership agrees that the local committees have a
“scrutiny” element in that the committee will undertake a review of an issue of local
concern and be able take action. The O&S Management of Authority B certainly
sees the local committees as having the opportunity to provide local challenge,
however as to whether that equates to O&S they remarked that could only be
viewed as sharing the methodology of O&S rather than its role at the boards would
be a subject of O&S investigation in the future.
Three area boards have been created in Authority C, which are made up of
members from that particular area. Authority C O&S Leadership said, specific
items are taken to the area boards and looked at in detail. If there are wider
implications for the whole authority they are fed back to the OSMC and reported to
the executive. Alternatively, O&S may refer local issues to the area boards.
Therefore, the area boards are independent of O&S, but have a close working
relationship with them. Area OSC were considered, but it was decided there would
be a capacity issue for members. Also, as Authority C Chief Officer explained,
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underneath the area boards 27 community forums will be established to involve
the local communities in the democratic processes of the council. However O&S
relationship to these community forums is to be determined, but may also be a
means to refer ‘parochial’ issues to the OSMC.
The Leadership from Authority D saw the creation of area boards for the unitary
authority as the main method of community engagement and one which could be
utilised by O&S. The O&S Management of Authority D said the relationship
between the area boards and O&S has not been established and a task group has
been set up to specifically look at how they can work together. Their
understanding was that the area boards would undertake local challenge and
service review, however they are not meant to undertake O&S work. The
Leadership from Authority D added that when an area board is not able to resolve
an issue such as a CCfA then it may also be referred to O&S to address. Certainly
a collaborative relationship is anticipated on consultations with the public.
9.2.3 Structure and Mechanism Conditions
The Development and Structure of Overview and Scrutiny
The CfPS (2006c) advocates that the O&S function is “member led” as a “principle
of good scrutiny”. The experience of members and officers in the case study areas
was that O&S had developed slowly over a number of years and that members
had played an ever increasing role in that development and now clearly led the
function in their authorities. The independent nature of the authorities in the two
tier system resulted in O&S functions tailored to the needs of their members.
Members were able to compare and contrast the various merits of their O&S
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functions when they came together on health (all two tier authorities had joint
health OSC) and ad hoc reviews such as transport (Authority B) and flooding
(Authority C). In addition, those members who were both district and county Cllrs
were able to experience firsthand the different approaches, strengths and
weaknesses. Members, especially in the districts were determined to promote the
benefits of their way of doing O&S and wished to see a merger of the best of the
district and county O&S functions as opposed to a ‘takeover’ by the county. Indeed
one member expressed the view that the county was inferior to the districts:
“scrutiny at the county council level wasn’t of the standard of the districts”.
As all of the shadow unitary authorities were required to establish an IE - to
oversee the implementation of the unitary authority - the former county councils
and district members formed a joint OSC to monitor the work of the IE. These
OSC became a natural vehicle for discussion and planning for the new unitary
authorities’ O&S function. All of the four case study authorities used them in this
way to varying degrees of influence and success.
In Authority A, a joint OSC brought together experienced O&S members from
across the county and districts. O&S members held a series of workshops with the
CfPS, IDeA and the local REIP and all the district and county cllrs (both executive
and non-executives) were invited to discuss the future of O&S and the CfPS wrote
a report to move forward the O&S function for the new authority.
Recommendations were made to, and accepted by, the IE.
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In Authority D the joint county and district OSC commissioned a local government
consultant from the CfPS to undertake a review of O&S in the authority area based
on the CfPS 4 principles of good scrutiny. Members from the districts and county
council were consulted and a report was compiled giving the consensus view and
officers discussed the practicalities of forming a new O&S function. The
recommendations were also accepted by the IE and adopted by the new unitary
council.
District members in Authority C’s area were especially keen to be involved in the
joint OSC of the IE and to address the future of O&S. In the research interviews
district members emphasised that difference between how the county council and
the districts undertook O&S. As one former district member stated their experience
of the O&S at the county council was primarily examining reports. District
members therefore saw the creation of the unitary authority as an opportunity to
change O&S at the county level. County and district members met and considered
the arrangements for O&S and district members were particularly concerned about
the structure and resources for O&S in the new unitary authority. However the
discussions between members and officers did not result in a document or plan
such as with authorities A and D. Therefore O&S in Authority C could be
considered as a continuation of the former county council’s approach. Authority B
had begun to address the move to unitary status and its impact on O&S sometime
before the transition period. The eight local authorities in the county had formed
member and officer networks and the officer network commissioned a PhD student
to evaluate the O&S function using the CfPS SEF. Interviews were conducted with
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chairs and vice chairs of O&S from each authority and surveys completed by other
stakeholders in O&S. The analysis identified the strengths of O&S and
development opportunities for the new authority. Recommendations were
developed into an action plan for the members and officers involved in O&S to
address and review during the early months of the unitary authority. In addition,
members were able to influence the development of O&S via scrutiny of the IE as
with authorities A, C and D.
Structure of Overview and Scrutiny
The focus of the Local Government Act (2000) was the creation of the new political
structures, which established executive leadership. In those early days of O&S
authorities were left in a position where the old committee system had been
disbanded and they had to develop an O&S structure that would allow members to
participate in holding to account the new executives as well as looking at issues in
depth to help develop policy. Research has shown that the government failed to
provide guidance as to how O&S should function other than the creation of a
single OSC for each authority (Copus, 2000, p.77, Johnson and Hatter, 2004, p.5).
However each authority, with guidance from bodies such as IDeA and CfPS, have
developed structures that meet the needs of their members and authority. The
structure of O&S in the two tier system reflected the size of the authority with most
adopting leader and cabinet model of the new political structures and the
remaining authorities choosing the 4th option. The main characteristics of the
structures for all of the case study unitaries were:
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 The larger authorities had a management board made up of the chairs and
vice chairs of the OSC
 Most authorities had 3 or 4 thematic committees or panels, which reflected
their service departments and/or their priorities
 The 4th option councils had one single OSC or divided O&S into two OSC
 Time bound task and finish groups were used to conduct in-depth or light
touch reviews on specific topics
 None of the authorities had divided their O&S function into separate
scrutiny and overview committees.
The structure of O&S post reorganisation for each of the case study authorities
can be seen in Chapters 5,6,7 and 8. The most significant differences between
them are that:
 Authority A has called the O&S committees ‘policy development and
scrutiny’ reflecting their interpretation of the term ‘overview’
 Authority A and B have aligned their OSC to the LAA themes
 Authority A has created an informal OSMB to co-ordinate the work of O&S
 Authority C has created a formal OSMB to co-ordinate the work of O&S
 Authority D uses the term select committee as they wish their committees to
operate like parliamentary select committees
 Authority D has established permanent task groups to annually review
major contracts.
These differences are all reflective of how members, with the guidance and
support of officers and such bodies as the CfPS, have shaped the structure of
O&S to meet their needs and interpretation of the role of O&S. For instance
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Authority A has previously not operated with a OSMB and has now introduced
one, albeit informally, to co-ordinate the work of O&S. The significance of this
informal arrangement is that they are not constrained by the council’s constitution
and free from any potential interference by leadership in choosing the overall chair
of O&S.
Overview and Scrutiny Work Programme
One of the 4 principles of O&S is the members lead the O&S process (CfPS,
2006c) and that is independent from the executive and other undue external
influence. The independence of O&S should be realised in the selection of topics
for the O&S work programme (see Figure 32 for examples of topics from the four 4
case study authorities’ work programmes). O&S receives suggestions from various
sources such as:
 Individual members
 The executive
 The chief executive, directors and other officers
 Representations from partners
 The cabinet’s forward plan, sustainable community strategy, local area
agreements
 The public.
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Figure 32: Examples of O&S Work Programmes from Case Study Authorities
Authority A Authority B Authority C Authority D
Health and Adults
 Review
outpatients
appointments
 Commissioning
Adult Care and
Support
 Patient
Transport
 Hospital Trust’s
Foundation
Status
Adults,
Wellbeing &
Health
 Mental health
day services
consultation
 Action to
reduce health
inequalities
 Transforming
social care
 Living with
Dementia
Care and
Wellbeing
 Carers
Strategy
 Supporting
People Action
Plan
 Emergency
Care Project
 Quarterly
Performance
Review
Health and Social
Care
 Care Pathway
for Older
People
 Autism
 Ambulance
Service
Response
Times
 End of Life
Care Strategy
Children
Education &
Families
 Transformation
of Children’s
Services
 Children’s Trust
Safeguarding
Children &
looked after
Children
 Primary Strategy
for Change
Children &
Young People's
 Anti-bullying
 Foster Care
and Foster
Carers
 Academies
and Building
Schools for the
Future
 Surestart
Family and
Children’s
Services
 Home to
School
Transport
 Surplus places
/ decline in
school
numbers
 Climbie Audit
Report
 SEN Provision
Children’s
Services
 Speech and
Language
Service
Provision
 Teenage
Pregnancy
 Primary School
Strategy
 Child &
Adolescent
Mental Health
Strategy
Corporate
Resources
 The Budget
 Performance
Management
Framework
 Internal
communications
 Member
communications
 Social media &
public
engagement
 Severance
Policy
Corporate Issues
 Discretionary
Rate Relief
 Harmonisation
of fees and
charges
 The Budget
 Performance
Reports
Economic
Prosperity and
Strategic
Services
 Facilities
Management
 Procurement
 Regeneration
 Tourism
O&S
Management and
Resources
 Service
Transformation
(HR)
 Harmonisation
of Staff Terms
and Conditions
of Employment
 Delivering
Customer
Focus
 Agency Staff
(and
consultancy)
Contract
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Figure 32: Examples of O&S Work Programmes from Case Study Authorities
continued.
Authority A Authority B Authority C Authority D
Communities
 Housing
Strategy
 Homeless
Strategy
 Sustainable
Communities
Act
 Gypsy and
Traveler sites
Environment &
Sustainable
Communities
 Waste strategy
 Grounds
maintenance
service review
 Winter
maintenance
strategy
 Street lighting
public finance
initiative
Communities
and Place
 Flood Action
Plan
 Mobile
Library
Services
 Climate
Change
Action Plan
 Customer
Service
Performance
Environment
 Gypsy &
Traveller
Service Review
 Car Parking –
harmonisation of
charging
 Climate
Change/Carbon
Trading
 Leisure Services
Environment and
Economy
 Unitary
Council’s
carbon footprint
 Developing
local transport
plan
 Creating a
green County
 Regeneration
and investment
of parks, lakes
and gardens
Safer & Stronger
Communities
 Communities
Libraries
 Anti-social
behaviour
services, focus
on public
places/spaces
 Social Inclusion
 Culture and
Leisure
Economy &
Enterprise
 Economic
Assessment
and Review of
Economic
Strategy
 Housing
 Participating in
review of
business
support
services
 Worklessness
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In Authority A each OSC determines its own programme with guidance from the
informal OSMC. The OSC chairs have a gate-keeping role to ensure that items are
prioritised:
 in line with the authority’s corporate plan
 as they will be able to influence the decision makers
 as they will make good use of their resources.
With regard to what topics they could choose, the O&S Management of Authority
A emphasised that there was a:
“non-political consensus amongst all members that where things are big
and are in need of fixing they need to be fixed”.
The priority for the O&S Chair was the council’s budget, whereas Authority A
Leadership said they required policy for the planning process, local development,
localism, waste management, the budget, health and social care. Finally, the Chief
Officer said that the authority needed to improve its performance and make
efficiencies.
The O&S Management of Authority B stated the work of O&S has to make a
difference and add value; therefore the work programme is developed within the
context of the sustainable community strategy, local area agreements, the council
plan, the cabinet’s forward plan and various other plans and strategies.
With the assistance of officers the members of the individual OSC are presented
with a long list of topics and after discussion a short list is compiled. Once a
consensus is reached in each committee it is considered by the OSMB, who will
look for areas of duplication, possibilities of cross-cutting reviews and capacity
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issues before it is then ratified. The O&S Management of Authority B did say they
were unable to recall when members have asked to scrutinise a specific issue.
Indeed, there is not a process where members can complete a pro-forma as to
suggest a topic for the work programme. Equally there is no direct consultation
with the public, although the Chief Officer of Authority B has stated the aim of
having an electronic mechanism for community suggestions via the authority’s
website.
The work programme at Authority C is a six month rolling programme determined
by members and co-ordinated by the OSMC. The OSMC looks at the forward plan
on a regular basis and tries to align their work to it. Members are asked for items
for consideration for the work programme and the executive have an input via
requesting that topics are considered for pre-scrutiny (policy development).
The experience of the Leadership of Authority C is that most if not all of the OSC
have far too full an agenda on occasions in order to do justice to their particular
role saying
“it would be better spent in considering fewer items in greater depth”.
This view chimes with that of the CfPS which advocates selecting topics to study
in depth (CfPS, 2004a). However they acknowledge that the executive should not
exert influence on the work programme and that the executive and O&S be
completely divorced.
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The Chief Officer of Authority C said with regard to the choice of topics for O&S
that they should be addressing issues:
“things like personalisation of social care, developing the local
development framework.”
Each service director within the resources team had had a meeting with the
members of the OSMRSC and presented the issues within the services for O&S to
consider for their work programme. Each of the select committees also had a
development day to identify the priorities and they have a ‘legacy report’ from the
transition into the new unitary authority which reflected the priorities of the districts
such as waste collection, leisure and housing. The O&S Leadership added that
the O&S Management was adept at identifying topics, but members were not
forthcoming with issues.
Research has shown that the O&S function has been more successful in overview
(policy development) than in scrutiny (holding to account) (Ashworth, 2003a;
Ashworth and Snape, 2004) Therefore the balance between the two aspects of the
O&S work programmes of the authorities is of interest as well as the topics that
have been chosen.
The Chief Officer of Authority A thought that there had been too much ‘scrutiny’ in
the past and that there should be a better balance between the two. However
Authority A Leadership argued that the new authority should have continued
having specific policy development committees where non-executives could
decide as opposed to just influencing policy. However, as mentioned above, the
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Chair argues that policy development should only be influenced by O&S and the
decisions on policy should remain with the executive as in the present constitution.
The O&S Leadership of Authority B thought that they have been able to achieve a
“good” balance between overview (policy development) and scrutiny
(performance), but had in opinion of the O&S Management the work programme
was concentrated too much on the wider strategic issues facing the authority.
The O&S Management of Authority C said that O&S in the former county council
has traditionally been post-scrutiny and they wanted to move more towards pre-
scrutiny of decisions. Indeed, the O&S Leadership from Authority C estimated that
only 25% of the work programme concerned policy development. The Chief Officer
of Authority C agreed that there should be more policy development. In their
opinion O&S started in a rather too adversarial way focusing more on scrutiny than
overview reflecting that the model for O&S was the parliamentary select
committees. They advocate that O&S is more effective when looking forward
developing policy rather than backward looking critising current or past decisions.
This was confirmed by the Leadership of Authority C who said that O&S:
“could be more focused on policy review and development.”
Members’ incentives to participate in O&S are through their desire to make
improvements for their constituents and because they may have a particular
interest or expertise in a subject under review. In addition, there are certainly (in
the case of Authority B) financial rewards for being a chair or vice chair of an OSC
although that may be too cynical a view of member’s motivation. Indeed to the
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contrary, the fact that the overall chair and vice chair receive the same or half of
an executive member’s allowances respectively; thus demonstrating that O&S has
parity with the executive in this aspect.
Allocation of Chairs and Vice Chairs
Research has shown that the ruling party’s (or coalition’s) policy of whether to
permit or not opposition chairs/vice chairs, has an effect on the O&S process and
its effectiveness (Ashworth and Hunt, 2003; Leach, Skelcher et al, 2003; Snape,
Leach and Copus, Leach, 2010). If it has been decided that majority party
members will chair the OSC then it can be argued that the executive will be able to
exercise influence, if not total control over what is supposed to be an independent
O&S function. The level of influence could determine what O&S topics are
selected for the work programme as well as reducing the challenge to executive
decisions and crucially the use of call-in.
Historically, under the two tier system the policy on the allocation of chairs varied
within - and across - the case study areas depending upon the political party in
control, the size of the authority, the willingness of the opposition to take the role of
chair or vice chair and the way in which the O&S had developed in line with best
practice as suggested by outside bodies; such as the CfPS (CfPS, 2006c).
Authority areas A, B, and C were most likely to appoint from majority parties,
however in Authority area D the common practice throughout the county was to
appoint opposition members even when they were few in number. For example,
one district appointed the single Labour party representative as the chair of O&S in
a council dominated by Conservatives.
287
The new unitary authorities have continued with previous practice. The policy of
the majority group in Authority B is one where leadership roles, chairs and vice
chairs are decided in full council (in effect the majority group room) and
predominantly allocated to the majority group members, indeed all bar one vice
chair of the OSCs are all from the majority Labour party. There are a number of
possible reasons for this policy. Simply that they are the ruling party, so they
should hold these positions, and also there are significant special allowances
attached to these positions so why would they offer them to the opposition? In
another minority controlled authority the chairs and vice chairs of OSC are also
decided by the full council, however the O&S chairs are appointed from the
opposition and therefore held by the minority parties.
In Authority A, the chairs and vice chairs of the OSC are selected from the ruling
coalition administration. They are chosen by the members of the individual
committees (as is the overall chair of O&S) and not the full council as in Authorities
B and C. This demonstrates a greater degree of independence of O&S from party
control, however recognising that membership of the committees can be
determined by, and between, parties in advance. Finally, Authority D also has an
opposition member as chair of the OSMB and the OSC elect their own chairs and
vice chairs, however the chairs are from the majority group and the vice chairs
from the opposition.
9.3 Assessing the Effectiveness of the Overview and Scrutiny Functions in
the New Unitary Authorities
The approach to O&S based on the experience of those interviewed, especially
the chief officers, authority leaders and O&S leaders which were of the same
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political group, would be “openness to challenge” (see Figure 33). They all
describe their “encouragement of and responsiveness to the work of O&S whether
it is critical or whether it involves policy recommendation” (Leech, 2009b, p35).
However, the analysis of the data leads to the conclusion that Authority B is
marginalised as the controlling group dominates the allocation of O&S chairs and
vice chairs (including the overall chair) and therefore the OSMB, which also
determines whether call-ins are accepted and the final O&S work programme. It
can be argued there is a clear “attempt to minimise the potential damage and
embarrassment that might emanate from the oppositions use of overview and
scrutiny by seeking to exert political control over it” (Ibid), especially as
dominance of the authority has been reduce to a slender majority of just eight
seats and thus leaving them in the minority in terms of those members available to
undertake O&S.
For the remaining three case study authorities, the analysis of the data leads to
the conclusion that while leaders and chief officers of these authorities clearly
“accentuate the positive aspects” of O&S, there is an increasing desire to
manipulate O&S by using it as a “consultative (and, where seen as appropriate a
policy development) mechanism” (Ibid). The authorities’ leaders are open to
scrutiny, but they argued the case for O&S to concentrate on policy development
and, in the case of Authority A, to determine policy for the authority. There are of
course varying reasons for this. In Authority A there is a desire by the newly
elected leadership for the authority to be inclusive and there was a pressing need
289
for new policies. For Authority C, the Chief Executive especially wanted less
reflective scrutiny and more assistance for the new minority political leadership to
determine policy for economically constrained times. Finally, Authority D, again
dominated by one party politically, also wanted more policy development but to
some degree has historically (in the experience of the O&S Chair) been used to
make difficult decisions for the executive or secure resources for the services.
Having stated the above, for the time being at least, all three O&S functions still
retain control of their work programmes, but will come under increasing pressure
from the executive to undertake policy development of their behalf as O&S has
more time to investigate an issue in depth.
Figure 33: Approach to Overview and Scrutiny by Ruling Party or Coalition in the
Case Study Authorities.
Unitary
Authority
Approach to Overview and Scrutiny by ruling party or
coalition
A B C D
Marginalisation – which involves an attempt to minimise the
potential damage and embarrassment that might emanate from
the oppositions use of overview and scrutiny by seeking to exert
political control over it.
   
Manipulation – which involves an attempt to accentuate the
positive aspects of overview and scrutiny, whilst minimising the
changes to the administration. Typically this approach uses
overview and scrutiny on a consultative (and, where seen as
appropriate a policy development) mechanism.
   
Openness to challenge – which involves an encouragement of
and responsiveness to the work of overview and scrutiny whether
it is critical or whether it involves policy recommendation.    
8
Adapted from Leach, S. (2009b, p.35)
8 As described by the Leaders of the case study authorities
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Leach describes various conditions for effective O&S and Figure 34 represents an
assessment of the case study authorities using these conditions.
Figure 34: Conditions for Effective Overview and Scrutiny in the Case Study
Authorities.
Unitary AuthorityAttitudinal Conditions
A B C D
Parties do not to use OS for party political points-scoring    
There are a limited number of high profile politically-divisive
initiatives which are not appropriate for an in-depth overview
and scrutiny review
   
It is recognised that OS will be influenced by political values
and priorities but not overtly    
The Executive takes seriously recommendations based on
evidence-based policy analysis and justifies the reasons for
their response
   
Overview and scrutiny is influential because it assembles and
interprets evidence in a responsible way    
Overview and scrutiny is properly supported by dedicated and
mainstream Officers    
Unitary Authority
Process Conditions
A B C D
Call-in is used responsibly, is not be invoked too easily and
meets specified criteria.    
Call-in is not limited to key decisions.    
An Officer adjudicates on whether a call-in meets the
criteria    
Executive Members attend call-in hearings to justify
decisions and answer questions    
A timetable enables OS Officers to collect evidence for call-
ins    
Call-in is facilitated by a setting other than a committee
room layout e.g. select committee style N/K N/K N/K N/K
The Select committee style is used for certain types of
review    
Spotlight/light touch reviews are used    
Minority Reports can be submitted    
OS Chairs present their findings to the Executive and
answer questions    
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Figure 34: Conditions for Effective Overview and Scrutiny in the Case Study
Authorities continued
Unitary AuthorityStructures and Support Mechanisms A B C D
OS has the ability and funds to access objective technical
information and expert witnesses    
The authority has link Officers in their authority to facilitate
OS    
The authority has a scrutiny champion at a senior level    
Chairs of OS committees/panels are shared amongst all
parties with significant representation    
There is an OS co-ordination committee to counterbalance
the Executive    
There is a structural separation between the ‘scrutiny’ and
‘overview’ roles    
Adapted from Leach, S. (2009b, pp.36-38)
9.4 Conclusions
This chapter has brought together the evidence gathered and presented in
chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 and compared and contrasted the individual experiences of
the four case study authorities. It has also highlighted any cross-authority
implications with regard to the research questions listed at the beginning of the
thesis. The next chapter address the wider implications of these findings on the
effectiveness of the O&S function and New Labour’s modernisation agenda.
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Chapter 10 Conclusions
10.1 Introduction
This chapter seeks to draw conclusions on the effectiveness of the O&S function
and the wider issues of New Labour’s modernisation agenda based on the key
findings made by this research. This thesis has demonstrated the ways in which
the unitary authorities have developed their O&S functions and, to a greater or
lesser degree, fulfilled the criteria and conditions espoused by academic research
and practitioners in the public sector. Therefore the following conclusions can be
made.
10.2 Conditions for an Effective Overview and Scrutiny Function
The four case study authorities have demonstrated that they have developed an
O&S function for their authorities based on the culture of O&S that evolved since
its uncertain inception back in 2000 in the former county councils and, to a lesser
or greater degree, by that which evolved in the former district councils. Some have
gone further than others to evaluate the state of the O&S function prior to the
establishment of the unitary authorities (Authority B p.175 and Authority D p.242).
While only cosmetic changes have been made in one authority more significant
restructure has taken place in others. One of the most contrasting differences is
the number of dedicated O&S officers each has and the dedicated budget they are
able use for their activities and investigations. The resources, member
involvement, the attitude of the leadership towards O&S and the profile and
understanding that the public has of the role of non-executive members all
determine the effectiveness of the O&S function, which in turn will determine
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whether it achieves the aims of New Labour’s modernisation agenda of
transparent and accountable leadership directly or indirectly delivering services to
meet the needs of their public.
However, the effectiveness of O&S is difficult, if not impossible, to measure
(London Assembly, 2009). Arguably the only measure of effectiveness of O&S is
its power of influence over service providers and policy makers, be they internal or
external, and this can only be measured by the number of recommendations
accepted and implemented. In terms of measuring the outcomes of an O&S
recommendation that has been implemented, an authority may be able to count
the increase in the users of library services or fewer incidents of fly tipping.
Alternatively the effectiveness of O&S could be measured by the number of
members of the public attending an O&S consultation event or it could be the
numbers of members involved in the function. As described above there are many
criteria or conditions that may enable O&S to be effective and the following are
those which this research has found to be the most significant.
10.2.1 The Structure of Overview and Scrutiny Reflects the Culture of the
Authority
It could have been argued that with the financial resources and officers available
to the county councils they had had the ‘better’ O&S functions so why would they
seek to change it? Each of the unitary authorities has developed an O&S function
that meets their own political culture and reflects the development of O&S under
the two tier system (Authority A p.143, Authority B p.178, Authority C p.214, and
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Authority D p.245). For example, they all utilise some form of management board
and thematic committees, however for three of the case study authorities the O&S
structure has changed little from that which was all ready in place in the former
county councils. Only one, Authority A, has appeared to adopt new approaches to
O&S. At the district council tier within the area of Authority A there was a culture of
co-operation and consensus as the majority of authorities were NOC and had
significant representation of independent Cllrs. The culture of co-operation and
consensus within the unitary authority as a whole and not just O&S was an aim of
the new leader. Also that the informal chair of O&S was a former district Cllr
resulted in the O&S function being seen as an amalgamation of the best of the
former district and county council functions and not just a continuation of the
former county council’s O&S function. In contrast, the results of the elections
before unitary Authority C was established, resulted in a change of political control
from a majority controlled council to a minority administration, but has not resulted
in a major restructuring of O&S.
10.2.2 A Positive Attitude Towards Overview and Scrutiny is Required from
the Leadership Leadership, Both Political and Officer, of an Authority.
The research has shown that leaders and chief officers of the case study
authorities understand the role of O&S (Authority A p.146, Authority B p.182,
Authority C p.216, and Authority D p.249). This has a bearing on the effectiveness
as they can have an influence on the activities of O&S, their work programme, the
officer and financial resources for O&S and the effectiveness of call-in.
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10.2.3 The Overview and Scrutiny Function should be Independent of
Influence from the Executive
The work programme should be determined by O&S (Snape, 2002; CfPS, 2006;
Leach, 2009). In this case study leaders and chief officers were open to and saw
the value of O&S, but were keen to promote the role of policy development as a
more worthwhile occupation for non-executive members. If the executive (or policy
committee) have too great an influence on the O&S work programme then OSCs
will risk becoming sub committees of the executive (or policy committees) and
consequently lose their independence. This was especially the case in Authorities
A (p.144) and C (p.214), when it was argued they had a greater need for policy
development given the change in political leadership of the authority and the
failure of previous policies to deliver services to the requirements of internal and
external assessment. It was also the view that if O&S played a significant role in
policy development it would be more inclusive as more members would be
involved than just the Executive. This was more so the desire of Authority A
Leadership.
10.2.4 Internal and Inter Party Politics Affects the Overview and Scrutiny
Function
All of the authorities strive to exclude party politics from O&S. As has been shown
this is deemed to be good practice in that O&S should make recommendations
based on consensus (Snape, Leach, and Copus 2002; Leach, 2009) . However
with a majority of Cllrs one party or coalition can impose whatever structure they
wish and even more so if leadership of O&S is the same political group as the
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executive. In Authorities B and D have for some considerable time always been
dominated by one political party. The expectation is that where the majority party
controls the executive and non-executive functions that O&S will be manipulated,
however internal party politics can also result in robust holding to account although
this is less likely if non-executive members wish to further their political careers. In
Authorities A (p.145), C (p.216), and D (p.247) opposition chairs and vice chairs
had been a part of their O&S functions for some time, however in Authority B
(p.182) all chairs and vice chairs of all OSC (with the exception of one
independent member who was previously from the same majority party) the
majority party does dominate O&S. While clearly dividing the two roles, the fear of
Authority B (p.182) was that allowing opposition members to chair OSC would in
itself make the O&S function an opposition to the executive rather than its ‘critical
friend’.
In addition, where opposition members contribute to the leadership of O&S
through being a chair or vice chair then their colleagues are much more likely to
participate in the O&S function. However if their perception, never mind the reality,
is that the majority party controls O&S than they are less likely to participate let
alone suggest O&S topics. Also if their only ‘power’ of call-in is limited by
restrictive criteria then opposition members will act party politically as opposed to
trying to work non-politically.
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10.2.5 Non-Executive Members have to Participate in Overview and Scrutiny
The effectiveness of O&S depends upon the involvement of all non-executive
members from the majority and opposition parties and independents (Leach, 2002
and 2009; Snape, 2002; Snape, Leach, and Copus, 2002; Sandford and Maer,
2004; CfPS, 2006). The vision for O&S is that the greater the diversity of views
and opinions that can be aired in a non-political forum will lead to
recommendations that are based on consensus and will have more success
influencing the executive (or policy committee).
With regard to member capacity, the age and experience of members is changing.
All of the case study authorities reported significant numbers of new, or nearly new
Cllrs who had no or little experience of the committee system (Authority A p.135,
Authority B p.168, Authority C p.205, and Authority D p.235). Equally some had no
experience of O&S, but they came with no ‘baggage’ and no expectation of being
able to make decisions as opposed to only being able to influence them. Training
is on offer to members who are not experienced, either as Cllrs, and specifically in
O&S. Also the demise of the districts as a second tier of local government focused
on delivering services to a smaller population has resulted in a democratic deficit.
That is too say the overall net loss of Cllrs has resulted in fewer non–executive
members being able to investigate, what is often negatively referred to as
localised, parochial issues. With unitary authorities now focused on the strategic,
which was the role of the county councils before them, a locally focused tier of
O&S has been lost. For example, will a unitary O&S review the provision of public
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toilets in a particular village? Of course localised issues such as these could be
resolved using CCfA or the community forums.
10.2.6 The Provision of Dedicated Overview and Scrutiny Officers and a
Discretionary Budget is Essential
The provision of dedicated O&S officers and a discretionary budget was of
significant concern to all of the authorities and is reflective of the academic
research and practitioner experience. Non-executive members are dependent
upon dedicated officer support of the O&S function and adequate financial
resources if they are to fulfil their role (Stewart, 2003; Sandford and Maer, 2004;
Leach, 2005). This research has shown that it is this which will inhibit the capacity
of most members to undertake O&S of the topics they want to investigate and give
them the independence from rest of the officer corps (Authority A p.131, Authority
B p.163, Authority C p.200, and Authority D p.231).
10.3 Further Conditions for Effective Overview and Scrutiny
On the basis of the experience of the case study authorities, there are a number of
other conditions that could be added to those used by Leach (see Figure 35).
These have been identified through the experience of the researcher working with
one of the case study authorities, the evaluation of the same authority area’s O&S
functions using the CfPS SEF, as well as the experiences of those interviewed.
While the conditions advocated by Snape (2002), CfPS, (2006) and Leach (2009)
are ones which most well developed and supported O&S functions should be able
to achieve, the conditions that I suggest reflect how the O&S function has evolved
and that there are more ways in which its effectiveness can be demonstrated.
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For example, O&S would be seen to be more effective if opposition members were
allocated positions as chairs or vice-chairs of OSC. Indeed, the ultimate aim would
be for the overall chair to be an opposition member. It is suggested that instead of
making O&S an opposition to the mxecutive it would encourage more opposition
members to participate in non-political debate in O&S rather than being engaged
in party politics in the council chamber. Another example would be for the public to
become engaged in O&S by suggesting topics for the O&S work programme. This
would clearly demonstrate that O&S members were reflecting the concerns of their
communities. O&S could also demonstrate its effectiveness by promoting its work
through the local media as well as the authority’s website and publications. By
participating in O&S member and officer networks and conferences authorities can
show that they are sharing best practice and therefore are constantly aiming to
improve the function. Given that O&S, like all local government functions, are
under financial pressure and competing for diminishing resources then I suggest
the more ways O&S can demonstrate its effectiveness the more likely members,
officers and the public will value its role.
10.4 Reflecting upon New Labour’s Local Government Modernisation
Agenda
This thesis has described how local government has for the last 30 years or more
been reformed, eroded and undermined, while local and central government have
become less able at resolving the ‘wicked issues’ of an increasingly complex and
globalised society and economy (see chapter 2). A network of public,
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Figure 35: Further Conditions for Effective Overview and Scrutiny
Condition Adds to the effectiveness of O&S by:
The chair of the OSMB is an opposition
Member.
Making O&S leadership independent of
ruling party or coalition and encouraging
non-political O&S.
Opposition members are allocated a
proportion of chairs and vice chairs of
committees.
Encouraging participation of opposition
members and non-political O&S.
There are protocols for engagement
with:
 The executive
 External partners
 Witnesses.
Facilitates good communication and
establishes the relationship between
O&S and other stakeholders.
There is a written criteria for the
nomination and selection of O&S topics.
Aligning the O&S work programme to
the priorities of the authority.
There is a time limit for the ruling party
or coalition to give a written response to
recommendations.
Ensuring a formal response to the work
of O&S.
There is an action plan for the
implementation of recommendations.
Identifying by whom, how and when
recommendations will be implemented.
There is a review of the implementation
of recommendations after 6 and/or 12
months.
Ensuring recommendations are
implemented.
Having permanent and/or ad hoc co-
optees on committees.
Involving the public in O&S.
The public suggesting and/or selecting
O&S topics.
Involving the public in O&S.
O&S holding meetings outside of the
authority’s main buildings.
Being seen to conduct O&S in the
community.
The authority promotes O&S via
 Dedicated O&S pages on authority
website
 Articles in authority publications
 Press releases to local media
 O&S annual report.
Raising the profile of O&S.
The authority participates in
 O&S member/officer networks with
other authorities
 Training internally and externally,
e.g. CfPS and IDeA
 Conferences locally, regionally and
nationally.
Continuing to improve knowledge, skills
and share best practice.
O&S forms joint OSC with other
authorities on specific issues, e.g.
health and public transport.
Being able to address issues of concern
across authorities.
O&S has a relationship with area/local
community boards/forums.
Being able to respond to localised
issues as well as the strategic.
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private and voluntary organisations work in partnership to provide public services
in a system of local governance. Democratic local representation and leadership
still has a role to play and New Labour has attempted to reinvigorate local
democracy and rebalance the centre-local government relations. Three areas that
New Labour focused upon were new localism, accountability and public
participation which are all linked to the O&S function.
New Localism
With regard to local and central government relations new localism emerged as an
issue for New Labour in their second term of office (see pp.6-8). Having further
centralised control of local government in their first term they decided that central
government needed to allow more localised decision making and policy
implementation, but ‘constrained’ within a national framework. Is there a direct link
between O&S and new localism? The case study authorities all emphasised their
commitment to O&S and, with the development of new community forums or
partnerships within defined localities, to ‘new’ localism. When questioned about
the relationship between O&S and the new community forums the interviewees
thought that they were two separate functions. O&S is a member led process that
represents the community’s interests when making recommendations to influence
decisions and policy. Whereas the community forums aim to involve the general
public by delegating executive decision making powers and resources to localities.
Arguably, while they may use similar methods in investigating an issue (i.e.
consultations, site visits, and questioning service providers) the public will be more
attracted to ‘new’ localist arrangements rather than O&S.
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Having espoused the virtues of ‘new’ localism, New Labour’s decision to abolish
district councils and create unitary authorities in the English shire counties serving
larger geographical areas (primarily for reasons of economies of scale) and to (at
a time when localism of one form or another is being promoted by all political
parties) is contrary to the old orthodoxy of localism (i.e. that democratically elected
representatives of a local area deliver and/or commission services that are
responsive to local needs). However, some local authorities argue that unitary
status for the English shire counties positions them as the strategic local
government in their areas (Stoker and Wilson, 2004). Arguably, for O&S this
enables them to undertake O&S investigations and reviews of external partners in
the areas such as health, policing, employment and regeneration with greater
authority. Therefore, this research suggests that despite New Labour’s desire to
show its new localist credentials the abolition of the district councils and the
creation of O&S are seen by the public and elected representatives alike as a step
backwards and a small step forward respectively. In contrast, the community
forums offer the prospect of a stride forward in terms of being able to make - and
not just influence - the decision making and policy process on issues which are of
importance to their locality.
Accountability
There are a number of forms of accountability in local government, which were
outlined in chapter 1 (see pp.8-9). The focus of this research has been the new
political structures and how the executives are held to account. Compared to the
long history of local government in the UK the new political structures are still in
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their childhood. The old committee system survived for 100 years before, after
many years of debate, it was deemed to be ineffective. New Labour aimed to
make local government transparent, accountable and efficient (ODPM, 1998). The
new political structures transferred decision-making to a select number of local
authority members and, while it may have been unwanted, non-executive
members have grown into their role of ‘scrutineers’ and their remit and powers
have widened from internal O&S of local authorities to encompass external
organisations who provided public services. Indeed, as more services are
delivered by partners and other providers that cross organisational and authority
boundaries there are more interested parties in holding those providers to account.
Subsequently, local authority members are described as being part of a “web of
accountability” through:
 The public
 The media
 The market
 Complaints
 Regulators
 Management/executive
 Lay scrutineers (including elected members) (CfPS, 2010f, p.3).
The CfPS describe the “web of accountability” as a process led by elected
members which is an “informal, collaborative approach, which focuses on
complementary working, dialogue and shared interests that is the best model for
the future” (Ibid). The significance being that elected members can relate the
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accountability process to the public given their position in the community. The
extent to which the public become directly involved in holding decision makers and
services providers to account is dependent upon the individual’s willingness to
become involved and by the efforts made to engage them. However as locally
elected representatives become more involved holding to account an ever growing
spectrum of decision makers, policy makers and service providers, it is uncertain
as to whether they can achieve their primary role of holding to account their own
executives. Internal and intra party politics is a barrier to effective O&S (arguably
the biggest) as is maintaining a sufficient level of dedicated officer support and
financial resources to allow non-executive members and co-optees the capacity to
undertake effective O&S.
Public Participation
As noted earlier in chapter 1 (pp.3-5) increased public participation in local
democracy has been a central aim of New Labour’s modernisation agenda.
Modern Local Government: In Touch with the People (DETR, 1998) and
Communities in Control: Real People, Real Power (DCLG, 2008) are just two
primary examples from a whole plethora of whitepapers, guides and policy
documents throughout New Labour’s time in office on increasing public
participation in local and national governance and renewing local democracy.
Communities in Control: Real People, Real Power stated that the government
wanted to:
“pass power into the hands of local communities. We want to generate
vibrant local democracy in every part of the country and to give real control
over local decisions and services to a wider pool of active citizens” (DCLG,
2008, p1).
305
It identified O&S as way in which the public could actively participate in local
governance, but highlighted the need to improve the public’s awareness of the
function. It would do this by encouraging:
 Large scale citizen engagement forums
 Moving committee meetings and hearings out of the town hall
 Webcasting
 Greater public involvement in suggesting and selecting topics for review
 Making information more readily available and accessible on websites and
at council offices
And by:
 Further enhancing the powers of overview and scrutiny committees in local
authorities to require information from partners on a broader range of issues
 If necessary providing councils in areas with district and county councils
with a power to combine resources in ‘area’ scrutiny committees
 Requiring some dedicated scrutiny resource in county and unitary councils”
(Ibid, pp. 90-91).
The research for this thesis has shown that the case study authorities have been
either ahead of the government in implementing the above or are still have
someway to go to meeting them. The literature shows that participation can be
limited by the rules and procedures of each organisation; whether organisations
are responsive to the needs and expectations of those participating; if the
participants are acting as a representative of a social group or as an individual or
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they are participating in the democratic process as opposed to being part of a
purely consultitative process (Barnes, Newman, and Sullivan, 2004). O&S in the
case study authority areas has been successful in attracting public participation,
but that has been when the issue has been of immediate concern, such as flood
management or hospital provision. The experience of those interviewed was that
O&S could do more to engage the general public, and that the community forums
could be one means of doing so. However the community forums are a
consequence of local authorities’ efforts to fulfil their new localist credentials,
contained in their applications for unitary status, rather than improving public
participation in accountability. As long as the ‘public’ are only asked for their views,
experiences and expertise when O&S seeks them out; that they can only influence
and that influence is filtered through the O&S function itself, then the public are
more likely to reserve their participation for forums where they can make decisions
and have access to financial resources. What is certain is that O&S is a new form
of public participation in local government that has yet to be fully evaluated.
10.5 Theorising Overview and Scrutiny
The findings of the research can be analysed to produce a ‘grounded theory’ as to
the effectiveness of O&S. Namely, that effective O&S is dependent upon the
positive attitude of the participants, the agreed process and the structure and
mechanisms in place that demonstrably support and value the role of O&S as an
influence on internal and external decision makers and service providers. The
analysis of the data on each of the case study authorities suggests the following
hypothesis (or at least predictions):
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 The effectiveness of O&S for all authorities will be dependent upon all of the
authorities ability to retain their current levels of dedicated officer support
 The effectiveness of O&S for all authorities will be dependent upon all of the
authorities’ ability to increase the number of non-executive members
involved in O&S
 Authority A is the most non-partisan, however it has potential difficulties
with the executive as it wishes O&S to develop policy rather than influence
 Authority B may find it increasingly difficult to maintain majority party
dominance of the allocation of chairs and vice chairs and will eventually
benefit from allocating some to minority parties and independents
 Authority C at the time of the research was the most partisan and has the
potential for more disagreement with the executive
 Authority D may have the most difficulty in encouraging members to
participate due to the large majority of the controlling party. Those members
from the party in control that participate in O&S may continue to use it
resolve internal party issues.
10.6 The Overview and Scrutiny Research Agenda
This research has added to the current knowledge by identifying and comparing
what new unitary authorities have done to ensure an effective O&S function. The
findings of this thesis suggest further areas for research. Firstly, research could
focus on the O&S function and its relationship with the general public, specifically
how O&S engages the public to suggest topics for investigation, as sources of
evidence and whether they are able to influence decisions that affect their lives.
This could also include O&S relationship with the community forums as a means
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of understanding the O&S function place in ‘new’ localism. A second area for
research could be a longitudinal case study of the implementation of O&S
recommendations to determine if the effectiveness of O&S can indeed be
measured. This thesis has shown the range of issues that the case study
authorities have planned to address through their work programmes. Therefore a
third area for research would be a comparative study of how local authorities
select topics for, develop, organise, resource and deliver their work programmes
and the demands that places on member and officer capacity. It would also be of
interest to see how the delivery of work programmes is dependent upon joint
working with other authorities, external agencies, service providers and the
general public. As all local authorities are having to justify all areas of expenditure
including the officer and financial resources allocated to the O&S function these
suggestions for additional research could be of benefit to local authorities when
prioritising expenditure, resource allocation and furthering the development of the
O&S function.
10.7 Postscript
The results of general election of 2010 and the intentions and actions of the
Conservative and Lib Dem coalition raise various questions as to the future of
O&S. Firstly, in a response to the imposition of the political structures on local
authorities by New Labour the Conservatives made a commitment to “allow
councils to decide what particular structure they wish to adopt – including a return
to the Committee system if they wish” (Conservative Party, 2009, p.21). The Local
Government Bill 2010-11 outlines the options as:
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 A leader and cabinet
 An executive mayor and cabinet
 A committee system
 Another prescribed system (councils may propose their own system,
subject to Secretary of State approval) (CfPS, 2010b, pp.1-2).
Those authorities that chose to maintain an Executive function will be required to
have at least one scrutiny committee and those which choose to return to the
committee system will be required to have “one or more scrutiny committees”
(CfPS, 2010d, p.3). With regard to the committee system this has been envisaged
as “a more streamlined model, more akin to the ‘fourth option’” (CfPS, 2010b, p.2)
The advantages and disadvantages of the committee system have been described
above (Chapter 3), but it is said that a return to the committee system would
ignore that the culture of local authorities has changed as well as the political
structures. It is argued that:
 The committee system would leave councils ill-equipped to handle
proactive cross-partnership decision-making
 Decisions will be reached in silos by committees lacking strategic co-
ordination
 (There would be) additional costs through transition and operation of a
committee system and potential loss of relevant skills if the resource needs
of the system are not properly planned
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 Councils will overlook the need to build into their new arrangements open,
deliberative forums such as scrutiny that demonstrate accountability and
provide the public with opportunities to effect change and influence services
(Ibid, pp.8-13).
It will be of interest to see how many local authorities adopt or return to the
committees system. It has been well documented that council members were
dissatisfied with the loss of decision making power the committees afford them.
However, the passage of time has meant that a new generation of members have
been elected to councils and have not had experience of the committee system,
therefore how likely are they to want to adopt it and, perhaps more importantly,
how likely are executive members willing to give up their position of power. Indeed
if the committee system is allowed to return how will it be justified on the grounds
of transparency, accountability and efficiency the very reasons for New Labour’s
approach to LGMA?
Secondly, with some confusion and lack of understanding on the part of the
coalition and the public David Cameron has heralded the ‘Big Society’ which “is
about helping people to come together to improve their own lives. It’s about putting
more power in people’s hands – a massive transfer of power from Whitehall to
local communities” (Cabinet Office, 2011).
This appears to be the Conservatives advance on ‘new localism’ as they want
communities to take over the running of services, such as libraries, and have more
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decision making power in areas such as planning. Rather than diminish the role of
O&S as being a means to reflect the concerns of the public it will be an opportunity
for O&S to:
play a role locally, in mediating between local people who want to exercise
their right to take power, with the council, who may have concerns about
that power being used to benefit all citizens in the locality. Scrutiny can
provide a neutral forum for debates between different actors on issues of
power and control, and can make recommendations accordingly... This is
not only to enhance its credibility, but to make it easier for the function to
cope with the atomisation of decision-making and the control of policy by a
multitude of different people and organisations, by involving a wider range
of interested parties in a proportionate and well-planned manner (CfPS,
2010e, p.11).
It is noticeable that the CfPS highlight the potential for the ‘Big Society’ to be
another group of service providers and decision makers to scrutinise.
The role of O&S with regard to the Coalition’s new localism agenda has been
raised by report of the House of Commons Communities and Local Government
Committee (2011). It states that O&S as a:
“specific tool for local accountability has received little attention…. local
authorities themselves, and others, viewed effective scrutiny by non-
executive councillors as a necessary complement to greater local discretion
and less central oversight” (HCCLGC, 2011, p.34).
The report acknowledged the CfPS case that O&S is “credible, legitimate and
proven to have genuine impact on services” (Ibid) and that elected representatives
have the skills and abilities to undertake wider O&S roles than non-elected
scrutinneers. The committee was also concerned that local authorities may be
allowed resurrect the old committee system.
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Thirdly, the cuts in public spending will have a significant impact on local
government and there will be some difficult and contentious decisions to be made
by local authorities. Therefore it is recommended that:
 (O&S) will provide an objective and robust forum for debate around cuts or
service changes
 Executives can and should be encouraged to see scrutiny as a place to test
assumptions they make around service delivery and as a neutral broker
between the council, its partners, and local people
 (O&S) could more rigorously use value for money (VFM) methodologies to
evaluate services, or policy development ideas
 Scrutiny could also apply cost-benefit analyses to proposals, or to its own
recommendations, to test them
 Scrutiny can continue to scan the policy horizon for the authority and its
partners, and to examine the long-term ramifications for decisions being
taken (CfPS, 2010b pp.4-5).
The financial situation is an opportunity for O&S to prove its worth. If non-
executive members can show, through non-political, consensual, evidence based
recommendations, that savings and/or improvements to services through better
informed policy and decision making can be made, then the executive will see
O&S as effective and the public may come to understand and value the function.
The danger will be that O&S will spend all its time undertaking VFM type
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investigations, which will potentially bring O&S too close to the executive’s agenda
and member’s will lose interest due to repetition.
Finally there other changes with which O&S will have to adapt. For example,
 The cuts in public finance will affect the officer support and dedicated
budget for O&S
 Shared provision of services between authorities will require more joint
O&S work
 The abolition of the CAA, national indicators of performance, the Audit
Commission and the emphasis on ‘Total Place’
 Elected police commissioners require scrutiny
 Scrutiny of the GP consortia and the commissioning of health services
following the abolition of the PCTs.
In summary, there are many challenges facing local authorities and the O&S
function itself. However the culture of O&S has been embedded in local authorities
and despite moves to return to old practices, there is the opportunity for O&S to
show its effectiveness in ensuring transparency, accountability and efficiency in
local authorities and the wider provision of public services. As ever the question
of whether members can fulfil the ever growing scope, if not demand, for their
services. What is certain, as alluded to earlier, the term “scrutiny” has never had
so much exposure and is now firmly part of the political lexicon as never before.
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Abbreviations
ACE Assistant Chief Executive
BV Best Value
CAA Comprehensive Area Assessment
CCfA Councillor Call for Action
CCT Compulsory Competitive Tendering
CfPS Centre for Public Scrutiny
CLLR(s) Councillors(s)
CPA Comprehensive Performance Assessment
DCLG Department for Communities and Local Government
DETR Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions
FTE Full-time Equivalent
GLC Greater London Council
GOSW Government Office South West
HLDS Head of Legal and Democratic Services
IE Implementation Executive
IDeA Improvement and Development Agency
JOSTB Joint Overview and Scrutiny Transition Board
LAA Local Area Agreement
LGA Local Government Association
LGMA Local Government Modernisation Agenda
LGR Local Government Reorganisation
LSOA Lower Super Output Area
NOC No Overall Control
NPM New Public Management
ONS Office for National Statistics
O&S Overview and Scrutiny
OSC Overview and Scrutiny Committee
OSMB Overview and Scrutiny Management Board
OSMC Overview and Scrutiny Management Committee
OSMRSC Overview and Scrutiny Management and Resources Select
Committee
OSP Overview and Scrutiny Panel
PCT Primary Care Trust
PSC Parliamentary Select Committees
REIP Regional Efficiency and Improvement Partnership
SEF Self Evaluation Framework
SOA Super Output Area
VFM Value for Money
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Appendix A
Interview Questions for Chairs of O&S for SEF (Authority B)
1. How long have you been a Cllr and how long have you been involved in
Scrutiny?
2. What do you see your role as a Chair of Scrutiny?
3. How is Scrutiny Structured in your Council? (inc. Officer support/Times of
meetings/Public involvement)
4. Please can describe the function and purpose of Scrutiny?
5. Can you describe an example of good Scrutiny that you have been involved
in?
6. How are the recommendations made by Scrutiny received by the
Executive?
7. How can the effectiveness of those recommendations be measured?
8. How does Scrutiny make a difference to the lives of the communities and
people you represent and serve?
9. How does Scrutiny effectively engage with people?
10.What should be the priorities for scrutiny in the new authority?
11.The new authority will have 116 Non-Executive Cllrs. What role should they
have in Scrutiny? What structure should be in place?
12. Is Scrutiny non-political? Have the minority parties been able to fully
participate?
13.Would a change in the political balance of the new authority effect the way
scrutiny operates?
14. Is there anything else you’d like to add?
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Appendix B
Interview Questions for District and County Council Members
1. How long were you a CC/District Cllrs? How long were you involved in
Scrutiny?
2. What was/is purpose of Scrutiny? What was your role in Scrutiny?
3. How was Scrutiny Structured in your Council? (inc. Officer support/Times of
meetings/Public involvement)
4. What was the relationship like with the Executive? How were the
recommendations made by Scrutiny received by the Executive?
5. Was scrutiny non-political? How did minority parties participate? Does the
political balance effect how scrutiny functions?
6. Did Scrutiny make a difference to the lives of the communities and people
you represented?
7. How did Scrutiny effectively engage with people?
8. What is the structure and function of O&S in the new unitary authority?
9. What influence did your Council have on this?
10. What should be the priorities for scrutiny in the new authority?
11. What part can O&S play in bringing the new Council closer to the
communities they serve?
12.Is there anything else you’d like to add?
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Appendix C
Interview Questions for O&S Leadership
1. How long have you been a Cllr and how long have you been involved in
Scrutiny?
2. How would you describe the function and purpose of Scrutiny?
3. How would you describe the relationship between O&S and the Executive?
4. What do you see your role as a Chair of Scrutiny?
5. How have recommendations made by Scrutiny traditionally been received by
the Executive?
6. How does Scrutiny hold the Executive to account? How is call-in used?
7. How much policy development work is done?
8. What should be the priorities for scrutiny in the new authority?
9. What arrangements have been made for O&S of LAA partners?
10. How has the work programme been determined? How much of it is influenced
by the public’s concerns?
11.Do enough Members participate? What are the barriers to participation? Does
it have adequate support and resources?
12.Is Scrutiny in your authority non-political? Has the political balance of the new
authority affected the way scrutiny operates?
13.Have the minority parties been able to fully participate? What are your views on
sharing Chairs of scrutiny committees?
14.How has unitary status affected the O&S function?
15. Would you go back to the Committee system?
16.Does O&S make a difference to the lives of the communities and people you
represent and serve?
17.What makes scrutiny effective? How do you measure effective scrutiny? Was it
effective before the unitary authority?
18.In a speech (to the NLGN) on Strengthening Local Democracy the Minister
John Denham said that “scrutiny is a lion that has failed to roar.” What is your
view of that statement?
19.Is there anything else you’d like to add?
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Appendix D
Interview questions for Chief Officers
1. How long have you been Chief Executive here (or elsewhere)?
2. How do you see as your role within the authority?
3. How would you describe the function and purpose of Overview and Scrutiny?
4. How would you describe the relationship between yourself, O&S and the
Executive?
5. When you receive a report from O&S what do you look for in the
recommendations?
6. Is O&S effective at holding the Executive to account? What is your view on
call-in as a way of holding to account?
7. What value do you place on O&S policy development work?
8. What should be the priorities for scrutiny in the new authority?
9. What has been the involvement of the senior Managers in suggesting topics for
the O&S work programme?
10.What is your view of O&S possible role in scrutiny of LAA partners and being
involved in CAA?
11.What is your view on how this authority engages with the public?
12.From your perspective does O&S appear to be non-political? Has the political
balance of the new authority affected the way scrutiny operates?
13.Does O&S make a difference?
14.What makes scrutiny effective? How do you measure effective scrutiny? Was it
effective before the unitary authority?
15.In a speech (to the NLGN) on Strengthening Local Democracy the Minister
John Denham said that “scrutiny is a lion that has failed to roar.” What is your
view of that statement?
16.Is there anything else you’d like to add?
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Appendix E
Interview questions for Leadership
1. How long have you been a Cllr and how long have you been Leader?
2. How do you see the role of leader?
3. How would you describe the function and purpose of Overview and Scrutiny?
4. How would you describe the relationship between O&S and the Executive?
5. When you receive a report from O&S what do you look for in the
recommendations?
6. Is O&S effective at holding the Executive to account? What is your view on
call-in as a way of holding to account?
7. What value do you place on O&S policy development work?
8. What should be the priorities for scrutiny in the new authority?
9. What is your view of O&S possible role in scrutiny of LAA partners and being
involved in CAA?
10.What has been the Executives involvement in suggesting topics for the O&S
work programme? How much of it is influenced by the public’s concerns?
11.From your perspective does O&S appear to be non-political? Has the political
balance of the new authority affected the way scrutiny operates?
12.Does O&S make a difference to the lives of the communities and people you
represent and serve?
13.What makes scrutiny effective? How do you measure effective scrutiny? Was it
effective before the unitary authority?
14.In a speech (to the NLGN) on Strengthening Local Democracy the Minister
John Denham said that “scrutiny is a lion that has failed to roar.” What is your
view of that statement?
15.Is there anything else you’d like to add?
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Appendix F
Interview Questions for O&S Management
1. How long have you been O&S Manager, what tier are you and who do you
report to? Do you have parity of esteem with the Executive and other Officers?
2. How would you describe the purpose of Overview and Scrutiny? What do you
see as your role as O&S Manager?
3. How have Members and Officers been involved in developing the O&S function
for the unitary authority?
4. What steps has the unitary authority taken to preserve the work of the District
O&S? E.g. have you collated their reports?
5. What difference did an election before going unitary make to the development
of the new scrutiny function? (Authority B and C)
6. What difference did an election after going unitary make to the development of
the new scrutiny function? (Authority A and D)
7. How many new or inexperienced Members were elected? Has there been an
increase in the number of Members involved in O&S? Has the culture of O&S
significantly changed?
8. Does the political balance of the new authority affected the way scrutiny
operates? From your perspective is O&S non-political?
9. Please describe how the work programme for O&S is developed? What is the
authority’s criteria for an issue to be added to the work programme?
10.Do the public have direct involvement in developing and participating in the
work programme?
11.Is there a balance between overview (policy development) and scrutiny
(holding to account)? Or do you do more of one than the other?
12.Is O&S effective at holding the Executive to account? How would you describe
the relationship between O&S and the Executive?
13.What provisions is O&S making for scrutiny of LAA partners, petitions and
CCfA? How will this impact on Member and Officer capacity?
14.Has they been an increase in Officer and financial resources to deal with the
increased work load?
15.Is there a danger that the unitary authority will focus on the big strategic issues
to the detriment of local concerns?
16.How do you see the relationship between O&S and the area boards/local
community boards/ partnerships?
17.What makes scrutiny effective? How do you measure effective scrutiny? Was it
effective before the unitary authority?
18.In a speech (to the NLGN) on Strengthening Local Democracy the Minister
John Denham said that “scrutiny is a lion that has failed to roar.” What is your
view of that statement?
19.Is there anything else you’d like to add?
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Appendix G
O&S Manager Survey
1. Do you have a dedicated O&S Team?
a. If yes, how many?
b. What are their roles?
c. What experienced do they have of O&S?
d. If no, who provides Officer support?
2. In what tier of management is O&S and in which
service/department?
3. Are there Link Officers between O&S and the other
services/departments? If yes, at what tier?
4. Who is the monitoring Officer for O&S?
5. Briefly describe your O&S structure (i.e. how many committees, what
themes are they related to?)
6. How are Chairs and vice Chairs of O&S committees determined?
7. Are there any opposition Members Chairs or vice Chairs of O&S
committees?
8. What are the criteria/rules for call-in?
9. Please describe the O&S training you offer to Members?
10.Do you have a discretionary budget for O&S? If so how much?
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